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 Tomas Tranströmer, The Half-Finished Heaven 
- vii - 
Abstract 
Amongst the reforms altering the European railway industry in the last two 
decades, the new provisions on rail (or transport) regulators’ renovated 
powers and independence have been little analysed by the literature. This 
study aims to quantitatively determine the impact of economic regulation on 
European railways efficiency and qualitatively identify the role of rail 
regulators across Europe. 
The quantitative analysis considers a sample of European railway systems 
for the period 2002-2010, and measures economic regulation by employing 
a purposely developed index rather than dummy variables, as widely utilised 
by previous literature. The findings differ depending on the way outputs are 
measured, with regulation producing cost reductions either when combined 
with vertical separation or when accompanied by competition. However, the 
combined impact of vertical separation and average levels of regulation only 
reduces costs when train density is below the sample mean. 
The qualitative analysis is based on the design of a questionnaire on rail 
regulation, collecting first-hand evidence from 20 regulators, infrastructure 
managers and railway operators across Europe. The questions take into 
account the findings of a specific literature review on a set of ideal 
characteristics germane to regulators in railways and comparable industries. 
Regulators seem to have achieved the necessary requirements in order to 
effectively operate. Independence is guaranteed on paper and in action, 
high levels of transparency render regulators accountable, and when 
intervention is requested, their responses appear prompt. On the other 
hand, the approval of track access charging schemes, together with the 
monitoring of the efficiency and quality of the infrastructure managers’ 
performances, only at times fully involves the regulators. 
Overall, from both analyses a complex scenario emerges, wherein strong 
economic regulation produces greater benefits in lightly dense contexts and 
when accompanied by vertical separation and effective competition. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1  Aims and objectives of the thesis 
This thesis aims to investigate the impacts produced by economic regulation 
on the efficiency levels of European railway systems. This represents a gap 
in the literature on the impacts of European railway reforms, in which little 
attention has been dedicated to the identification and measurement of the 
impacts produced by economic regulation on railway efficiency. Filling this 
gap implies complementing the related literature strand with new and 
updated results on the effects of the structure, regulation and competition of 
railways. Quantitative and qualitative analyses have been performed in order 
to reach this aim. In particular, the interrelated studies of econometric 
estimations and responses to a specifically developed questionnaire 
represent the backbone of this work. The choice of carrying out these 
activities naturally arises from pursuing the following objectives: 
i.Defining what an ideal rail regulator should look like, by tracing the related 
ideal characteristics in the literature; 
ii.Examining the role played by regulators based on the literature review on 
ideal rail regulator characteristics and on the responses to a new survey 
involving the actors in the European railway industry (regulators, 
infrastructure managers and railway undertakings) from whom first-hand 
evidence is collected; 
iii.Constructing a newly developed regulation index able to account for the 
multi-faceted characteristics of regulatory activities in railways; 
iv.Employing this regulation index as a variable for econometric estimations 
based on a railway total cost model, in order to highlight the quantitative 
effects of economic regulation on a railway system’s cost efficiency; 
v.Clarifying the interdependencies between economic regulation, structure and 
competition in their impacts on a railway system in terms of overall effects on 
cost efficiency. 
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1.2  Context and background 
Over the last decades the European railway industry has been reshaped by 
several reforms which have impacted on preeminent aspects such as the 
financial and organisational structure of railways and the way operators can 
compete both nationally and continentally. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
these reforms were considered much needed as a consequence of a 
growing sectorial decline, generated by multiple problems. Among the 
others, the fierce intermodal competition produced by road and air modes, 
the financial strain on public budgets determined by highly subsidised and 
inefficient national incumbents, and the necessity to strongly invest in a 
deteriorating infrastructure all represented impelling incentives that the 
European Commission in particular exploited in order to gradually, yet 
deeply, reform the railway industry. 
The general aims of these reforms envisaged diverse effects, some of which 
are yet to be fully realised. Promoting competition and contestability in the 
industry was intended to allow the presence, or at least the threat, of new 
and potentially more efficient operators in the railway arena, both for freight 
and passenger services, and both at national and international levels. To 
foster this, structural reforms were planned too, for the purpose of 
streamlining the organisations and pushing towards a separation between 
the infrastructure managers and railway operators, deemed as necessary to 
disentangle discriminatory webs and release competitive forces. Economic 
regulation was also under scrutiny, in particular in relation to the design of 
continental standards for important aspects such as access, charges, safety 
and interoperability. These effects, attempting to conform to the European 
Union (EU) fundamental principle of allowing free movement of persons and 
goods in the European area, prefigured the end of a system denoted by 
separated national railways, while favouring the creation of a system based 
on a shared continental market. 
The implementation of these railway reforms has been widely and deeply 
studied by different authors in terms of their impacts on factors such as 
demand, efficiency and modal share. A number of literature strands have 
enjoyed great attention: among these, the effects of interventions linked to 
liberalisation, privatisation and structural re-organisation have been 
scrutinised producing, at times, opposing results (van de Velde et al., 2012). 
This thesis will instead pursue a strand only slightly examined by past 
literature, namely the effects produced by the reforms involving economic 
regulation on the efficiency levels attained by European railways. The way 
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the railway markets are now regulated and the role played by, in most cases, 
recently established railway regulators represent an area deserving accurate 
analysis for the following principal reasons. Firstly, economic regulation 
reforms have been designed in order to intervene in significant areas which 
may greatly affect railway costs, such as promoting competition and tackling 
discriminatory practices linked to, for instance, the access to and the 
charging of railway services. Secondly, structural innovations have 
determined the necessity to better monitor the operations performed by the 
infrastructure managers. Indeed, the renovating spirit of this modern railway 
era seems particularly concerned with a greater focus on a more efficient 
use of public resources destined to the management of the network. Thirdly, 
the previous reasons have led to, depending on the various systems, the 
introduction or the empowerment of regulatory bodies within the railway 
systems, enabled to investigate and independently decide on railway 
matters. As a consequence of these factors, there exists the need to verify 
whether the reforms on economic regulations have produced beneficial 
effects on railway efficiency, attempting to answers questions such as: How 
is economic regulation impacting on European railways efficiency? What is 
the role played by railway regulators in this? How are they dealing with 
discrimination and competition issues? Are infrastructure managers 
adequately monitored? Is the role played by these regulators relevant within 
the overall railway governances? This work will attempt to provide answers 
to these questions by following the structure delineated in the next 
paragraph. 
1.3  Thesis structure 
This thesis consists of 8 chapters. After the introductive Chapter 1, Chapter 
2 will review the railway reforms implemented in Europe in the last decades. 
These will be illustrated in chronological order, starting from the earlier and 
pioneering interventions in the 1990s, and moving onto the description of 
more recent and organic interventions, namely the Three Railway Packages, 
the Recast of the First Railway Package and the proposal for a Fourth 
Railway Package. A deep review of the literature on the impacts of railway 
reforms will follow, dedicating a larger space to efficiency-related studies. 
The high amount of this type of works has produced a vibrant and 
constructive debate on the real impacts of a number of reforms, especially 
related to changeovers involving the competition levels and the structural 
models. Other studies will also be reviewed, in connection with, for instance, 
- 4 - 
subsidisation, transaction costs and modal share. Final considerations will 
be drawn, clarifying also why the analysis on the impacts of economic 
regulation on efficiency is seen as a gap that should be filled. Chapter 3 will 
firstly provide a brief literature review on how economic regulation is 
measured in studies regarding non-railway but comparable industries. On 
the basis of the related findings, the choice of employing a newly developed 
index measuring economic regulation will be proved to be appropriate, rather 
than relying on dummy variables as most studies in railways do. This choice 
will constitute one of the principal novelties connoting the econometric 
estimations of this work. 
Chapter 3 will also present another significant literature review seeking for 
what constitutes an ideal rail regulator. While Chapter 2 defines why the 
analysis of the impacts of economic regulation may be enriching, Chapter 3 
highlights why the choice of adopting a regulation index may be fitting, and 
which characteristics best define a railway regulator, thereby enhancing the 
process of measuring regulation. The literature review on the ideal rail 
regulator characteristics will not only help towards benefitting from a well-
built regulation index for econometric estimations, but also shed some light 
on which key areas need to be taken into account when the regulatory 
activities are evaluated. The range is variegated, but indicatively these key 
areas can be distinguished between formal requirements, such as 
independence and autonomy, and substantial operations, such as the 
monitoring of the system efficiency. Selecting these key areas will be 
fundamental in terms of designing the qualitative exercise of this work, 
namely the questionnaire on the role played by European railway regulators. 
This questionnaire will be methodologically introduced in Chapter 4. Here 
the survey will be explored in terms of its constituent questions, deemed to 
be able to deeply investigate how the European rail regulators perform 
against the ideal regulatory characteristics. Also, the addressees of the 
questionnaire will be listed, and the rationale behind the formalisation of two 
versions of the questionnaire explained. Further notes concern the progress 
of the survey and the response rate obtained. 
The responses will be instead analysed in Chapter 5. These will be sub-
divided according to key area, also carefully explaining which actors were 
involved for each enquiry, either regulators or infrastructure managers and 
railway undertakings. In general, findings seem to conform to legislative 
expectations more from a formal point of view rather than from a substantial 
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one, since crucial activities on charging systems and efficiency appear still 
limited for most of the regulators in the sample. 
Moving to the quantitative analysis, Chapter 6 will methodologically describe 
the econometric model chosen for the estimations. Importantly, a section will 
be solely focusing on the construction of the regulation index, based on the 
collection and manipulation of data available from IBM and Kirchner (2002, 
2004, 2007 and 2011). Links with the literature review on ideal rail regulator 
characteristics will be provided, in order to ascertain the extent to which the 
regulation index is able to embrace the key areas outlined by that review. 
The remaining variables will also be described together with the model 
based on a translog total cost function and estimated by using seemingly 
unrelated regressions. 
Chapter 7 will report the econometric results, clustered in two main 
categories. On the one hand, the outcomes for general statistics and 
production-related variables will be illustrated, mostly in line with 
expectations and previous studies’ findings. On the other hand, the policy 
variables will be considered, especially in relation to the interrelated roles 
played by economic regulation, vertical separation and passenger 
competition. 
Lastly, concluding remarks are included in Chapter 8. Novelties and findings 
of the thesis will be summarised, along with suggestions on future research. 
Importantly, policy implications from the qualitative and quantitative analyses 
will be jointly discussed, for the purpose of highlighting the ways economic 
regulation impacts on the level of efficiency of a railway system (econometric 
results) and how this is related to the width of functions allocated to 
regulators (questionnaire responses). In other words, evidence will be 
examined to detect whether economic regulation produces beneficial effects 
on railway efficiency and, if that is the case, whether these effects augment 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review on impacts of railway reforms 
2.1  Introduction 
As illustrated in the initial Chapter, this thesis will primarily concentrate on 
analysing the impacts of reforms on economic regulation upon the efficiency 
levels of European railways. By pursuing this aim, this research would be 
able to complement and enrich a rather wide and prolific literature strand on 
the impacts of railway reforms. In order to appropriately understand where 
this research is placed and how it interrelates with other studies on railway 
reforms, a thorough review of the overall strand appears necessary.  
This Chapter aims to present this literature review, illustrating the principal 
studies therein contained and the reforms upon which the related analyses 
are based. Section 2.2 will illustrate these railway reforms in a chronological 
way, dedicating a greater space to the reforms on economic regulation 
which represent the main object of this thesis. The literature review on the 
impacts of railway reforms will be included in Section 2.3, subdividing the 
studies on efficiency (Section 2.3.1) and on further profiles (Section 2.3.2). 
Section 2.3.3 will discuss the main limitations and results of the literature. 
Conclusive remarks are included in Section 2.4. 
2.2  Background on legislation of railway reforms 
Multiple European Directives and two Regulations, Four Railway Packages 
(the last of which is not yet implemented) and one Recast (regarding the 
First Railway Package) have shaped the policies defining the modern era for 
European railways. It is useful to distinguish between the early and more 
recent legislation. In the 1990s a start was made on structural unbundling 
and on setting the rules for participation in rail industry. However, it is only 
post-2000 that Three legislative Railway Packages built on this earlier 
progress, to liberalise entry into the freight and international passenger 
sectors and to set clear rules regarding structural unbundling, safety and 
regulation. On regulation, major changes importantly came about with the 
Recast of the First Railway Package. These legislative developments are 
explained in more detail below. 
The first relevant piece of legislation was the Council Directive 91/440/EEC 
which inaugurated the reforms by promoting accounting separation between 
transport services and infrastructure managers, insisting particularly on the 
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managerial independence and on the financial restructuring of the former 
actors. The criteria for opening up markets to competition were then refined 
by Council Directives 95/18/EC and 95/19/EC which, respectively, indicated 
procedures for licensing, network allocation and charges for those railway 
undertakings involved in international combined transport of goods and 
international groupings. This first legislative impulse was completed with 
provisions in 1996 on the interoperability of the trans-European high-speed 
rail system (Council Directive 96/48/EC).  
Moving to the most recent legislation, the new decade (post-2000) saw the 
promulgation of Three Railway Packages expanding the liberalisation 
processes and detailing their founding conditions, continuing on the paths 
pursued by the above Directives. The First Railway Package (European 
Parliament and Council Directives 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 
2001/14/EC, “First Railway Package” hereafter) envisaged organisational 
and accounting separation at the vertical level (that is, between 
infrastructure and train operations) and accounting separation at the 
horizontal one (that is, between passenger and freight operations). It also 
legislated on the validity of licences within the EU and on the requirement of 
safety certificates for rolling stock, revised the tasks and activities of the 
infrastructure managers, and prefigured the establishment of independent 
regulators. With the Second Railway Package (European Parliament and 
Council Directives 2004/49/EC, 2004/50/EC and 2004/51/EC, and European 
Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No.881/2004, “Second Railway 
Package” hereafter), the focus shifted mainly to safety and interoperability 
recommendations (among the others, the creation of the European Railway 
Agency) and, in terms of market openness, on the possibility for international 
(from 2006) and all remaining types (from 2007) of freight companies to 
access the whole European network. Lastly, competition in international 
passenger services as of 2010 was introduced through the Third Railway 
Package (European Parliament and Council Directives 2007/58/EC and 
2007/59/EC, and European Parliament and Council Regulations (EC) Nos. 
1370/2007, 1371/2007 and 1372/2007, “Third Railway Package” hereafter), 
approving also quality standards for this operational segment. 
An important legislative breakthrough was formalised in 2012 with the 
Recast of the First Railway Package (European Parliament and Council 
Directive 2012/34/EC, “Recast” hereafter), aimed to address issues in major 
aspects affecting the European rail market. Firstly, difficulties of new 
entrants gaining access to the market and the consequent protection of 
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incumbents’ positions led to a low level of competition. Secondly, the 
monitoring activities exerted by national authorities were argued to be 
inadequate as, in most cases, deficiencies in autonomy, competences and 
powers had surfaced. Thirdly, the declining quality of railway infrastructure 
due to limited funds and investments (public and private) affected several 
European Union countries. Lastly, the incorporation of regulatory functions 
within ministerial bodies was considered a problem in terms of lack of 
necessary independence and inability to pursue non-discriminatory actions 
and monitoring of the quality and efficiency of infrastructure managers’ 
performances. The latter point is important since governments may wish to 
restrict funding to railways because of fiscal constraints, and therefore an 
independent regulator may play a key role in ensuring sufficient funds are 
provided in order to realise the benefits of the reforms. 
This Recast was particularly significant in respect of its introduction of 
specific measures designed for the regulatory authorities. With regards to 
their competences, these were planned to be more extensive in order to 
include aspects concerning the access to and charging for railway services, 
considered to be fundamental for incentivising market entry and preserving 
fair competition (Article 56). Importantly, as noted above, the independence 
of these bodies was reinforced, requiring their autonomy from public entities 
which may pressurise their decisions, and ensuring that regulators were no 
longer residing within transport ministries (Article 55). Thus regulators, 
through this legislation, are now required to be independent of both 
government bodies and railway undertakings. In addition, the activities of 
sanctioning, audit, investigation and appeals procedures were strengthened, 
calling for greater cross-border collaboration too (Article 57).  
Furthermore, supplementary actions highlighted the width of powers that 
these regulatory authorities were accorded. Article 30 opened the possibility 
for the stipulation and management of contracts between these entities and 
network managers, illustrating how the regulators can evaluate the 
adequacy of the amount of funding needed to guarantee the performance of 
the infrastructure for the period of the contract. Moreover, Article 56 
introduced stronger powers for regulators in respect of accounting 
monitoring (relating to conformity with measures in regulatory and separated 
accounting). This confers on the regulators the possibility of requiring 
financial accounts of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings, and 
data on track access charges and financial performance of infrastructure 
managers. However, it should be noted that the legislation allows these 
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activities to be alternatively carried out via a multi-annual contract between 
the infrastructure manager and the government.   
The Recast concludes the review of legislation already approved at 
European level and ratified (already or soon) by the national parliaments. 
Moving to the most recent normative projects, a final step towards the full 
implementation of competition conditions in the European area is made by 
the Fourth Railway Package (COM, (2013) 25, final). In its “market pillar” 
provisionally agreed at European level in 2015, this Package introduces the 
right to access domestic passenger markets (for commercial services from 
2020), and strongly favours “competition for the market” (tendering 
procedures) for public service obligations, which may still be directly 
awarded but only after justifying this choice to the regulator. Further 
interventions concern the expansion of powers on the part of the European 
Railway Agency, in order to shorten the rolling-stock authorisation procedure 
in terms of costs and length, and the preference for separated organisations 
for railway governance, even in vertically integrated companies, aiming to 
avoid discriminatory actions from infrastructure managers. 
These legislative interventions reflect a complex framework characterising 
the regulatory activities in European railway systems. As it will be seen in the 
next Section 2.3, literature preferences focused on other reforming 
measures, mainly concerned with structural re-organisations and market 
liberalisation. Investigating the findings of the principal studies on railway 
reforms will not only provide a review on the overall research progress, but 
also help understanding how this work fills an important gap in this field. 
2.3  Literature review on impacts of railway reforms 
Literature on railway economics has produced many studies attempting to 
assess the impact of the reforms outlined above, whilst reaching diverse 
conclusions. However, these studies have concentrated on changes in 
railway organisation, designed to increase competition thus reducing costs 
and increasing rail market share. Some studies have also taken into account 
the presence of an independent regulator. In the limited number of cases 
where this has been done, regulation was measured in a simple way 
(through dummy variables), not only missing the consideration of further 
aspects related to de jure and de facto independence1, but also failing to 
                                            
1 Hanretty and Koop (2010) produced a relevant study on these aspects. 
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detect the multiple activities and complex remit of the regulatory bodies. One 
reason for the relatively simple treatment of regulation in previous studies 
has been that their focus has been on other aspects of the reforms.  
The overall review on the literature on the impacts of railway reforms is 
subdivided in two parts. The first part (Section 2.3.1) will concern the 
literature covering the impacts of rail reforms (regulatory and other reforms) 
on efficiency, while in the second (Section 2.3.2) a review on the literature 
covering the impacts on further profiles is presented. A discussion of the 
studies is presented in Section 2.3.3, covering the main methodological 
limitations (Section 2.3.3.1) and the differences in results (Section 2.3.3.2). 
The findings and limitations of the studies reviewed are also presented in 
Appendix A. 
2.3.1  Studies on the impacts on efficiency 
In the last decades, European railway systems have been undertaking 
reforms modifying their connotations with a view to achieve some relevant 
objectives, such as higher efficiency, lower restrictions on market access 
and increase in rail modal share, as pursued by the Railway Packages. This 
Section will concentrate on the studies investigating the effects of railway 
reforms on efficiency, around which the analyses of this thesis are centred. 
As significant starting point, the attention can be concentrated on the work 
published by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013). This study considers 30 
European and East Asian railway organisations from 1994 to 2007, but 
important exclusions are indicated, regarding countries such as United 
Kingdom and United States. In order to classify the different organisational 
configurations, the authors define five categories of actors: integrated 
company, railway undertaking (serving both passenger and freight markets), 
passenger operator only, freight operator only, and infrastructure manager.  
Vertical separation is reached when the management of the network and the 
management of operational services are allocated to different independent 
bodies, whereas horizontal separation corresponds to the unbundling 
between passenger and freight operations. Dummies are employed to reflect 
the presence of these structural forms.  
Importantly, the models are distinguished into single-output and multiple-
output specifications. The former presents a measurement aggregating 
passenger and freight outputs along with a hedonic function of the output 
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characteristics, while the latter features disaggregated measurements of the 
two types of service (passenger and freight)2.  
The main outcomes attest how the adoption of vertical and horizontal 
separation produce different consequences. While vertical separation is 
adversely influenced by high levels of train density in terms of producing 
cost-reducing effects, horizontal separation may generate cost-reducing 
effects regardless of other conditions. This is documented by the sign of the 
coefficients for horizontal separation which, across all the models, turn out to 
have strong magnitude and statistical significance. The authors attempt to 
explain this result by highlighting the importance of diseconomies of scope 
between passenger and freight activities, together with the decrease in 
episodes of subsidisation destined to passenger segments, typically 
benefitting from these contributions.   
On the other hand, vertical separation as such plays a cost-reducing role too 
with strong statistical significance but, as mentioned earlier, when 
considering the cross-term with train density opposing effects are observed. 
This is potentially determined by coordination and transaction costs which 
may be particularly high in those circumstances where greater levels of 
traffic or congestion, for example, force a more substantial use of resources 
to conclude agreements between counterparts. In these cases, the 
specialisation advantages deriving from vertical unbundling appear to be 
neutralised.  
Lastly, interesting suggestions for future research on vertical separation 
effects are indicated. In particular, the authors underline the relevance of the 
analysis on the different typologies of vertical separation, along with the 
detection of its indirect effects ascribable to general competitive conditions. 
                                            
2 In particular, output is measured by: 
 Total number of train km aggregating both types of service for the single-
output model, together with passenger revenue share, load factor of 
passenger service, passenger travel length and number of freight cars 
per train as hedonic output characteristics; 
 Revenue passenger km and revenue tonne km for the multiple-output 
model. 
The total cost function in both models also comprises: labour, energy (fuel), 
material and capital prices. In addition, the models include these 
environmental variables: network (total route length); technology 
(percentage of electrified lines); and train density (obtained by dividing 
the number of train km by the total length of a railway and, in turn, by 
365 to allow for daily measurements). 
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This work was subsequently updated by two studies which determined an 
important breakthrough in the overall literature strand. The first contribution 
is the comprehensive report produced by van de Velde et al. (2012), 
providing quali-quantitative findings building on an enhanced version of the 
dataset utilised by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013). The analytical novelties 
introduced by this study emerge firstly in relation to the extension of the 
temporal interval, now from 1994 to 2010. This new data was obtained 
thanks to involvement of the members of the Community of European 
Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER), which also had the possibility 
of correcting old data. Secondly, United Kingdom is importantly included in 
the sample: its exclusion represents a major drawback for the majority of 
previous papers. Thirdly, numerous test variables are defined in order to 
take into account the whole range of organisational approaches that can be 
implemented in a particular railway system: namely, vertical integration, 
vertical and horizontal separation, holding company and essential functions 
separation. These characteristics may denote this report as paradigmatic in 
respect to the topics covered and instruments employed, providing at the 
same time updated results on the effects of structural and liberalisation 
reforms. The results show that vertical separation generates positive effects 
on efficiency when train density and the share of revenues produced by 
freight traffic are low, whereas horizontal unbundling and holding model 
appear to reduce costs independently of other factors. Surprisingly, 
competition does not significantly affect the abatement of costs, underlining 
a potential limitation of the analysis due to the lack of precision concerning 
the attribution of this factor’s impacts. In addition, horizontal separation 
advantages are described as partly produced by the sale of freight services, 
a benefit not strictly connected with the inner functioning of this structural 
reform. Another shortcoming may arise with regards to the computation of 
train density for each country, which is measured by using the sample mean 
when, in actual circumstances, this factor can greatly differ across regions. 
Similar results are presented in the second updating contribution by Mizutani 
et al. (2014), wherein holding company, vertical separation and vertical 
integration are compared in terms of their effects on costs. In particular, 
taking into account holding company represents a significant novelty in the 
literature. Findings suggest that high levels of density and high proportion of 
freight transport on the network negatively affect the capability for vertical 
separation to reduce costs. Therefore, differences in individual railway 
systems need to be carefully considered, and a sole recipe may not be valid 
given the diversity of European railways. Free choice should then be 
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ensured for individual countries, especially in light of future market 
developments that would potentially determine an increase both in traffic - 
thus rendering vertical separation less convenient - and in new entrants’ 
share - thus making holding company less appealing -.  
These studies’ findings manifest a stronger cost-reducing role played by 
horizontal separation rather than vertical separation, highlighted as well in 
the articles by Cantos et al. (2011) and Cantos et al. (2012) Therein, the 
interconnections between the two typologies of unbundling are scrutinised 
and evaluated to be beneficial. 
In the first study (Cantos et al., 2011), data refers to 16 countries’ railway 
industries over a long period (1985-2005) and is analysed by means of non-
parametric methods (data envelopment analysis and Malmquist index). 
Passenger km and tonne km measure the outputs, whereas number of 
employees, rolling stock size, freight train supply3 and number of km of 
railway network are categorised as inputs. Dummy variables are generated 
to take into account vertical and horizontal separation, as well as openness 
in the freight segments and “competition for the market” in the passenger 
services. Furthermore, control variables are defined to cover aspects that 
might contribute to explain the productivity change4.  
In respect to efficiency and productivity aspects, a noteworthy result can be 
traced in the relevance of the interaction between vertical separation and 
openness of freight market, together with a general positive influence of the 
totality of reforms. On the contrary, tendering methods appear to have 
scarce importance, possibly due to difficulties affecting their design.  
The cross-countries results estimated over time exalt the benefits enjoyed by 
those countries which undertook a full process of separation (vertical and, 
above all, horizontal). These railway systems achieved the best 
performances in terms of efficiency, technical progress and productivity 
(namely, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark). In particular, 
technical growth is highlighted as the factor mostly contributing to the 
increase in productivity.  
                                            
3 This corresponds to the annual fleet wagons strength for freight transport. 
4 These are: 
 percentage of passenger train km of the total train km; 
 quotient of the total number of train km and the number of km of track; 
 average passenger occupation per train unit; 
 average freight occupation per train unit. 
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Other relevant outcomes are the advantages created by the adoption of 
horizontal separation together with vertical separation, since solely 
implementing horizontal unbundling might generate lower performances for 
efficiency and productivity. Additionally, positive effects on productivity levels 
seem to be generated for those railway services with higher traffic density 
and occupation.  
Technical change is also investigated, finding that vertical separation, when 
accompanied by tendering procedures, appears to promote this factor. 
Stronger technical progress is also achieved when horizontal separation is 
complemented by vertical separation, similarly to the results for efficiency 
and productivity. 
As a conclusive note, the authors stress that accounting for the trends of a 
particular country does not modify the qualitative results obtained. From a 
policy point of view, the study appears to indicate that vertical separation 
might produce positive consequences with a view to the potential 
introduction of horizontal unbundling. Nonetheless these structural reforms 
had only been enforced in the years immediately preceding this study, 
leaving space for further research which could observe the performances of 
these measures on a longer period of time.  
Slightly different policy implications surface in Cantos et al. (2012). This work 
is based on the econometric analysis of 23 European railway systems for the 
period 2001-2008. Passenger km and tonne km transported are chosen to 
measure the output side, whilst the input side consists of the number of 
employees in the sector, the rolling stock size5 and the number of km of the 
railway infrastructure. In relation to the organisational structure of the railway 
market, dummy variables are employed with regards to vertical separation, 
competition in the freight routes, and liberalisation in the passenger 
segments in the form of tendering procedures.  
Emerging from this study is the favour conceded to the combined 
enforcement of vertical and horizontal separation, potentially leading to 
improvements in efficiency. Comparing the results produced by the adoption 
of data envelopment analysis and two-step stochastic frontier analysis, the 
latter method gives account of relatively smaller levels of efficiency. 
However, when considering a ranking perspective, consistency emerges 
between the two approaches. More specifically, vertical separation appears 
                                            
5 This results from the number of available coaches, railcars, locomotives, 
wagons and multiple-unit trailers. 
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to produce little effects on efficiency, which instead turns out to be positively 
influenced by strong competition for passenger and freight services.  
These outcomes are altered when a further variable is introduced, namely 
the dummy describing the implementation of the full reforming package. 
Strong emphasis is placed onto implementing the totality of reforms (vertical 
separation, “competition for the market” in the passenger sector and 
“competition in the market” for the freight sector), indicating how such an 
intervention might produce positive consequences on efficiency, possibly 
generated by the complementarities gained.  
Overall, these two last studies underscore the benefits attainable from the 
enforcement of a complete process of separation or an even broader 
reforming package. Advantageous seems the implementation of vertical 
unbundling, which may exert conditions of ease with a view to the 
implementation of horizontal separation. Friebel et al. (2010) develop 
another notable work in this path, documenting the gains that a gradual 
application of a number of reforms may yield - referring to both vertical and 
horizontal separation, liberalisation of markets and presence of independent 
regulator -, in opposition to the disadvantages that a simultaneous adoption 
may cause. Similarly, Wetzel (2008) illustrates as inadequate the 
configuration emerging from an incomplete implementation of the totality of 
reforms. 
Concentrating the attention firstly on the work by Friebel et al. (2010), a long 
interval is here taken into account (1980-2003), investigating the railway 
industries of 11 EU countries. Output is measured by passenger km and 
freight tonne km variables. Inputs are based on capital and physical 
elements, such as network (labour and land), additional labour and rolling 
stock. Moreover, deregulation aspects are accounted for by specific dummy 
variables, designed according to the number of reforms and to their temporal 
employment. 
The estimates show a positive relationship between the regulatory 
interventions and the efficiency levels, provided that these are implemented 
gradually, since their simultaneous application might bring about negative 
performances.  
Data unavailability constitutes a problem for this work too. Data for United 
Kingdom is not complete6 and therefore not enclosed in most of the 
                                            
6 In particular, staff data for the period from 1995 to 2003. 
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regressions in the study. Further limitations concern the lack of control for 
the intensity of subsidisation, rather diverse across the countries, and the 
potential impacts of qualitative factors which are not considered when 
measuring the railway outputs.  
In Wetzel (2008), the sample includes 31 railway firms from 22 European 
countries observed for the period 1994-2005, and the econometric 
methodology consists of a stochastic frontier analysis. A multi-output 
distance function panel model accounts for elements related to regulation, 
specific features of countries and companies, as well as temporal trends. 
Inputs here considered are the number of employees (annual mean), 
number of rolling stock and network length (in km), whereas outputs are 
measured by passenger km and freight tonne km. Exogenous aspects are 
also examined, with regards to specific characteristics of the companies7 
and countries8. 
Observing firstly the environmental variables, efficiency might be negatively 
affected by higher degrees of network and population density, whereas a 
wide presence of electrified lines might foster it. Moreover, from a macro-
regional point of view, worse results are reported in Eastern Europe.  
As for policy variables, a more efficient configuration might be reached when 
openness in the domestic freight market and an independent body for 
regulatory issues are present, whilst negative outcomes may emerge from 
liberalisation in international services and in domestic passenger markets.  
The author provides explanations to justify the results on environmental and 
policy variables: 
 The construction of electrified lines may generate a reduction in costs, 
determined by lower maintenance and coordination expenses; 
 High density levels for population (and consequently customers 
utilising passenger transport in the same area) and network might provoke 
greater expenditures in connection with the management of routes; 
                                            
7 These are: network density (network length in km per square area km) and 
electrified lines (percentage of electrified lines in the total network 
length). 
8 These are: gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and population 
density. Also, a dummy variable is created in order to account for the 
differences between European macro-areas (West and East). 
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 Delay in Eastern Europe might be caused by the economic and 
technological reforms yet to be completed by the countries in this area; 
 International services might be affected by difficulties regarding the 
cross-border activities, whilst the domestic passenger segment might suffer 
from more acute problems for journeys schedule and ticket clearing system 
than the freight one9. 
In respect to separation variables, the results are inconclusive, since the 
effects produced by these structural reforms mostly depend on the method 
of categorisation of the individual countries. Relevantly, those Western 
European companies affected by the worst performances in efficiency only 
adopted a few reforms (accounting separation and international access), 
indicating that the incomplete implementation of a reforming package might 
produce an unsatisfactory scenario.  
Limitations affect this paper as well in terms of missing data, forcing the total 
or partial exclusion of the British, Danish, Dutch, Swedish and Estonian 
systems from the sample. Another technical difficulty, shared by Friebel et 
al. (2010), pertains to the distinction between actual and formal approval of 
the measures: the latter aspect is where the examination focuses on in these 
studies, determining results which are thereby affected by this temporal 
discrepancy. 
Another reform deserving attention is the accounting separation between 
companies operating in network management and rail operations. This 
measure was analytically examined by Asmild et al. (2009). In this article, 23 
European countries are observed for the period 1995-2001 in order to 
identify the impact of railway reforms through multi-directional efficiency 
analysis. The data is pooled to construct one common frontier, through 
which the authors can directly compare efficiencies, assuming that relative 
changeovers are only due to legislative innovations. Inputs are divided into 
discretionary (labour and material10) and non-discretionary (network 
length11), while outputs are measured by passenger train km and freight train 
km. In relation to dummy variables, five different policy indicators are 
introduced, reflecting accounting separation, complete separation, 
                                            
9 The author notes that a stronger level of competition might offset these 
disadvantages. 
10 Capital and rolling stock are not enclosed due to data unavailability and 
accounting difficulties. 
11 Since network length, at least in the short-term, is not considered a 
decision parameter. 
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independent management, competitive tendering for passenger service, and 
market opening for freight transport.  
Efficiency levels are argued to be increased by the reforms, especially in 
connection with accounting separation which might produce better results in 
reducing costs pertaining to both staff and material, affected only individually 
by other types of measures. As partial limitation, data was unobtainable for 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania which were therefore not enclosed 
in the sample. 
Based on different interpretative standpoints, other authors investigate the 
reforms’ impacts concluding that, especially in relation to vertical separation, 
disadvantageous effects in efficiency are produced. Therefore, discernible 
divergences surface in contrast with the policy implications highlighted by 
the previously reviewed works. Growitsch and Wetzel (2009), Jensen and 
Stelling (2007) and Merkert et al. (2012), albeit presenting dissimilar 
observations on the size of the impact, find vertical separation generating 
pejorative effects on efficiency. This negative impact contrasts with the 
benefits generated by other factors, such as deregulation interventions 
(Jensen and Stelling, 2007) and economies of scope (Growitsch and Wetzel, 
2009). 
The study by Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) analyses 54 railway companies 
from 27 European countries observed over the period from 2000 to 2004. 
Methodologically, the study is centred on a two-stage data envelopment 
analysis employing non-parametric and super-efficiency models. Outputs are 
measured by using train km (networks managers), passenger km 
(passenger rail operators) and tonne km (freight rail firms). Inputs are 
examined in two different analytical models, respectively including only 
physical measures, and monetary and physical measures at the same 
time12. For vertically separated contexts, the construction of “virtually” 
integrated companies conglomerates the data ascribable to every network 
manager with every railway operator (passenger and freight ones).  
The two models, accounting for physical and monetary inputs, show that the 
majority of the actors in the sample present economies of scope; in 
particular, better performances are reported in the “monetary” model. 
                                            
12 Input variables are: number of employees, number of rolling stock, and 
network length. The first two variables are then replaced with the 
operating expenditure in the second model. 
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Significantly, the authors conclude that, on average, the integrated 
companies are more efficient than the “virtually” integrated companies.  
Following the ranking established by the Rail Liberalisation Index Report 
(IBM Business Consulting Services and Kirchner, 2004), patterns are also 
identified. Railway markets in Spain, Greece and Ireland show the worst 
results in terms of liberalisation, and their integrated railway firms suffer from 
diseconomies of scope and low levels of efficiency. On the contrary, 
integrated railway firms acting in more liberalised markets (Germany, Italy 
and Switzerland) enjoy stronger performance, gaining in productivity thanks 
to economies of scope. Nonetheless, this outcome does not seem consistent 
since some countries with little rail liberalisation still enjoy economies of 
scope, highlighting the relevance of other factors such as privatisation, 
competitive experience, and rail modal share. 
Future research paths are indicated, particularly related to investigating 
which directions the impact of the economies of scope takes, either vertical 
(network manager and rail operators) or horizontal (passenger and freight 
services), or both. Equally important might be to consider the significance of 
aspects inherent in railway quality and safety which commonly impact the 
structure of costs. 
The analysis provided by Jensen and Stelling (2007) is based on a 
longitudinal econometric approach which takes into account annual data 
included in the period 1970-1999 for the Swedish incumbent Statens 
Järnvägar (SJ) and the set of remaining operators in this national market. 
Outputs are measured by passenger km and freight tonne km. For inputs, 
the authors exclude the depreciation of rolling stock and infrastructure 
expenses, thereby only considering aspects linked to operating, 
maintenance, administrative and marketing areas.  
Vertical separation is argued to negatively impact on the efficiency level, 
whereas stronger competition generates an opposite outcome. Overall, the 
effect of deregulation appears to bring about a higher amount of benefits 
rather than disadvantages. The negative effects of vertical separation might 
be provoked by the rise in short-term costs due to restructuring necessities, 
as well as by long-run modifications of the cost structure. Moreover, lower 
efficiency might be linked to increased transaction costs and the sub-
optimising conditions deriving from the unbundling process. 
In relation to model limitations, it may be noteworthy to underline that cost 
data for some new small operators was not obtainable, determining the 
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exclusion of these actors from the dataset when approximations were not 
possible. 
In Merkert et al. (2012), transaction costs are analysed in respect to the 
implementation of vertical separation in three countries: United Kingdom, 
Germany and Sweden. The sample includes 42 railway undertakings, 
observed during the year 2007. The sample is analysed thanks to a bottom-
up method which, by detecting the particular interfaces where transaction 
costs arise, thereby permits their individual quantifications. This 
measurement not only covers the effective time spent by staff to reach a 
particular agreement, but also identifies the operating divisions involved in 
the transaction within the macro-area “infrastructure managers-rail 
operators”. 
Overall results show that transaction costs caused by vertical unbundling 
allow for only about 2-3% of total costs, highlighting the possibility for this 
organisational structure to induce competitive benefits able to more than 
counter its negative impacts. This quantification does not account for costs 
incurred by network managers and railway operators in their relationships 
with regulatory bodies, even though the authors suggest that the related 
computation would alter only slightly the total transaction costs.  
Looking at the measurements computed for each country, Germany seems 
to enjoy the most efficient configuration. Nevertheless, an overarching vision 
is necessary in order to consider parent company support and regulatory 
expenditures which might modify the ranking’s positions, depending on the 
level of financial interconnections within the German holding model.  
Some operators’ data turned out to be unavailable, even though their 
absence does not corrode the integrity of the sample, which is deemed to be 
adequately representative of the countries’ systems. In addition, a 
methodological limitation affecting the bottom-up process is its inability to 
take into account different interfaces13, as well as to distinguish between the 
costs for the monitoring of performances and the costs due to specific 
interconnections between network bodies and railway companies.  
Further elements are highlighted. The effects of vertical unbundling on the 
overall efficiency levels might be considerable due to, for instance, 
restructuring costs. Moreover, the advantages of competition, if stimulated, 
need to be considered. Lastly, transaction costs should be monitored at 
                                            
13 For example, in relation to rolling stock manufacturers. 
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regular intervals in order to ascertain whether notable modifications have 
occurred with regards to their amount and significance. 
Costs incurred while completing transaction activities are scrutinised in 
Merkert (2012) as well. Herein 46 undertakings across Sweden, Germany 
and Great Britain railways are analysed by means of a top-down approach. 
Transaction costs appear to only slightly affect the total operating costs 
when vertical separation is enforced, suggesting that this structural reform, if 
accompanied by competition, may offset the rise in costs by stimulating even 
slight benefits. This is attested by the finding on low transaction costs, which 
are on average around 10% of the total operating costs for the analysed 
companies.  
The German holding model appears to have the lowest transaction costs, 
even though in that system greater parent support needs to be taken into 
account. Overall, the author suggests that the analysis may be valid for other 
European and non-European railway systems, provided they rely on the 
same structural forms considered by the study, namely holding model and 
vertical separation. The other form, separation of key powers, is less 
diffused around Europe and would presumably produce even smaller 
transactions costs, as characterised by smaller fragmentation than the fully 
separated model. 
Supplementary research is suggested by stimulating the investigation of, for 
instance, the effective impact of labour on the level of transaction costs, the 
interface between network manager and rail operator, the characteristics of 
the decision-making process, and other typologies of cost, such as 
opportunity costs, incremental costs, one-off separation costs and risk costs. 
2.3.2  Studies on the impacts on profiles different from efficiency 
Shifting the attention on studies with analytical objectives different from 
efficiency, it may be particularly noteworthy to review the works by: 
 Drew and Nash (2011) on traffic growth and competitive conditions; 
 Preston and Robins (2013) on welfare effects; 
 Drew (2009) on the freight segment. 
The work by Drew and Nash (2011) importantly highlights the significance of 
the institutional, regulatory and financial conditions characterising the railway 
systems. The analysed countries belong to the EU, and are analysed 
separately both in terms of membership to EU 15 or to EU 12, and in terms 
of the size of their railway systems.  
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On rail freight, results give account of no correlation between vertical 
separation and greater competition, increased traffic and stronger modal 
share. This is implied by the smaller number of licences issued and slower 
pace associated with freight market growth observed when vertical 
separation is in place. Stronger results are instead detected in respect to the 
passenger segment, but this is indicated not to be ascribable to vertical 
separation14. As policy recommendation, the authors illustrate that other 
factors should be assessed when investigating railway reforms, particularly 
referring to: the regulation environment; the financial conditions of the 
incumbent; the existence of services of public interest; and the governmental 
support in infrastructure interventions. This wider approach may allow 
identifying the quantitative elements strictly associated with vertical 
separation, and defining the impacts that this structural reform produces in a 
more isolated way. 
The public control regime on railway companies (network manager and 
operators) is assessed by Preston and Robins (2013), who stress how a 
more rigorous approach in the way the British rail system was monitored 
after the Hatfield accident in 2000 determined negative impacts on welfare. 
Based on the British rail passenger segment, the econometric analysis aims 
to forecast its demand and its components, accounting for - on the inputs 
side - the infrastructure and train operating costs, and - on the outputs side - 
passenger km, real revenue per passenger km, train km. Further variables 
include real GDP and dummies for privatisation, Hatfield accident and 
strikes.  
Vertical and horizontal separation appear to produce disadvantageous 
effects on welfare which, overall, declined after Hatfield accident, when 
public control on network manager and rail operators became stricter. 
Reforms augmented the complexity of the system, producing a rise in costs 
(transaction costs, diseconomies of scale and principal-agent-related costs). 
Also, regulatory failures are pointed out in respect to the low level of 
investments in infrastructure. Limitations are underlined in terms of the 
construction of the counterfactual, which does not capture the increasing 
                                            
14 In particular, growth of passenger traffic and modal share are reported for 
United Kingdom, France and Spain (vertically separated contexts on 
paper). Nonetheless, the authors point out that the British system is 
predominantly based on franchising, allowing for open access 
operations, while the national operators in France and Spain are the sole 
serving the passenger routes. 
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costs in infrastructure operations in the aftermath of privatisation and, above 
all, the Hatfield accident. 
This multi-faceted approach is also emphasised in Drew (2009), in which 
open access and vertical separation are compared by computing the 
respective benefits on customers of freight services. Three virtuous 
countries are taken into account on the basis of the top level of liberalisation 
reached by their freight markets: Germany, Sweden and United Kingdom. In 
particular, the British scenario is analysed more in detail in terms of the 
restructuring process affecting the freight segment.   
Liberalisation, in general, is argued to have produced greater advantages in 
terms of traffic growth in these three countries than what was achieved in 
non-liberalised countries. Vertical separation seems to deliver better 
outcomes for freight customers than open access to market, even though 
the British study (where both measures were enforced) highlights how this 
structural reform might increase other types of cost (such as infrastructure 
and transaction costs).  
In conclusion, the regulatory interventions on railways are described as 
resulting from policy-making processes involving numerous institutional, 
market, scale, scope and technical factors, delineating a complex scenario 
where these aspects may change within the same country. 
2.3.3  Discussion 
This Section provides a discussion of the limitations, results and further 
paths of research that the review of the above studies induces to consider. 
In the first part, the focus will be on the limitations affecting the 
methodological approaches (Section 2.3.3.1), while the second will discuss 
the differences in results (Section 2.3.3.2).  
2.3.3.1  Methodological limitations 
Many studies underscore the difficulties encountered in benefitting from 
correct measurements for inputs and outputs. Mizutani and Uranishi (2013) 
presents a measurement for energy components - energy consumption and 
energy expenditures - which had to resort to fuel consumption data provided 
by Eurostat, partly because of the variety of energy sources utilised 
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(resulting in the employment of the tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE) variable), 
and partly because of the deficiencies affecting the original data source15.  
Also Wetzel (2008) highlights how energy data turned out to be unavailable, 
countering this by assimilating energy to rolling stock, on the basis of their 
close relationship. In relation to the outputs, the choice towards using 
passenger km and freight tonne km is argued to be able to include 
governmental restrictions on capacity allocation into the analysis, 
overcoming the limitations of other measurements (such as passenger train 
km and freight train km). 
The distinction on the measurements of the inputs in the two models 
analysed by Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) - only physical quantifications in 
one model, and both physical and monetary quantifications in the other 
model - leads to some reflections on the benefits and drawbacks 
characterising both approaches. Physical measures do not permit to detect 
the changes in relative factor prices at international level, whilst the 
monetary examination faces issues in respect to different price levels, 
accounting regulations, and currency conversion. Manipulating the financial 
data of operating costs into the purchasing power standard - a common 
currency purposely created - represents the solution adopted by the authors, 
who employ purchasing power parities indicated by Eurostat in order to 
control for currency conversion, differences in price levels and purchasing 
powers of the analysed countries. Counterbalancing these enhancements 
are the problems due to different accounting rules which do not appear to be 
resolved, calling for further analyses able to account for the variety of 
policies implemented in this area. 
Interesting and comprehensive are the explanations presented by Jensen 
and Stelling (2007) with regards to the selection of the cost variables, the 
data adjustments performed, and the construction of an input price index. 
From the operating costs, the authors exclude the depreciation of rolling 
stock and the infrastructure costs, defining this latter element as including 
the totality of costs incurred by the network manager except those for new 
investments and re-investments in railway tracks. Moreover, a list of 
interventions on the quality and quantity of data pertaining to the former 
Swedish monopolist is designed, including: 
                                            
15 The original source is International Railway Statistics, issued yearly by 
International Union of Railways (UIC). Energy expenditures are included 
within material expenditures in UIC data. 
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 Statistical interpolation method used for the purpose of filling the gaps 
for those years in which infrastructure costs are missing; 
 Modifications in the description of investment in tracks and real estate 
which, until 1981, was considered as network operating costs whereas, after 
1981, it became part of the set of investments not inherent in maintenance 
and replacement activities; 
 Tackling the potential presence of “creative accounting” as a 
consequence of the implementation of vertical separation after 1988, which 
might have led to artificial estimation of costs for the new organisation aimed 
to provide better initial conditions. 
Lastly, similarly noteworthy appears the elaboration of an input price index. 
Considering labour, capital and electricity costs, an aggregate index is 
obtained by adding the individual price indices multiplied by weights defining 
the average input cost shares. The growth of the cost shares, for the 
objectives of the work, should result uniform in the temporal interval. Here 
other difficulties potentially arise, in terms of accounting for outsourcing 
activities, reclassification of costs and organisational fragmentation, all of 
which might complicate the calculation of the degree of change. 
Another distinction that might result problematic to define is presented by 
Asmild et al. (2009), when some typologies of infrastructure costs are 
observed (for instance, maintenance) and potentially categorised as variable 
or capital expenditures. In addition, capital or rolling stock is not included in 
the analysis due to the lack of data in the original source16. Besides this, the 
various depreciation rules utilised by the countries under examination 
corroborate this choice. 
In Merkert (2012), the measurement of labour encounters analytical 
burdens. Labour input is indeed based on the estimation of its potential 
capacity, less accurate than the realised capacity, which is however more 
difficult to measure. This does not allow the highest level of accuracy in 
quantifying the key element of this paper, namely the transaction costs. 
As a last contribution on this topic, in van de Velde et al. (2012) some 
difficulties are described in respect to the measures of rolling stock and 
diverging international depreciation rates. With regards to rolling stock, this 
                                            
16 The original source is NERA Economic Consulting. Utilising other datasets 
would have been impracticable according to the authors, as this data 
would have been inconsistent and incompatible with NERA data. 
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variable is calculated as the sum of numbers of vehicles of differing types, 
which however display different characteristics. The authors therefore 
consider that this procedure might negatively affect the computation of 
materials input prices, when rolling stock is selected as denominator. The 
issue on depreciation rates, as previously illustrated for other references, 
represents a common problem in this report as well, even though this is 
indicated to be partially controlled for by including capital input prices in the 
model. 
2.3.3.2  Differences in results 
Remarks concerning the quality of the studies’ results can be presented 
following two main groups: 
 On the one hand, the results on variables intrinsically related to the 
railway reforms; 
 On the other hand, the results on variables not directly connected with 
the railway reforms. 
Illustrating the former group, a relevant breakthrough in the composition of 
the samples is attained by van de Velde et al. (2012) report which removes 
previous works’ shortcomings deriving from the exclusion of United 
Kingdom. This study tackles another problem, by accurately identifying the 
moment of the implementation of the reforms that, in some papers (Wetzel, 
2008 and Friebel et al., 2010), is replaced with the moment of their 
promulgation, generating potentially misleading implications.  
Among individual reforms, difficulties surface when the measurements of 
respective effects turn out to be overlapped, thereby hindering their precise 
quantification, as in van de Velde et al. (2012, particularly for competition), 
Cantos et al. (2011), Friebel et al. (2010). In addition, further directions can 
be undertaken towards deeper analyses on: 
 Vertical separation effects in individual countries - especially in 
relation to those contexts where train density hugely varies across regions 
and traffic from freight services is significant (van de Velde et al., 2012) -; 
 The examination of the relationships arising between railway 
undertakings and infrastructure managers, ranging over transaction costs, 
which should be constantly monitored (Merkert et al., 2012), as well as other 
typologies of cost, as indicated by Merkert (2012).  
Taking into account the latter group on results on variables indirectly 
referable to railway reforms, many authors stress the importance of the 
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inclusion of profiles associated with institutional, regulatory and financial 
conditions. This is particularly meaningful when assessments are needed on 
phenomena of subsidisation (Friebel et al., 2010), on quality and safety 
costs, and on the impact of rail modal share (Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009). 
Similarly, when the intervention of the government is decisive in 
infrastructure operations or in the identification of segments of markets 
aimed to serve public interests (Preston and Robins, 2013 and Drew and 
Nash, 2011), its effects deserve appropriate investigations. 
Lastly, noteworthy is the existence of a pattern based on the relationship 
between the sample and interval selection, and the findings obtained. To 
clarify this, the studies highlighting the disadvantages of vertical separation - 
Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009, and Jensen and Stelling, 2007 – will be firstly 
considered. In the former study, the dataset comprises multiple European 
undertakings and the period of observation is relatively short (2002-2004). 
On the contrary, in the latter study only one system is considered (the 
Swedish one), but more decades are taken into account (1970-1999). A 
more homogenous configuration emerges in respect to those studies which, 
although with important differences and dependent on relevant conditions, 
indicate the impact of vertical separation to be potentially advantageous. For 
instance, the studies by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013), van de Velde et al. 
(2012), Cantos et al. (2011) and Cantos et al. (2012) are characterised by 
rather large samples - oscillating from the 16 EU companies analysed by 
Cantos et al. (2011) to the 33 European and Asian railway systems 
assessed by van de Velde et al. (2012) - and similar chronological intervals - 
each of them covering at least eight years -. Even though a partial degree of 
analogy might be hypothesised, vertical separation spreads its potentially 
beneficial impacts through magnitudes and conditions which at times 
strongly differ among these works. In addition, the termination of the periods 
analysed in the articles deserves to be investigated, because it might occur 
when the implementation of a specific reform is still undergoing. 
2.4  Conclusions 
Comparing the various studies, contrasting outcomes are reported in the 
literature in particular regarding the impacts of vertical separation. van de 
Velde et al. (2012) and Mizutani et al. (2014) find vertical separation carrying 
beneficial repercussions when train density is low, while horizontal 
unbundling appears to produce cost reductions irrespective of other aspects. 
Cantos et al. (2011) and Cantos et al. (2012) report instead the existence of 
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a linkage between these two structural reforms, claiming that positive effects 
can only be generated when both of them are implemented (together with 
freight market openness in the former paper). At the other end of the 
spectrum, vertical separation seems to be detrimental according to 
Growitsch and Wetzel (2009), Jensen and Stelling (2007) for the Swedish 
system only and, in terms of transaction costs, Merkert et al. (2012). 
Looking at the findings specifically on regulation, even in this case the 
results slightly differ in the few studies analysing this profile. While Wetzel 
(2008) recommends the introduction of an independent regulator as able to 
create positive repercussions on costs, Friebel et al. (2010) trace similar 
benefits, especially when this reform is accompanied by sequential reforms   
involving vertical and horizontal unbundling and open access to market. 
Overall, the study of the regulatory effects appears superficial, reflecting the 
lack of sophisticated methods for measuring regulation in railway-related 
studies.  
In general, a number of limitations affecting studies in railway reforms have 
been overcome thanks to some recent works, especially Mizutani et al. 
(2014) and van de Velde et al. (2012). The composition of the samples, for 
instance, now benefits from the inclusion of United Kingdom, arguably the 
country in which rail reform has been carried furthest (United Kingdom is 
excluded in most of the other studies). Moreover, the mixed results 
regarding individual reforms appear to be dependent on specific factors. In 
particular, with vertical separation, perhaps the most divisive among the 
reforms, the role played by density, as pointed out by van de Velde et al. 
(2012), may hugely vary across regions and needs to be carefully assessed. 
Freight traffic as well brings repercussions on the effects of vertical 
separation, deserving deeper analyses in relation to its variability. 
Lastly, further issues concern elements directly or indirectly related to the 
reforms. In the first group, the correct consideration of transaction costs 
between the different interfaces of a railway system (regulators, 
infrastructure managers and railway undertakings) should be mentioned, as 
explored by Merkert et al. (2012). In the second group, the analysis of the 
reforms’ impact should also aim to incorporate profiles associated with 
institutional, regulatory and financial systems, accounting for phenomena 
such as subsidisation (Friebel et al., 2012), and governmental power on 
infrastructural operations and on the provision of routes serving public 
interests (Preston and Robins, 2013 and Drew and Nash, 2011). 
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In this Chapter, the impacts of railway reforms were predominantly 
investigated with regards to the analytical objective of this thesis, namely 
railway efficiency. Further profiles were also taken into account, such as 
modal share and welfare. Importantly, this review pointed out that the effects 
of the reforms have been mixed and, especially for vertical separation, 
contrasting views on its advantages have emerged. Considering the 
objective of this thesis, the attention dedicated by these studies to the 
reforms on economic regulation and on the regulators’ role has been rather 
limited, in terms of both measuring and tracing regulatory impacts. Here lies 
the rationale behind this research, which will analyse the regulatory effects in 
a more in-depth and precise manner than what was carried out in the past.  
In order to do so, the next Chapter will present findings on the way 
regulation is measured in works on comparable network industries, since 
those in railway economics have tended to utilise rather simplified dummy 
variables. Focus will also be concentrated on another type of literature 
review, attempting to define what determines an ideal regulator in railways. 
This will be relevant for the design of the questionnaire on rail regulation 
(Chapter 4), central to the qualitative analysis of this thesis (Chapter 5). On 
the quantitative side, the evidence described by the literature reviews on the 
impacts of railway reforms and on measuring regulation greatly contributes 
to the methodological choices explored in Chapter 6, based on the 
construction of a composite regulation index which will form integral part of 
the econometric analysis (Chapter 7). Ultimately, the findings resulting from 
the quantitative and qualitative analyses aim to illuminate the magnitude and 
trend of the role played by economic regulation and regulators within the 
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Chapter 3 
Literature review on ideal rail regulator characteristics 
3.1  Introduction 
The previous Chapter explored how several studies analysed the impacts on 
railway reforms on different profiles, particularly concentrating on efficiency. 
It also pointed out the little attention on reforms affecting economic 
regulation. Therefore, dedicating more focus on this type of reform would 
complement the literature, by taking into account not only the role played by 
rail regulators but also the interrelationships between economic regulation 
and interventions on the structure and competition of railways.  
A first attempt in this direction will be carried out by delineating how 
regulation is measured in studies on comparable network industries, given 
the rather simple methods adopted by railway-related works. This Chapter 
also moves forward by considering what is implied by the role of rail 
regulator, in particular by looking at the related ideal characteristics. This 
assessment will constitute the necessary foundation sustaining the design of 
the questionnaire on rail regulation in the next Chapter, central for the 
qualitative analysis of this thesis. In particular, the research of ideal rail 
regulator characteristics will help to determine how European regulators 
perform against these ideal benchmarks, and which patterns, practices and 
deficiencies can be identified. The emerging evidence, together with the 
econometric estimates incorporating a newly developed regulation index, will 
provide a comprehensive view on how the regulatory role has evolved, 
which impacts has produced, and which areas are in need of improvement. 
The ideal rail regulator characteristics will be traced by reviewing studies and 
industry reports looking at the role played by regulators in railways. 
Contributions will also be discussed in respect to general regulation theory, 
and studies on transport or network industries. Importantly, the reviews on 
how regulation can be measured and on the ideal rail regulator 
characteristics will be preceded by focusing on what is implied by the 
concept of economic regulation in railways, observing the theoretical 
background and which operational models have been adopted in Europe.  
Section 3.2 will explore the notions and models behind economic regulation 
in the railway industry. Given the little attention of the literature on railway 
economics over economic regulation, Section 3.3 will provide insights on 
how to measure regulation emerging from studies on comparable industries, 
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and explore the rationale behind the research. The literature review on the 
ideal rail regulator characteristics will then follow in Section 3.4. Conclusions 
are presented in Section 3.5. 
3.2  Economic regulation in railways 
Regulators have been playing a significant role in the European railways 
industry for quite a few years. Since the legislative wave inaugurated at the 
beginning of the 1990s by the European Commission, the introduction, 
renewal and strengthening of regulatory roles have been of primary 
importance among the railway reforms implemented continent-wide. 
Nevertheless, as explained in the previous Chapter, this type of measure 
has attracted little attention by the literature on the impacts of railway 
reforms, concentrating more on structural and market interventions, such as 
the effects of vertical separation and higher levels of liberalisation. Given the 
powers and autonomy granted by continental legislation, the current 
conditions controlling the activities of rail regulators will be explored, for the 
purpose of filling the gap in the literature, and ultimately de-constructing and 
discussing the role played by regulatory bodies in the European railway 
industry. Thus this work, by moving from a rather simple way to account for 
regulation utilised by previous studies, aims to provide an in-depth, bottom-
up analysis able to document the state and direction of practices in rail 
regulation around Europe. In order to offer background to this analysis, the 
current Section will attempt to define what is implied by the concept of 
regulation in railways, while the next Sections will focus on describing how 
regulation can be measured and on capturing ideal characteristics of the rail 
regulator’s role.   
The necessity of a regulatory presence in railways is explained by multiple 
factors. To analyse these, a few notes should be formulated on relevant 
reforms which have shaped the industry. Firstly, the European Commission 
has legislated on the separation of infrastructure and operations, if not at 
organisational level, at least at the accounting one. A full unbundling is 
defined as vertical separation, while at the opposite end of the spectrum lies 
vertical integration. At an intermediate position, a holding company 
represents a configuration where the accounts and management are 
separated but the different bodies all belong to the same mother company. 
Secondly, non-discriminatory practices have become the highroad to pursue 
in respect to the formalisation of the infrastructure managers’ processes and 
decisions. As a matter of fact, these bodies hold prominent powers related to 
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the allocation of capacity and the setting of charges. The inherent decision 
process should avoid producing advantageous (or disadvantageous) 
conditions for particular railway operators, whose influence is intended to be 
minimised. 
Thirdly, competition in this sector has increasingly strengthened in the last 
decades. Freight is the sub-market within which competitive conditions have 
been mostly incentivised and promoted (Second Railway Package, 2004). 
Passenger transport was instead impacted by pro-competitive provisions 
only more recently (Third Railway Package, 2007) and, as opposed to the 
complete openness of the freight segment, currently only requires an open 
market for international services. However, some countries have gone 
beyond this in opening the market either through competitive tendering or 
open access. 
This pattern shows the importance of the regulatory presence in the 
following ways. The implementation of vertical separation in a number of 
European countries involves the emergence of important interactions 
occurring between disjointed interfaces, namely the infrastructure managers 
on the one hand, and the railway undertakings on the other. These 
interactions are typically related to investment strategies, capacity allocation 
and timetabling, as well as real-time operations, creating an interdependent 
environment for railway undertakings, infrastructure managers and (at times) 
governments. If with vertical integration (and to some extent within the 
holding company model), the costs emerging from transaction costs are 
argued to be small because the interactions are between entities sharing the 
same business interests, with vertical separation these costs are likely to 
reach greater levels, since the parties involved are placed on opposing 
positions, and the possibility of reaching compromises is inevitably reduced. 
However, direct transaction costs do not seem to be great in railways (as 
shown by Merkert et al., 2012); what seems to impact more heavily are the 
costs arising from misaligned incentives and the potentially suboptimal 
decisions thereby created (see van de Velde et al., 2012). In this scenario, 
as pointed out by Finger and Messulam (2015), regulators could act as 
impartial third parties aiming to minimise transaction costs, and the 
associated wider problem of misalignment of incentives. To be effective, the 
regulatory role should require a strong independence from governmental or, 
more in general, political influence, when the negotiations involve railway 
undertakings or network managers controlled (directly or indirectly) by the 
government. 
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In these structurally unbundled contexts, regulators can also be relevant in 
terms of obtaining the desired levels of efficiency by the railway system as a 
whole. Infrastructure managers may indeed be less incentivised onto the 
efficient use of the available resources, in contrast with more integrated 
models, where the efficiency reached by the network managers, by 
impacting on railway undertakings’ activities, also produces consequences 
on the mother company grouping all these entities. In separated models, this 
shared interest tends to fade, and railway undertakings may turn to 
regulators which could be enabled to exert that necessary pressure on the 
infrastructure managers to improve efficiency.  
This potential capability also surfaces by looking at a pivotal reform on the 
regulatory role (the Recast), delineating the regulatory powers related to the 
control of the performance of the infrastructure managers, which may involve 
the quality and efficiency of the services provided. From the point of view of 
quality, regulators’ actions could be directed towards the safeguard of 
adequate levels of performance in areas such as track maintenance and 
strategic investment planning. From the point of view of efficiency, the 
charging system might require the approval from regulatory bodies, which 
also seek an optimal allocation of the resources through the preservation of 
non-discrimination.  
Different effects arise from these regulatory operations. While the regulators’ 
control of the infrastructure managers’ performance and efficiency produces 
direct effects on costs, monitoring non-discrimination only indirectly might 
impact on the efficiency of a railway system. Within this latter area another 
regulatory activity can be included, namely the promotion and strengthening 
of competitive conditions. Through the resolution of disputes on competition 
and, more generally, the prevention of practices deviating from this 
objective, regulators might play a role in ensuring that potentially more 
efficient players are allowed to enter the railway arena, thus also putting 
pressure on the incumbent to become more efficient. Nevertheless, it should 
be borne in mind that within the railway sector, freight services are denoted 
by greater levels of competition, in comparison with passenger ones. 
Therefore, if the above observations on regulators and competition may 
express a certain practical implication for the freight sub-markets, it is much 
more limited for the passenger segments.  
For these segments, the promotion of competitive conditions by means of 
regulatory pressure on local and national decision makers appears to be the 
principal way to ultimately increase the competition in rail transport, together 
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with improving the levels of efficiency. Passenger markets are typically 
distinguished between commercial segments and routes covered by public 
service obligations: while for the former “competition in the market” 
represents the most common approach, for the latter forms of “competition 
for the market” need to be conceived and implemented to increase 
contestability. In phases connected to, for instance, the design of tendering 
procedures and their enforcement, regulators can support and actively 
participate in the related tasks. At the same time, these bodies can oppose 
discriminating modalities of capacity allocation aimed to minimise 
competition and favouring certain actors, potentially occurring when direct 
awards are utilised. 
Institutionally, in order to obtain these goals, three rail regulatory models 
have been developed in Europe (see IBM Business Consulting Services, 
2006; Crozet et al., 2012): the ministry model (Model 1), the railway authority 
model (Model 2), and the special regulatory authority model (Model 3). The 
first set comprises those countries in which the Transport Ministry plays the 
role of the industry regulator, or in which the absence of an authority 
requires the ministerial action in order to grant investigative powers to ad 
hoc bodies each time the need arises. The requirements for independence 
of the Recast made this model illegal, but it has been prominent during the 
period of the analysis. In the second group, a regulator is part of a railway 
authority, namely a body responsible to government and mainly involved 
with licensing, safety, and administrative activities rather than access 
regulation, for which it normally is scarcely equipped. If this type of body is 
enhanced in terms of independence and specialisation in regulation, and is 
given decision-making powers, it is then included into the third model, 
characterised also by the presence of staff exclusively working on economic 
regulatory issues. As part of this third model, it should be also noted that a 
number of European rail regulators are placed within bodies not exclusively 
dealing with railways, ranging from multi-industry to competition authorities. 
Numerically, the special regulatory authority model (Model 3) has become 
more popular in recent years. This institutional form is now present in twenty 
countries, as opposed to seven countries in 2006 (IBM Business Consulting 
Services, 2006). The remaining nations adopted the railway authority model 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Norway), while a few 
still have a ministerial body or no regulator at all (Switzerland and Ireland). 
Those countries not fully complying with the current legislation are relative 
new comers in the EU, or only belong to the European Economic Area 
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(EEA), or in the case of Ireland have a railway system not geographically 
integrated with the rest of the European network. 
The literature on the impact of railway reforms has dedicated little attention 
to this regulatory changeover, concentrating on other aspects, as 
documented by the full review in the previous Chapter. This lack is being 
tackled by this thesis which, as a result of the regulators’ updated functions, 
will quantitatively analyse the impacts of economic regulation on railway 
efficiency and qualitatively discuss the current regulatory practices. The 
former task is centred on the employment of a purposely developed 
regulation index, whose methodological choice naturally follows what 
emerges from the next Section on measuring regulation in non-railway but 
comparable industries. The latter task builds on responses from European 
regulators, infrastructure managers and railway undertakings to a specifically 
designed questionnaire. Significantly, the questionnaire design takes into 
account ideal rail regulator characteristics, against which European 
regulators’ performances are measured. The literature review tracing these 
ideal characteristics is presented in Section 3.4. 
3.3  Measuring regulation 
As noted in the previous Chapter, the role of regulation has been 
investigated by a few studies and typically through the lens of the presence 
of an independent regulator, measured by dummy variables. This is 
traceable both in the papers previously examined and in studies performed 
in respect to non-railway but comparable industries.  
This is the case for Barros et al. (2010) who, in their study on the Japanese 
air sector, allow the regulatory variable to change value according to 
observations recorded when yardstick regulation was and was not in place, 
also determining the impact of the induced modifications on an output 
measure for aviation management. A similar approach is followed by 
Soderberg’s article (2011) on Swedish electricity distribution, in which a 
dummy variable is created to account for the enforcement of incentive-based 
regulation, as part of a cluster of firm-specific exogenous aspects. The 
independence of the regulator is instead the principal focus of the studies of 
Quiros (2011) on the European postal sector and of Wallsten (2001) on 
telecommunication markets in Africa and Latin America: the related 
regulation dummies oscillate between 0 and 1, reflecting the opposite 
emerging scenarios. The latter author also points out that supplementary 
information is needed and would be beneficial in respect to the typology of 
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regulation enforced, the organisational and financial characteristics, and the 
competencies of the authority. This deeper level of assessment may be 
achieved through employing more sophisticated instruments, such as the 
nonlinear function in the work of Marques and Barros (2011) on European 
airports’ performances, where regulation is explained by including 
transaction costs and influence on managerial ability as arguments.  
The formulation of indices is to the same extent an accurate device able to 
cover the width of aspects inherent in regulatory role and activities. Sound 
examples of using indices are particularly traceable in the works of Zhang et 
al. (2008) on the electricity sector and Grajek and Roller (2012) on 
telecommunications. In Zhang et al. (2008), the regulation variable is based 
on a four-component index accounting for the regulatory governance in the 
electricity sector and attesting the presence of: electricity or energy 
regulatory law, independent regulator, fixed-term appointment for the 
management of regulatory agency, and authority’s funding deriving from 
licence fees and levies or from government sources. While the first three 
component of the index are dummies, the fourth assumes values between 0 
and 1, varying from total funding from government to complete self-funding. 
The model elaborated by Grajek and Roller (2012) considers the incumbent, 
multiple entrants and the regulator, and the decisions of each are assumed 
to be dependent on the actions of the other actors. Three equations are 
constructed in order to describe the dynamic relationships between the 
intensity of regulation in a given domestic market, the infrastructure stock of 
the incumbent, and the sum of the stock of entrants’ infrastructure (as well 
as entrants’ individual investments). This design is intended to provide the 
linearised first-order conditions of a static investment game, where the 
choices on the level of infrastructure and regulation are formulated as a best 
response to what is selected by other agents. This setting evidently 
highlights the interrelationships between market structure and economic 
regulation which need to be considered when measuring the impact of 
regulatory activity. 
The references here discussed attest the degree of depth of the various 
methodological instruments available. A dummy variable, albeit based on a 
simpler elaboration (e.g. Wetzel, 2008 and Friebel et al., 2010), faces some 
difficulties when the regulation scenario involves several factors which 
cannot be all comprised into a particular driver, like the independence of the 
agency. Further characteristics of the regulator concerning, for instance, its 
powers and the nature of its processes need supplementary ways of 
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explanation, which can be represented by the employment of a number of 
dummies ultimately assembled in an overall index. The works of Zhang et al. 
(2008) and Grajek and Roller (2012) are exemplary in this sense, as they 
highlight how multi-faceted the regulatory configuration might be in a specific 
sector. In this research, the construction of a regulatory index, taking 
account of the different regulatory aspects, plays a decisive role in the 
analytical determination of the impact of the railway reforms on efficiency. 
Starting from the technical indications emerging from railway and non-
railway literature, the methodological plan is designed to absorb the 
regulatory factors into a general index to be employed as part of the 
explanatory variables of a total cost model. Two studies represent the 
cornerstones around which this activity will be conceived: the Rail 
Liberalisation Index reports by IBM and Kirchner (published in 2002, 2004, 
2007 and 2011), and Mizutani and Uranishi (2013), whose contribution is 
deeply delineated in Chapter 6.  
On the basis of the literature findings, the research questions for the 
quantitative analysis are set as follows. What is the impact of regulation on 
the efficiency of European railway systems? In order to do so, it is also 
important to ask how a regulation variable can be measured in railways? 
This thesis proposes to fill these gaps in the literature by quantifying 
regulation through a newly developed index and studying its impact on rail 
efficiency thanks to the estimation of a total cost function and the related 
system of equations. Besides this quantitative investigation based on 
econometric estimates, a qualitative analysis will also be carried out, building 
on the responses to an ad hoc questionnaire on rail regulation. The literature 
findings around which this questionnaire is designed are detailed in Section 
3.4. Overall, the derived results, from the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, will help to shed some light on the role of regulation and 
understand its interrelationships with structural and competition profiles.  
3.4  Literature review on ideal rail regulator characteristics 
The regulatory role in rail implies multiple characteristics which have been 
little analysed by the literature. In order to close this gap, this Section will 
provide a review of those characteristics which may be considered ideal for 
a rail (or transport) regulator. 
These “ideal characteristics” originate from a review of the literature on the 
role and operations of regulatory bodies, as well as its interrelationships with 
the government and the various types of stakeholders (such as regulated 
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companies, trade unions, local public administrations and incumbent). From 
the moment of creation of the regulatory body, important factors should be 
considered. As explained by Fleck (2000) with regards to general regulation 
theory, the timing of introduction of the regulator in a national system is to be 
carefully engineered. The emphasis should not be placed on the automatic 
creation of bodies which elsewhere have guaranteed the success of the 
reforms, but on their staggered establishment depending on the different 
development stages of a system. This implies that a railway regulator may 
not be required until the market has reached a certain level of competition. 
The relevance of the context in regulation is stressed by Gassner and 
Pushak (2014) as well, who point out the necessity to adapt regulatory 
structures to the economic, political and sectorial conditions in which the 
agency would operate. Therefore, regulation studies need to take into 
account the context, and this research aims to embody this prerogative in 
the analysis of the European railway industry, wherein various and, at times, 
extremely different national characteristics coexist. 
Another strand in general regulation theory examines the following stage, 
when the regulator has been established. The impact of enactment costs, 
necessary to implement a new policy, is obviously important to the choice 
between regulating and maintaining the status quo (Stephenson, 2007). 
Having a priori preferences also matters when the government is 
considered, especially when the executive limits the regulatory action to the 
mere ratification of governmental decisions, ultimately restricting the 
regulator’s possibility of growing and developing its own expertise. 
A third strand looks into the informational asymmetries affecting any 
regulated market. In this framework, Fremeth and Holburn (2010) point out 
that the minimisation of regulatory capture could depend on three factors: 
the long regulator’s experience, the large number of staff and the existence 
of similar policies previously implemented by other agencies. In particular, 
Macher et al. (2011) underline that the previous experience and intensity of 
staff training are indicative of regulators’ heterogeneity in terms of their 
capability to minimise the information asymmetry gap. Ultimately, these 
particular circumstances surrounding the regulatory actions would determine 
the impact that economic regulation can have on the organisational structure 
adopted by the regulated companies (Levine, 2011). 
Specifically to railways, an important study in this area was produced 
following an OECD Round Table discussion of experts on the role of 
economic regulators (OECD/ITF, 2011). Central in these references is the 
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focus on the significance of independence, which in turns depends on 
several factors. One of the primary objects of the regulator should be the 
pursuit of non-discrimination, connected with situations in which particular 
operators enjoy advantageous conditions for the access to relevant 
infrastructure. To achieve this, the regulator needs to be provided with 
appropriate human and financial resources and be accountable for its 
decisions thanks to a clear distinction between its responsibilities and the 
government (or other agencies) ones. The way the regulator reaches its 
goals is ideally transparent, publicly displaying the process and the results 
that substantiate specific decisions. Moreover, minimising the frequency of 
planning modifications in relation to infrastructure or transport services, and 
avoiding bowing to short-term political aims, confers stability and 
predictability. Lastly, an ideal regulator would be able to intervene on issues 
on its own initiative (and not only when requested by regulated firms), 
thereby growing autonomous capabilities. 
Besides these points, and observing another network industry like 
telecommunications (OECD, 2000), regulatory oversight is better achieved 
by a collegiate body (i.e. board) rather than by a single person, and the 
related members should maintain their roles only for fixed staggered terms. 
Moreover, an external body should report on the activity carried out by the 
regulator, in order to evaluate its performance.  
On this last topic, Niemeier (2011) signals the importance of the cost-
effectiveness of a regulator, the objectives and procedures of which should 
be monitored by a third party through a cost-benefit analysis. The 
significance of the cost-effectiveness analysis is highlighted by Ponti (2011) 
as well, especially in terms of the presence of transaction costs attributable 
to the regulatory activity. 
Further indications on how an ideal railway regulator should look like may be 
extrapolated from the recent Recast. The legislation now confers on rail 
regulators competences regarding the monitoring of access to and charging 
system of the pertaining railway market, with a view to generate adequate 
levels of contestability and competition. Also, the possibility of requesting 
data and information on accounting documentation, track access charges 
and financial performance of the infrastructure managers is deemed as a 
relevant regulatory power. Besides these, the formalisation of an effective 
sanctioning scheme should be seen as essential as well. 
Among these, a particularly important legislative innovation is represented 
by the powers of demanding data on efficiency and on the multi-annual 
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financial equilibrium from the infrastructure managers (as suggested by the 
Recast). Since only in a few countries does the regulator seem to play an 
active role on efficiency control, the European experience in the rail sector 
turns out to be limited. Lessons could be learnt from practices employed in 
comparable network industries: in the energy sector for instance, the related 
extensive literature (Haney and Pollitt, 2009, 2011 and 2013) reports 
findings on the international diffusion (and related issues) of benchmarking 
methods, such as frontier-based and average benchmarking. 
Some of these aspects have also been investigated by the Rail 
Liberalisation Index reports produced by IBM and Kirchner (2002, 2004, 
2007 and 2011). These studies provide an overview on the state of the 
liberalisation processes in European countries, constructing indices and 
formulating rankings in order to evaluate which countries are denoted by 
advanced, scheduled and delayed progress. Even if the aim of these reports 
is not only centred on the regulatory state of each country in the sample, 
some of the drivers selected by the authors reflect and confirm the adequacy 
of the previously described findings. This can be observed by considering 
drivers covering the general aspects of the authority (including elements like 
independence, accountability and transparency), the object of the regulation 
(for instance, the responsibilities deriving from different types of inspections), 
and the regulators’ powers (involving the possibility of imposing coercive 
means, or the range of investigations that can be performed). Another 
important study on rail regulation was produced in 2006 (IBM Business 
Consulting Services, 2006), where a survey was conducted in order to 
assess the regulatory conditions of rail network access in Europe. The areas 
therein investigated (such as general powers, scope and organisational 
aspects of the regulators) are also covered in this research, by means of a 
purposely developed questionnaire on rail regulation. Analysing the related 
responses aims to update past results by accounting for alterations occurred 
in the last decade, as well as complementing the research on this field by 
including those characteristics describing an ideal rail regulator. 
On the basis of the findings extrapolated from the literature review, the 
research questions for the qualitative analysis are set as follows. How are 
the European rail regulators performing in terms of these ideal 
characteristics? What are the current regulatory trends characterising 
European railway systems? This thesis proposes to fill these gaps in the 
literature by constructing a questionnaire able to capture the extent to which 
rail regulators possess the ideal rail regulator characteristics, and by 
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analysing the collected results from a sample of regulators, infrastructure 
managers and railway undertakings across Europe. 
These qualitative findings will complement the quantitative results based on 
econometric estimations of the regulatory effects, whose rationale was 
explored in the previous Section. The combination of these qualitative and 
quantitative activities will create an overarching analysis on the effects of 
economic regulation on the cost efficiency of European railways.  
3.5  Conclusions 
This Chapter examined what regulation in railways implies, how it can be 
measured and which characteristics ideally substantiate the regulatory role. 
Theoretical notions on the importance of regulation in railways have been 
provided, together with indications on the operational models previously and 
currently adopted in Europe in order to conform to legislative reforms. This 
was followed by two literature reviews, substantiating the methodological 
choice of adopting an index and detecting the ideal rail regulator 
characteristics to include in such an index. The overall evidence, 
innovatively in railway economics, enables to define how to measure the 
regulatory activity and what is expected by a regulator in railways in terms of 
its structure, operations and powers. 
The findings emerging from these literature reviews have been utilised for 
the two principal tasks of this thesis. Firstly, to undertake econometric 
analysis centred on the impacts of economic regulation on railway efficiency. 
The related methodological design and quantitative results will be presented 
in Chapters 6 and 7. Secondly, to design a questionnaire on rail regulation 
which, sent to different actors in the European railway industry, has allowed 
determining how European railway systems perform in terms of an ideal 
benchmark. The data and information collected thanks to this questionnaire 
will be utilised for the qualitative analysis of this thesis, aimed to identify how 
the regulatory role has evolved in European railways and where it will need 
to improve. Importantly, this analysis will update previous studies on 
regulatory activity, by covering the period after the 2012 Recast17. The 
                                            
17 The necessity of collecting empirical evidence on the impacts of the 
reforms is pointed out by Laurino et al. (2015), who develop a desk 
survey to review railway models at a global level, involving some of the 
European countries examined in this survey. The analysis of the role 
played by regulatory bodies carried out in this thesis is more in-depth 
though, and importantly grounded in first-hand evidence. 
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questionnaire design and progress will be illustrated in the next Chapter, 
while the results will be presented and discussed in Chapter 5. This bottom-
up approach will complement the top-down approach which econometrically 
investigates the regulatory effects on railway efficiency. The qualitative and 
quantitative results in these ways obtained will ultimately both inform the 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology for qualitative analysis 
4.1  Introduction 
Building on the findings emerged from the literature on the ideal rail regulator 
characteristics in Chapter 3, this Chapter will present the methodological 
approach behind the qualitative analysis of the thesis. This type of analysis 
aims to document how European railway regulators perform against the 
aforementioned ideal characteristics, thereby moving from the theoretical 
platform to the real scenarios. Methodologically, the way this process is 
carried out revolves around the design of a purposely designed 
questionnaire, including enquiries specifically informed with the evidence on 
the ideal rail regulator characteristics.  
The responses to this questionnaire, coming from various sources involved 
in the European railway systems, would potentially be able to identify which 
roles have been forged for and by rail regulators and to what extent these 
roles adhere to the operational principles outlined by the literature. Besides 
investigating the distance between real and ideal roles, the questionnaire 
findings will also be scrutinised in order to detect general patterns, if any, in 
European rail regulation and ultimately answer these kinds of questions: Are 
railway systems progressing in a similar fashion in terms of economic 
regulation? Which ideal requirements are more commonly met and which 
are instead more commonly unfulfilled by European rail regulators? Which 
regulatory best practices and deficiencies can be traced at European level? 
This Chapter will give an account of the intermediate and methodological 
stage situated between the literature review and the analysis of the 
questionnaire results. Section 4.2 will illustrate the design of the 
questionnaire, as well as its individual questions, explaining their rationale 
and highlighting their linkages with the ideal rail regulator characteristics. 
The questionnaire versions, its instructions and the range of actors surveyed 
are described in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 will focus on the progress of the 
questionnaire, depicting its timeline from the designing stages to the 
collection of the responses. Lastly, Section 4.5 will account for the 
methodological limitations of this survey, as well as suggesting future 
corrective actions. 
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4.2  Design of the questionnaire 
As explained above, there exists a strong relationship between the findings 
from the literature on the ideal rail regulator characteristics and the design of 
the questionnaire. This connection is primarily attested by the choices 
regarding the 8 key areas composing the survey, which are listed in column 
1 of Table 4.1 together with the related purposes in column 2. Column 3 
highlights which participants (regulators and/or regulatees18) were involved 
in relation to the 8 key areas. Each of these key areas focuses on specific 
ideal rail regulator characteristics, and includes questions formulated with a 
view to capture the relevant regulatory practices in the analysed countries. 
This Section will describe in detail each of these key areas and its 
component questions.  
 
Table 4.1  Questionnaire on ideal rail regulator characteristics: key areas 
Key area Purpose Addressed to 
1. Positioning in the 
market 
Historical evolution of the 
regulator and competition 
levels of passenger sub-
markets 
Regulators only 





government and other 
bodies, while promoting 
conditions for long-term 
planning 
Regulators only 






                                            
18 The sub-set of regulatees includes infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings. 
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Key area Purpose Addressed to 
4. Distinct 
responsibilities 
Avoiding overlapping of 
roles and accountability 
between regulator and 




5. Human and financial 
resources 




6. Transparency Ensuring the 




7. Pro-activity and 
effectiveness 
Growing autonomous 




8. System efficiency Accessing and analysing 
data on infrastructure 





Within the first key area, related to the regulator’s position in the market, the 
first set of questions are designed to capture general information about the 
experience of the regulator in order to assess its commitment, which is 
argued to be one of the ideal characteristics. Focus is therefore placed on 
the historical background of the regulator, with queries concerning the 
longevity of the regulator and its major responsibilities’ changes in recent 
years. Related responses would potentially account for the regulator’s 
evolution, in terms of capability to adapt to new legislation and industrial 
conditions. The second set of questions instead investigate the context in 
which the regulators operate, rather than the possession of ideal 
characteristics.  Domestic passenger markets are specifically scrutinised 
since, across Europe, these markets typically represent the least developed 
in terms of competition. Questions attempt to define the proportion of the 
network allocated through public service contracts (in percentage of 
passenger km), moving then to examine the allocative procedures for public 
service routes (direct awards or tenders) and the respective proportion as a 
percentage of passenger km. Non-public service (or commercial) routes are 
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subsequently analysed, by detecting whether competition is legally permitted 
and actually occurs. For these last questions, the surveyed actors are asked 
to exclude cases where international services compete with national 
services.     
In relation to the second key area inspired by the ideal characteristics of 
stability and predictability, the questions specifically investigate the regulator 
(or regulatory board) terms of appointment and decision-making processes. 
In the first place, the presence of a regulatory board as opposed to an 
individual regulator is ascertained. Whether the appointment of the 
regulatory board (or individual regulator) is for a fixed term and renewable is 
determined by the subsequent questions. This group of enquiries is required 
to capture not only the level of collegiality of the regulatory body’s top 
management, but also the conditions defining its time in power. For those 
cases wherein the regulatory board is present, further questions ask for the 
number of board members, and how many of these are employed full-time. 
The proportion of full-time members may be important to delineate the level 
of commitment and participation shown by the top management of the 
regulatory body. Moreover, the voting system implemented to take decisions 
is examined, in order to assess whether unanimity or a simple majority is 
necessary to reach decisions. Importantly, the related information may be 
crucial in terms of establishing the level of discussion and depth behind the 
formalisation of regulatory measures. The relationship between the 
regulatory body and the government is investigated thanks to the final 
questions of this key area: the identification of the body appointing the 
regulator (or regulatory board), as well as the level of dependence of 
regulatory decisions upon governmental desiderata, may help to understand 
how free of interferences the regulatory domain is. 
Non-discrimination (area 3) represents a broad key area of regulatory 
activity. Here the questionnaire explores the existence and extent of 
discriminatory situations connected with several railway aspects (such as 
track, rolling stock, highly specialised staff). The capability of the regulator to 
respond to these problems is assessed, as well as the number of complaints 
received and dealt with (on average in a one-year period). In addition, the 
presence of priority regulation is detected, in relation to cases of disruptions 
affecting train paths, access to services and timetabling process.  A further 
section includes the analysis of framework agreements, attempting to 
establish both their proportion in respect to total capacity and which 
operators are involved. Understanding how extensive framework 
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agreements are may be relevant especially for those railway systems 
wherein infrastructure managers can prioritise the use of such device when 
deciding upon the allocation of capacity. In line with this, the overall intention 
behind the questions in this key area is to search for potential discriminatory 
practices and threats, and check the regulatory ability to tackle them. 
The fourth key area pertains to the distinction of responsibilities between the 
regulator and the government (or other agencies): here are placed questions 
on the existence of connections between railway undertakings and the body 
(or bodies) issuing licences, safety certificates and vehicles certificates, and 
on the degree of independence of the regulator from political influence in 
respect of these matters. These enquiries are aimed to clarify the role of the 
regulator in its interrelating actions, especially whether these are informed 
with the necessary independence and accountability. 
The adequacy of available human and financial resources is explored in the 
fifth key area, where queries intend to assess the number and backgrounds 
of the staff employed by the regulatory body and to detect which actors 
contribute to funding the regulatory activities. It should here be pointed out 
that the enquiries about the regulatory staff are only concerned with those 
employees working on economic regulation (and not, for instance, on safety 
and interoperability). The financial conditions are explored by identifying the 
funding actors, to which extent they contribute and whether they are 
represented in the regulatory board. Relevantly, the questionnaire also asks 
whether these financial contributions are deemed sufficient. Collecting this 
quantitative and qualitative information about the regulatory resources is 
considered as fundamental for the purpose of testing the autonomy of a 
particular regulatory body. 
The sixth key area on transparency controls for the degree of openness 
established by the regulator and consists of questions on the clear and 
public specification of regulatory decisions and processes. These involve 
diverse aspects, including the regulator’s competence and powers, the 
issuing of licences, safety certificates and homologation of vehicles, and the 
allocation of capacity (together with the related conflicts resolution). Most of 
these are investigated under three profiles: whether their characteristics or 
procedures are publicly available and clearly specified, where this 
information can be traced, and whether there exist aspects that need to be 
clarified.  
Within the seventh key area on pro-activity and effectiveness, the regulatory 
powers on the approval of track access charging schemes are examined. 
- 48 - 
Naturally, these represent one of the most significant factors in terms of 
supporting, or limiting, competition forces. Therefore, regulatory intervention 
on augmenting or consolidating the fairness of access charges ought to be 
taken into account. Further queries concern the legal and financial effects of 
the regulatory decisions, determining whether these are binding, and can be 
appealed against, and whether regulators are able to impose penalties. 
Regulatory powers are here scrutinised in terms of their extent and 
magnitude, determining the strength of the regulatory action once the 
decisions are formalised. 
The last key area (area 8) refers to important powers conferred on regulators 
by the Recast, especially in relation to the identification of which regulatory 
mechanisms are in place to incentivise efficiency. This investigation is 
clearly of great interest for the aim of this thesis. The role played by 
regulators in regulating the infrastructure manager’s performance and 
efficiency is examined, as opposed to the role played by the government 
through the multi-annual contract, the presence of which is also verified. 
Further questions attempt to define whether and how regulators monitor and 
enforce the quality and efficiency of the infrastructure managers’ 
performance, as well as whether data on cost-efficiency and quality of 
service can be accessed. This range of questions helps shed light on how 
regulatory actions impact on efficiency and ultimately evaluating the success 
of reforms affecting economic regulation in rail. The related results will be 
useful not only for the qualitative analysis contained in Chapter 5, but also 
for drawing connections with the econometric estimates presented in 
Chapter 7. 
4.3  Questionnaire versions, instructions and participants 
Given the depth and diversity of the enquiries, the questionnaire is designed 
to involve crucial actors in the European railway industry. As seen in the 
previous Section, the questions cover not only regulatory aspects, but more 
economic and operational ones as well. For these reasons, the 
questionnaire was sent to regulators, infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings. 
Two versions of the questionnaire were designed for the parties involved: 
one for the regulators, and one for the regulatees, namely the infrastructure 
managers and the railway undertakings. These versions differ in terms of the 
individual questions (or whole key areas) selected, whose exclusion or 
inclusion seeks to avoid uninformed answers and to prevent potentially 
- 49 - 
biased responses. Blank copies of the two questionnaire versions are 
presented in Appendices B and C.  
The difference between the two versions, and the rationale behind this 
designing choice, can be observed in some examples. The questions on 
regulatory board’s term of appointment and structure were only addressed to 
regulators, as infrastructure managers may not be able to possess the 
relevant information on those points. Biased responses could emerge in 
relation to the independence of political influence or transparency-related 
queries: it appears intuitive that regulators may overestimate the level of 
independence of political influence or transparency of their processes and 
decisions, while infrastructure managers and railway undertakings, which 
are in the set of potential regulatees, may provide more realistic answers. 
This dichotomous structure is argued to appropriately capture the quality and 
effectiveness of regulatory practices in a railway system, by involving 
counterparties which interact with conflicting interests and thereby are able 
to offer objective information. 
Instructions were provided together with the questionnaire. The overall aim 
of the questionnaire was presented in the front page, whereas each key area 
was introduced by a brief statement defining the purpose of the questions 
therein contained. Both open and multiple choice questions were formulated, 
with the possibility of expressing comments as well, both at the end of each 
key area and at the end of the questionnaire. It was also specified that the 
questions only refer to railway regulators and railway themes and should 
have been answered accordingly. Answers which are not specifically rail-
related could have been given when it was not possible to distinguish 
between the characteristics and activities of the rail regulatory bodies (or 
divisions) and those of different agencies (or divisions) - for instance, when 
an authority for multiple transport modes is in place -, but this issue should 
have been pointed out. Some of the questions were pre-answered and only 
needed to be verified by the participants. These questions concerned 
information that is publicly available in industry reports and studies.  
Moving to the list of participants involved, most of the contacts were 
obtained from the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure 
Companies (CER) Economics Group and the Independent Regulators’ 
Group – Rail (IRG) Charges Working Group; more details on the collection 
of the responses are provided in the next Section. The initial objective was 
represented by approaching representatives from those countries included in 
the econometric analysis, in order to compose analogous samples. Due to 
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understandable difficulties, the involvement of all those selected countries 
was not possible. Nonetheless, responses from other countries were also 
collected, rendering the surveying project a rich and accomplished piece of 
the overall research. In the end, 17 regulators were contacted obtaining 14 
responses, which correspond to a highly satisfactory 82% response rate. 
The focus is mostly placed on the regulators’ responses as the participation 
of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings was limited, with the 
latter confined to incumbents rather than new entrants19. The full list of 
regulators who provided their responses is displayed in Table 4.2. The 
activities carried out to involve these actors and collect their responses are 
presented in the next Section. 
 
Table 4.2  Questionnaire on ideal rail regulator characteristics: list of 
participating regulators 
Country Regulatory body 
Belgium Dienst Regulering van het Spoorwegvervoer 
en van de Exploitatie van de Luchthaven 
Brussel-Nationaal / Service de Régulation du 
Transport Ferroviaire et de l'Exploitation de 
l'Aéroport de Bruxelles 
Finland Liikenteen Turvallisuusvirasto / Finnish 
Transport Safety Agency (TRAFI) 
France Autorité de Régulation des Activités 
Ferroviaires et Routières (ARAFER) 
Germany Bundesnetzagentur / Federal Network Agency 
for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post 
and Railway 
Greece Regulatory Authority for Railways (RAS) 
                                            
19 The following 6 infrastructure managers and railway undertakings 
responded to the questionnaire (out of 19 potential participants 
contacted): ÖBB-Holding AG from Austria; NMBS / SNCB from Belgium; 
VR-Group Ltd from Finland; Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane S.p.A. from 
Italy; Polish State Railways – PKP from Poland; and SBB AG from 
Switzerland. 
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Country Regulatory body 
Italy Autorità di Regolazione dei Trasporti (ART) / 
Transport Regulation Authority 
Luxembourg Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation (ILR) 
Netherlands Autoriteit Consument & Markt (ACM) / 
Authority for Consumers & Markets 
Norway Statens Jernbanetilsyn (SJT) / Norwegian 
Railway Authority 
Poland Urząd Transportu Kolejowego (UTK) / Office 
for Rail Transport 
Slovenia Agencija za komunikacijska omrežja in 
storitve Republike Slovenije (AKOS) / Agency 
for Communication Networks and Services of 
the Republic of Slovenia 
Sweden Transportstyrelsen / Swedish Transport 
Agency 
Switzerland Railways Arbitration Commission (RACO) / 
Schiedskommission im Eisenbahnver (SKE) 
United Kingdom Office of Rail and Road (ORR) 
 
4.4  Questionnaire timeline 
The design of the questionnaire, its diffusion and the collection of the related 
responses occupied a long period of time within the overall research. Once 
the first design of the questionnaire was prepared, a pilot was attempted by 
asking a representative of the Swedish regulatory body to respond and 
comment on the questions. Unfortunately, this piloting activity did not take 
place and, in the face of the project’s decreasing temporal limits, was 
replaced with an alternative option. This envisaged the start of the actual 
survey, while allowing for the refinement of the questionnaire on the basis of 
the comments received by the first respondents. Thanks to personal 
contacts and the ones made available at an international conference, a 
handful of regulators were approached, receiving responses from the British, 
French and German representatives. As explained, this alternative option 
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was not only important for the collection of the first responses, but also for 
the regulators’ comments, particularly useful to understand which questions 
needed to be re-designed or removed completely, and which instead 
deserved to be incorporated. Naturally, these alterations involved both 
versions of the questionnaire, in relation to those cases when the same 
questions or key areas were affected. 
A significant breakthrough was realised when a presentation was organised 
at one of the meetings held by the CER Economics Group. The 
questionnaire had been sent prior to the meeting by the Group Chair to the 
members, together with a brief introductory document. The participation in 
this event, especially thanks to the discussion that followed the presentation 
of the project, greatly contributed to expedite the collection of the responses, 
sent by 6 infrastructure managers and railway undertakings present at that 
meeting. Reminders were also sent by the Economics Group Chair in the 
following months to stimulate the widest possible participation. 
The majority of regulators’ responses were obtained thanks to the 
participation in a similar event, organised by the IRG Charges Working 
Group. Also in this case, copies of the questionnaire and the project 
introduction had been distributed to the members by the Group Chair before 
the meeting. In that context, the revised version of the questionnaire was 
presented not only to new respondents, but also to old ones (as mentioned 
previously, from United Kingdom, Germany and France) to whom it was 
asked to only answer newly introduced questions. The German and the 
French representatives provided these extra responses on their railway 
systems; in the French case, this took the form of a telephonic interview, 
thanks to which a revision of old responses was also carried out. 
Unfortunately, the same revising activity was not possible with the British 
regulator. However, since the differences in the original and final versions 
are small, the answers from the British regulator were included in the 
analysis. Minor changes, arising from the feedback on the presentation of 
the project, altered the final version of the questionnaire, which the Group 
Chair again distributed between the Group members following the meeting. 
The success of the participation in the IRG meeting is demonstrated by the 
particularly high number of respondents in its aftermath: excluding previous 
(and revising) respondents, 10 regulators sent back their completed 
questionnaires, including some members which had not attended the 
meeting, but whose contact details were made available by the Group Chair. 
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In addition to this, a different representative of the Swedish regulatory body 
was contacted and the related responses collected. This was seen as 
particularly necessary for the research, since Sweden represents one of the 
most advanced contexts in rail regulation and competition around Europe.  
Finally, the questionnaire was first sent out in October 2014 and all 
responses were received by August 2015. 
4.5  Methodological limitations 
This final section intends to discuss the methodological difficulties emerged 
from the construction and actual development of this surveying project, 
mainly focusing on the selection of the key areas of the questionnaire and 
the choice of actors involved. 
While the detection of relevant key areas represents a noticeable 
breakthrough for the literature, the related set cannot be considered 
complete. Further key areas may emerge in future, not only from railway-
related studies but also from evidence based on comparable network 
industries. Possibly, these new key areas may be able to enrich the design 
of future surveys, by delving even more into the role played by regulators in 
railways.  
This difficulty leads to a connected one: the formulation of the questions has 
not indeed been uniformly smooth. The ambiguous nature of certain 
questions has determined the adoption of a surrogate strategy aimed to 
stimulate answers as accurate as possible. This is traceable when observing 
the enquiries on the regulators’ independence and autonomy, which have 
been accompanied by ancillary questions potentially able to ascertain the 
extent of these ideal characteristics not only on paper but also in action. For 
instance, regulatory independence and autonomy have been scrutinised by 
requiring information, respectively, on the procedure for the appointment of 
the regulatory board members, and on the amount of financial and human 
resources available. Albeit to a limited extent, this strategy might have 
neutralised biased responses, which represented one of the problems 
predicted during the planning stages of this survey.  
The risk of receiving biased answers is clearly triggered by the type of actors 
involved. Restrictions such as lack of available contacts and temporal 
limitations have prevented from relying on a larger and more diverse set of 
addressees. This is particularly evident for the group of infrastructure 
managers and railway undertakings which, for instance, ought to be 
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enriched with non-incumbent operators. The views expressed by this type of 
actors may differ from and contrast the mainstream which, especially for 
discriminatory practices and regulatory promptness, does not questionably 
highlight any relevant problem (as it will be seen in the next Chapter).  
Moreover, the role played by regulators within the overall railways 
governance should be assessed examining the governmental positions. In 
this area, governments still seem to hold relevant decisional power in many 
countries, even when the independence and autonomy of the regulators is 
guaranteed by law. Involving governments in future surveys may represent 
the opportunity to assess how actually free of interferences the regulatory 
actions are. 
Overall, the involvement of the current actors is of great support for the 
qualitative analysis of this thesis. Understandably, an even wider 
participation, especially on the part of infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings, but also by extending the survey to governments, appears 
desirable. While these expansions are possible for future research, it should 
nonetheless be pointed out that this represents one of the first surveys 
capable of delving into the regulatory scenarios in European railways on 
such a scale, importantly providing with much needed first-hand evidence on 
this field.  
Lastly, a note on the methodological approach needs to be indicated. All the 
actors approached were assured that the information provided was to be 
maintained confidential. Given this condition, the analysis of the responses, 
extensively presented in the next Chapter, will not be aimed to single out 
individual countries, but to identify general Europe-wide trends from an 
aggregate examination of the findings.  
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Chapter 5 
Questionnaire results 
5.1  Introduction 
Following on the design of the questionnaire on rail regulation and the 
collection of the related responses, this Chapter will focus on describing and 
commenting on the findings obtained. In particular, this analysis will look at 
the extent to which European rail regulators have conformed their structure, 
operations and powers not only to current legislation, but also to those ideal 
rail regulator characteristics which informed the choice on the questionnaire 
key areas. Bearing in mind the confidentiality limitations explained in the last 
Chapter, the responses will be observed in a collective way, rather than 
isolating a particular system’s practices. Consequently, the intention of this 
Chapter is to detect regulatory patterns across Europe, if any, and to identify 
those areas where the regulatory performances need consolidation or 
improvements. In terms of the overall research, this qualitative analysis 
conducted in respect to the questionnaire responses will constitute the basis 
for formulating policy implications and recommendations on the rail 
regulators’ role, complementing the quantitative analysis on the effects of the 
reforms on economic regulation which will be presented in Chapter 7. These 
policy considerations will find large space in the concluding Chapter 8. 
This Chapter will report and discuss the questionnaire results in Section 5.2, 
which is sub-divided according to the questionnaire key areas. Section 5.3 
will then draw conclusions on the overall surveying project. 
5.2  Questionnaire results and discussion 
The results will be illustrated and discussed following the categorisation in 
key areas presented in Chapter 4, by specifying from which source the 
information derives: either from regulators or from infrastructure managers 
and railway undertakings. A summary of results from selected questions is 
provided in two separate tables: Table 5.1 for the regulators and Table 5.2 
for the infrastructure managers and railway undertakings. As noted earlier, 
the participation of infrastructure managers and railway undertakings was 
particularly limited. In addition, the responses received from these actors 
tend to confirm the responses of the regulators. Therefore, regulators’ 
responses will be predominantly illustrated, except for a few cases (for 
instance, key area on transparency).
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Table 5.1  Questionnaire on ideal rail regulator characteristics: summary of selected responses from regulators (covering areas 1-3, 5, 
7 and 8). 
Key area Issue Sample Yes No Don’t 
know 
Detailed response 
1. Positioning in the market Experience of regulator 14    More than 5 years 
(11); Less than 5 
years (3) 
 Procedures for 
allocation of routes 
under public service 
contracts 
14   4 100% direct awards 
(6); Direct awards 
and tendering (2); 
100% tendering (2) 
 Actual passenger 
competition in routes not 
covered by public 
service contracts 
14 5 3 2 Not legally permitted 
(4) 
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Key area Issue Sample Yes No Don’t 
know 
Detailed response 
2. Stability and predictability Individual regulator or 
regulatory board 
14    Individual regulator 





14 11 3   
 Majority voting for 
regulatory board’s 
decisions 
14 5  2 Individual regulator 
decides (7) 
 Appointment of 
individual regulator or 
members of regulatory 
board 
14   2 By the government 
(10); Others (2) 
 Governmental guidance 
on regulatory decisions 
14 1 11 2  
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Key area Issue Sample Yes No Don’t 
know 
Detailed response 
3. Non-discrimination Complaints received by 
the regulator (on 
average in a one-year 
period) 
14   3 Less than 5 
complaints per year 
(8); More than 5 
complaints per year 
(3) 
 Favouring certain RUs 
when disruptions occur  
14 4 9 1  
5. Human and financial 
resources 
Number of employees 14   1 More than 10 (4); 
Less than 10 (9) 
 Adequacy of financial 
resources 
14 10 3 1  
7. Pro-activity and 
effectiveness 
Approval of all track 
access charging 
schemes 
14 5 8 1  
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Key area Issue Sample Yes No Don’t 
know 
Detailed response 
 Legally binding 
decisions by regulator 
14 14    
 Regulator’s possibility of 
imposing penalties 
14 11 3   
8. System efficiency Regulator’s role in 
monitoring and 
enforcing the quality and 
efficiency of the 
infrastructure manager 
14 4 9 1  
 Regulator’s possibility of 
requiring data on cost-
efficiency and quality of 
service from the 
infrastructure manager 
14 4 7 1 Individual cases (2) 
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Key area Issue Sample Yes No Don’t 
know 
Detailed response 
 Body regulating the 
performance and 
efficiency of the 
infrastructure manager 




Safety authority (1) 
 
Table 5.2  Questionnaire on ideal rail regulator characteristics: summary of selected responses from infrastructure managers and 
railway undertakings (covering areas 3, 4 and 6) 
Key area Issue Sample Yes No Don’t 
know 
NA 
3. Non-discrimination Presence of discriminatory 
practices 
6  6   
 Promptness of regulator’s 
intervention in case of 
discrimination 
6 4  1 1 
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Key area Issue Sample Yes No Don’t 
know 
NA 
4. Distinct responsibilities Collusion between RUs and 
regulatory bodies 
6  5  1 
 Regulator’s independence 6 5  1  
6. Transparency Transparency of regulatory 
roles, objectives, powers and 
processes 
6 6    
 Existence of regulator’s 
annual report 
6 2 2 1 1 
 Transparency of decisional 
methods and process 
involving licensing, safety 
certificates and 
homologation of vehicles 
6 5   1 
 Transparency of allocation 
processes and decisions 
6 5   1 
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5.2.1  Positioning in the market 
The positioning in the market (area 1) defines the experience of the 
regulator and the major changes undertaken in recent years. The majority 
of regulators have accumulated an extended operational longevity, at times 
over 15 years. In particular, 11 regulators out of 14 have more than 5 years 
of experience, indicating that these bodies seem to have reached a stable 
position in the industry which, on paper, may have contributed to provide 
them with an appropriate level of credibility and commitment. This is also 
identifiable by looking at recent changes at national level to regulatory 
responsibilities, on the basis of the responses received from 11 regulators 
(out of 14). These changes not only conferred greater independence on the 
regulators, but also increased their weight and participation in key 
processes, such as the monitoring of the multi-annual contracts attributed 
to some of them. Importantly, these alterations are all directed towards an 
expansion of the powers of the regulators, rather than restricting their remit. 
In terms of the configuration of the passenger market, the related results do 
not seem to be particularly encouraging from the point of view of 
competition. The proportion of the passenger market covered by public 
service routes (in passenger km) is on average equal to approximately 
77%20, and direct awards represent the predominant method of allocation: 
regulators’ responses (from 14 countries) indicate that in 6 countries direct 
awards are the only procedure utilised, while in another 2 countries the 
related implementation is alternate with tendering procedures, which only 
play a marginal role though. Only in 2 countries in the sample is 
competitive tendering the norm21. Also, regulators only rarely play a role in 
the designing stages of the tendering procedures. Overall, utilising direct 
awards is argued to restrict the level of contestability, by limiting the 
number of competitors for specific public service routes, which instead may 
be more efficiently allocated by tendering procedures. Nevertheless, the 
choice of formalising a direct award may be due, among other reasons, to 
                                            
20 This question was pre-answered by using 2012 data and, in some cases, 
was corrected by the regulators with more recent information. The 
differences are not large, confirming a constant trend in this area.  
21 Numerically, approximately 87% of the routes under public service 
contracts is allocated, on average, through direct awards (in passenger 
km). It should be noted that this figure refers to only 10 systems, as 4 
regulators did not provide any answer. 
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the lack of newcomers able to rival the incumbent, which is the case for 
several domestic markets. 
A further question addressed to regulators concerns the existence of open 
access conditions for non-public service routes in the domestic passenger 
market, excluding cases where international services compete with 
domestic services. While open access is legally permitted in 8 countries 
(out of 14), in only 5 of them does this actually occur, possibly attesting that 
lack of competitors previously mentioned. 
5.2.2  Stability and predictability 
The second key area on stability and predictability determines how the 
regulators function in terms of appointment, structure and decision-making. 
The regulators’ sample (amounting to 14 participants) is equally divided in 
relation to the presence of either an individual regulator (7 countries) or a 
regulatory board (remaining 7 countries). The stability of the appointment is 
guaranteed in 11 countries (fixed-term contract), with an average duration 
per term equal to approximately 5.45 years. In reality the overall 
appointment may last longer, as these positions are renewable once in 6 
countries, and more than once in 3 countries. These results seem to go in 
the direction of avoiding frequent planning modifications on the part of 
regulators, who have the possibility of setting their activities with a long-run 
perspective. Though the picture therefore seems positive here, it should be 
noted that the possibility of re-appointment (2 regulators even indicated 
that no limit exists in the possibility of re-appointment) may determine a 
prolonged, and potentially detrimental, situation where regulatory power 
remains in the same hands for many years.  
In the sample, the majority of the components of the board are employed 
full-time22, indicating another sign strengthening the perception of the 
regulatory commitment by other industry actors; in particular, the boards, 
on average, consist of 4.50 members. Decisions, apart from the 7 cases 
where an individual regulator is present, are taken by majority voting in 5 
countries23. The procedure for the board’s appointment is equivalent for 
most regulators, with the government selecting board members in 10 
countries (out of 14). In 2 countries, the appointment is determined by the 
                                            
22 In total, about 73% of the members in regulatory boards are employed 
full-time. In 3 countries, the regulatory board does not exist, while 1 
regulator did not provide any answer. 
23 This information was not available for 2 countries in which a regulatory 
board is present. 
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parliamentary president on the one hand, and by the board of the regulator 
itself on the other. These questions lead to the examination of how the 
regulator and the government interact. Only 1 regulator included in the 
sample, when taking decisions, seems to have the obligation to take into 
account governmental guidance: also, from the answers received, 
governmental instructions appear to be either rare or not binding. Naturally, 
this detachment from political aims represents an important requirement for 
the regulatory autonomy that, according to these results, has reached a 
widespread application across Europe. 
5.2.3  Non-discrimination 
The activities substantiating independence are explored further by looking 
at the answers on non-discrimination issues (area 3), which involved all the 
participants (regulators and regulatees) to different extents. Within this 
area, infrastructure managers and railway companies only were queried 
with regards to a sub-set of questions on the presence of discriminatory 
practices and regulatory promptness upon tackling such problems. 
Regulators only were instead questioned on another sub-set of enquiries, 
pertaining to the number of complaints received, and whether certain 
railway undertakings are favoured when disruptions occur. Finally, all the 
participants were asked about the existence and extent of implementation 
of framework agreements. Perhaps surprisingly, infrastructure managers 
and railway undertakings did not detect any discriminatory problem 
connected to a wide range of railway areas24. It should be noted however 
that the railway undertakings surveyed are incumbents, and potentially 
suffer to a smaller extent from these problems as opposed to newcomers. 
Also, regulators’ promptness on tackling related problems is considered 
satisfactory by 4 participants (out of 6)25. In reality, this promptness has 
been tested in a very small number of cases in several countries:  indeed 8 
regulators (out of 14) receive less than 5 complaints per year (on average), 
and 3 of them have indicated that no complaint was ever lodged. 
Nonetheless these responses, by offering a valuable snapshot of the 
                                            
24 The question focused on the following areas where discrimination may 
occur: track, rolling stock, highly specialised staff, use of electrical 
supply equipment for traction current, refuelling facilities, freight 
terminals, marshalling yards, train formation facilities, storage sidings, 
depots, passenger stations, or any additional area. 
25 In relation to the 2 remaining countries, in one case problems concerning 
the timeline of the regulatory processes were highlighted, while in the 
other case no information was available. 
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current role played by regulators in railways, allow to appreciate the wider 
range of powers and activities these bodies now enjoy, if compared with 
the limiting conditions observed at the outset of this reforming season. 
As mentioned previously, area 3 covers further questions on potential 
discriminatory issues arising from disruptions or when framework 
agreements are stipulated. The minimisation of discriminatory practices 
seems to emerge also when the regulators are asked about the presence 
of railway undertakings somehow favoured in case of disruptions: only 4 
regulators (out of 14) indicate this to happen, determining a priority 
treatment especially for passenger transport. Lastly, as documented by the 
responses collected from both regulators and regulatees, framework 
agreements between the infrastructure managers and the railway 
undertakings are characterised by moderate diffusion across Europe: in 
most of the considered countries a threshold has been determined, but 
only in 4 countries (out of 15, the whole sample of countries involved in the 
questionnaire26) do framework agreements actually cover more than 10% 
of the overall capacity. Given the possibility for infrastructure managers to 
assign priority to framework agreements when deciding on the allocation of 
capacity, these results seem to attest that potentially discriminatory 
practices in this field are rather infrequent.  
In general, discrimination does not seem to be considered a problem by the 
infrastructure managers and railway undertakings in our sample, and 
regulators appear to play a proactive role when the need arises (in terms of 
responses to lodged complaints): determining whether regulatory actions or 
the contextual market characteristics primarily drive towards this 
configuration is not clear. It should be noted that the sample does not 
include new entrant railway undertakings who may have given different 
answers on this question. 
5.2.4  Distinct responsibilities 
The autonomy of the regulators is further verified by the responses related 
to the key area on the distinction of responsibilities (area 4), for which only 
infrastructure managers and railway undertakings were interrogated. In 5 
countries (out of 6), collusive relationships between railway undertakings 
and bodies issuing licences, safety certificates and vehicles certifications 
                                            
26 15 is the total number of countries analysed in our questionnaire, taking 
into account the country of origin of all the participants (regulators and 
regulatees). 
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were not found27. Importantly, a general awareness of the independence of 
the regulator appears to emerge: all 6 infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings deny the governmental influence over regulatory decisions 
and are able to identify the source of the regulator’s independence, 
typically determined by the legislation.  
This outcome, together with what was found in the previous key area (area 
3), seems to confirm that the actors ultimately impacted by the regulators’ 
processes and decisions positively evaluate the regulatory modus 
operandi: in general, regulatory actions appear to be informed with 
autonomy and to be potentially able to tackle issues affecting their national 
markets.  
5.2.5  Human and financial resources 
Whether regulators are appropriately equipped to carry out these actions is 
scrutinised by the questions on human and financial resources (area 5). 
Currently, the responses to the questionnaire show that, in terms of full-
time equivalent, 266.8 employees work across 13 countries28 for the 
regulatory bodies on railway economic regulations only (excluding safety 
and interoperability). Comparing this result with the data provided in 2006 
by IBM’s report on rail regulation in Europe29 (IBM Business Consulting 
Services, 2006), the number of staff employed has nearly doubled: in 
particular, 3 regulatory bodies which had no staff in 2006, have now 
employed personnel, even though only 4 regulators (out of 14) have more 
than 10 employees. The backgrounds of the personnel are rather diverse, 
mainly associated with economic and legal, but also involving rail industry, 
engineering and administrative expertise.  
The capability of hiring new staff does, however, seem to be limited for 3 
regulators (out of 14), where the amount of resources received is not 
considered adequate. These resources derive from two sources: funding is 
provided fully by the government for 8 regulators, fully by the industry for 5, 
and by both for the remaining 1. These financing bodies are represented in 
the regulatory board only in 1 country, thus almost all decisional processes 
                                            
27 For the remaining country, the provided answer is inconclusive on this 
point. 
28 One regulator did not answer to this question. 
29 According to the IBM’s report, the number of employees involved in rail 
regulation in 2006 was equal to 144 (in this sample). Nevertheless, 
only a part of this staff dealt with regulatory issues full-time, even 
though the exact proportion was not specified. 
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appear not to be influenced by the positions of the budget funders. In 
general, the majority of regulatory bodies have not indicated problems with 
the amount of human and financial resources available, and the growing 
trend in the number of staff seems to corroborate this. Nevertheless, the 
financial difficulties affecting 3 regulators are not to be underestimated, 
producing warnings especially for those contexts where the governmental 
funding may be restricted by fiscal constraints.  
5.2.6  Transparency 
The regulators’ efforts on transparency (area 6) have reached appropriate 
levels, according to the responses given by infrastructure managers and 
railway undertakings. When asked about the transparency of the 
regulators’ competence and processes, and the procedures for licensing, 
safety certificates, homologation of vehicles, and the allocation of capacity, 
the regulatees expressed positive views, also indicating the sources where 
the related explanatory documentation is available30. A negative area 
concerns the presence and monitoring of annual reports: the 6 responses 
from infrastructure managers and railway undertakings suggest that only 2 
regulators produce such a report, which is checked by an impartial third 
party only in 1 country. In sum, this deficiency, albeit important, does not 
appear to considerably affect the accountability of the regulator, whose 
operations are characterised by adequate clarity and are publicly detailed. 
5.2.7  Pro-activity and effectiveness 
Moving to the seventh key area related to pro-activity and effectiveness, 
regulators’ powers turn out to be rather limited in respect to a crucial 
element in the railway industry, namely track access charging schemes. 
Only 5 regulators (out of 14) have the possibility of approving the totality of 
these schemes, upon the related submission, even though the Recast 
indicates that the regulatory body shall ensure that charges set by 
infrastructure managers comply with the principles set out in the Recast. 
Responses from infrastructure managers and railway undertakings confirm 
the unbalanced trend characterising this task, for which regulators seem to 
play an active role only when connected complaints are raised and non-
discrimination needs to be preserved (as previously highlighted): 
nonetheless this may be rare in those numerous contexts where 
competition is lacking. This function pertaining to the approval of all 
charging schemes is in need of uniformity across Europe: the lack of power 
                                            
30 Only one participant identified two areas that need better specification. 
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in this respect means that regulatory capabilities are not being fully 
exploited (as attested to some extent also by the results emerging in the 
previous key areas). On the other hand, a positive picture emerges 
regarding the enforcement powers accorded to regulatory decisions: all the 
regulators (14) are able to produce legally binding decisions31, and the 
majority (11) can impose penalties, in most cases hitting a certain 
proportion of the sanctioned company’s turnover. 
5.2.8  System efficiency 
A similarly unbalanced trend is identified in the last key area (area 8), 
where the monitoring powers of the regulators are investigated, with 
particular reference to the activity of the infrastructure managers. The 
position is here, perhaps, unexpected, considering the new powers given 
by the Recast in this area. Only 4 regulators (out of 14) play a role in 
monitoring the performance (quality of the infrastructure) and efficiency of 
the infrastructure managers, while 3 of these and 1 other can require data 
to support their regulatory role32. This is corroborated by the presence of 
only 2 countries in which the regulators (alone or with the government) 
regulate the performance and the efficiency of the infrastructure manager 
(that is, more than simply a monitoring role), as opposed to the alternative 
situation (7 countries) where exclusively the government plays this role 
through a multi-annual contract, which exists in 11 countries (out of 15, the 
whole sample).  
Clearly several regulators across Europe partially fail to positively impact 
on their railway systems’ costs and quality, as confirmed by similar results 
emerging from the responses sent by infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings33. While diverse activities are in place in a number of 
countries - covering tasks such as audits, investigations, notification of 
warnings and, in some cases, even the possibility of affecting infrastructure 
managers’ powers -, these are argued not to embrace the full range of 
                                            
31 The possibility of appealing against decisions is allowed in 12 countries 
(out of 14). 
32 It should be noted that another 2 regulators can access this type of data, 
but only for individual cases and not as a general practice. 
33 In this sub-set of our sample, only 2 out of 6 participants detect the 
possibility for the regulator of demanding data on the infrastructure 
managers’ cost-efficiency and quality. 
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possibilities conferred on regulators by the relevant legislation. Influencing 
the efficiency and quality of infrastructure managers’ performance 
ultimately produces potential repercussions on costs, access charges, 
competition and demand levels, and this seems to be mainly achieved 
thanks to the enforcement of multi-annual contracts (by governments) 
around Europe. This scenario, together with the drawbacks identified 
previously in respect to the track access charging schemes, appears to 
negatively impact on the regulators’ capability to play a substantial role in 
the safeguard of their railway markets (though of course the Recast does 
permit the government, rather than the regulator, to take on the role of 
regulating quality and efficiency). 
5.3  Conclusions 
This Chapter investigated the responses provided to the questionnaire on 
ideal rail regulator characteristics. These were collected from a sample of 
European regulators, infrastructure managers and railway undertakings in 
order to verify how the regulatory structures of European railways conform 
to this ideal benchmark. The results can be summarised as follows: 
 Most of regulators appear to have accumulated adequate 
experience in the railway systems wherein they operate, and recent 
changes show their capability to adapt to new legislative and market 
conditions; 
 Appropriate levels of independence of political influence and 
autonomy, in terms of structure, decisional making and resources 
available, seem to have been achieved by the majority of railway 
regulators; 
 Similarly, transparency and accountability requirements are argued 
to be satisfactory by the set of regulatees; 
 Positive outcomes also seem to emerge with regards both to the 
powers inherent in regulatory decisions, normally legally binding and 
capable of imposing penalties; 
 Limits arise when looking at regulatory powers on monitoring the 
efficiency and quality of the railway systems, particularly in relation to the 
approval of access charges and control of infrastructure managers’ 
performances; 
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 Regulators’ role in promoting competition levels is generally 
restricted to the preservation of non-discrimination, while little is their 
involvement in designing tenders, which nevertheless are infrequently 
utilised to allocate public service routes around Europe. 
Therefore, a number of formal requirements appear to have been met, but 
more substantial powers are modestly diffused across European regulatory 
structures. These qualitative results will contribute to the discussion on 
policy implications on the regulators’ role in the conclusive Chapter 8, in 
combination with the quantitative findings on the impacts of economic 
regulation on railway efficiency. The methodological approach of this 
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Chapter 6 
Methodology for quantitative analysis 
6.1  Introduction 
The questionnaire results reported in the previous Chapter define and 
inform the qualitative side of this research. By focusing on current 
regulatory trends, divergences, best practices and deficiencies 
characterising European railways, the questionnaire contributes to give 
account of the role played by regulators, investigating the nature and extent 
of their operations and interactions with other railway actors. In this and the 
following chapter, the research moves a step forward and attempts to 
establish the type and size of the effects, if any, produced by regulators, 
and economic regulation in general, on European railways systems. The 
regulatory effects will be analysed by specifically looking at the results on 
railway efficiency. The rationale behind this choice is justified by the 
European Commission original intention to promote and allow railways to 
become the main mode of medium distance routes in the passenger 
market and long distance routes in the freight market. The achievement of 
this objective required considerable improvements in efficiency obtainable, 
in the eyes of the European legislators, through stronger levels of intra-
modal competition, onto which the range of reforms has attempted to 
impact. In this sense, this research complements the prolific and varied 
literature on the impacts of railway reforms, by shedding light on a 
somewhat unexplored area: the effects on efficiency produced by the 
reforms affecting economic regulation and the role played by regulators. 
This chapter will illustrate the methodological connotations of the analysis 
on the regulatory impacts on efficiency. This analysis, in line with the 
contributions belonging to the previously mentioned literature strand (and 
detailed in Chapter 2), will be quantitative and centred on econometric 
estimates. The presentation of the related data and the variables used in 
the econometric model will be explained in the next Sections. The next 
Section (6.2) will cover the construction of the regulation index (6.2.1) as 
central to the study’s objectives, highlighting its methodological limitations 
(6.2.2) as well. In Section 6.3, the emphasis will shift onto the overall 
presentation of the econometric model, together with the indications on the 
data sources. More specific description of the remaining variables and 
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notes on the estimation method are included in Section 6.4. Lastly, Section 
6.5, by providing the economic rationale behind the model choice, 
delineates the a priori expectations on the policy variables’ behaviour. 
6.2  Regulation index characteristics 
This section will focus on one of the major cornerstones, and at the same 
time novelties, of this research, namely the use of a regulation index for 
Europe’s railways. The details behind its construction will be illustrated in 
Section 6.2.1, while Section 6.2.2 will discuss the related methodological 
limitations. 
6.2.1  Constructing the regulation index 
Building a regulation index naturally arises from the intention to study the 
regulatory structures in the European rail industry, with a view to detect 
their effects on railway costs and efficiency. As previously discussed in 
Chapter 3, regulatory bodies may influence costs and efficiency by a 
number of means, both directly through pressure on infrastructure 
managers, and indirectly through promoting competition.  
The IBM and Kirchner studies (2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011) provide an 
overview on the state of the liberalisation processes in the European Union 
countries, formulating rankings in order to evaluate which countries are 
denoted by advanced, scheduled and delayed progress. The evidence is 
summarised by calculating the scores (from a minimum of 1 to a maximum 
of 10) for specific subject macro-areas for each country which, in turn, 
correspond to the sum of drivers and sub-drivers inherent in various 
aspects, broadly clustered into: the legislative transposition of the 
European directives and regulations; the effective implementation of these 
policies; and the competitive characteristics of the markets. A list of the 
sub-drivers selected for the regulation index is presented in Table 6.1. 
The major interest of this thesis is addressed towards the consideration of 
those sub-drivers that appropriately describe the regulatory systems, 
covering: 
 The general aspects of the authority (including elements such as 
independence, accountability and transparency);  
 The object of the regulation (for instance, the responsibilities 
deriving from different types of inspections);  
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 And its powers (involving the possibility of imposing coercive means, 
or the nature of the investigations that are allowed to be performed)34.  
 
Table 6.1  Regulation index: drivers and weights 
Source: IBM and Kirchner (2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011). Weights 
have been re-calculated by the author to reflect the specific set of sub-
drivers selected for the regulation index. 









Existence of the regulatory 





  Transparency of competence 
of regulatory authority 
0.017 
  Transparency in case of 
proceedings/sanctions 
0.017 
  Independence of political 
influence 
0.017 
  Existence of an annual report 0.017 
 Object of the 
regulation 
Inspection of network 
statement (10 aspects) 
0.022 
  Investigations concerning 
allocation procedure 
0.022 
                                            
34 Laabsch and Sanner (2012) utilise the IBM Rail Liberalisation Index in 
their study on the impact of vertical separation on the success of 
railways, but their method and purpose are different from what is 
pursued by this thesis. The above authors include the totality of drivers 
in order to account for the degree of market opening in the different 
countries, and only consider the last 2 reports (2007 and 2011). The 
intensity of regulation is instead measured in a rather limited way, by 
using the number of staff of the regulatory body. 
- 74 - 
Macro-area Driver Sub-driver Weight 
  Investigations concerning 
charging scheme 
0.022 
  Investigations concerning level 
or structure of user fees 
0.022 
  Monitoring competition 0.022 
 Powers of the 
regulatory 
authority 
Can/must start investigations 
upon request 
0.015 
  Can/Must start investigations 
ex officio 
0.015 
  Legally binding character of 
regulatory authority decisions 
0.029 
  Determination by the regulatory 
body 
0.015 
  Possibility of imposing coercive 
means 
0.015 
  Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 
  Possibility of issuing ex-post 
and/or ex-ante decisions 
0.015 
  Legal certainty of ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 
  Monitoring processes 0.015 
Administrative 
barriers 
Licensing Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
0.034 





Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
0.012 
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Macro-area Driver Sub-driver Weight 
  Transparency of issue process 0.012 
 Homologation 
of vehicles 
Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
0.059 






Existence of priority regulations 
for certain RUs 
0.055 
  Non-discriminatory access to 
services 
0.055 
  Non-discriminatory marketing 
for all train paths 
0.041 
  Transparent mechanism to 
resolve conflicts 
0.028 
  Framework contracts 0.028 
  Transparent and standard train 





Coverage of infrastructure 
charging system 
0.110 
  Publication of infrastructure 
charging system 
0.055 
  Uniform charging system 0.055 
Total   1.000 
 
To develop the analysis, from the IBM and Kirchner’s list of sub-drivers 
those specifically related to regulation are extracted, and are then used to 
construct a new regulation index for each country and time period in the 
sample. This index is then incorporated into the econometric model in order 
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to permit more substantial analyses of the regulatory effects on railway 
costs than those elaborated by the existing railway-related literature. 
Specifically, the index includes regulatory drivers and sub-drivers, and 
relative scores, for a group of 17 European countries. The versions of the 
reports were published at staggered intervals; hence the insertion of the 
quantitative information for the intervening years between reports is 
estimated automatically through an averaging approach, calculating the 
mean between the values connected to two consecutive reports. Where the 
numerical alterations are greater than a certain threshold (chosen to equal 
± 3 points), appropriate legislative or operational details have been sought 
in order to determine the reasons underlying these changeovers. When a 
sub-driver is not present for a specific year, the constant scores 
assumption is instead employed, inserting the value connected to the 
temporally closest report, where that factor is examined. Bearing this in 
mind, the range of answers for the sub-drivers included in the regulation 
index is presented in Appendix D, as extrapolated from the 4 Rail 
Liberalisation Index reports. In relation to the weights, these are held 
constant for the entire temporal interval to the ones chosen by the authors 
in the most recent report. This choice reflects the presumption that, with 
time, the authors accumulated the necessary experience to design an 
increasingly accurate weighting system. Scores and weights were given in 
an arbitrary way by the reports’ authors, but this issue is recognised to be 
natural in this type of study, for which a degree of subjectivity ought to be 
taken into account. The range of activities performed to construct the 
regulation index is summarised in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2  Activities performed to construct the regulation index 
1 Collection of the Rail Liberalisation Index reports published in 
2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011, in part available online, and in part 
obtained through direct request to Deutsche-Bahn (DB) staff 
2 Selection of the relevant sub-drivers presented in the studies, for 
the purpose of identifying a range of typical regulatory issues 
3 Conglomeration of the regulatory data of 17 European countries in 
a single panel 
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4 Calculation of the regulatory index for each report and each 
country (4 indices for 17 countries), making use of the weights 
chosen by the authors for the 2011 study, then re-calculated 
according to the chosen set of sub-drivers 
5 Inclusion of additional data for the gap years (average and 
constant scores) 
6 Identification of the reasons behind the main changeovers 
impacting the scores of specific sub-drivers over time 
 
Given these notions on scores and weights, Figure 6.1 provides a 
visualisation of the trends characterising the railway systems in the sample 
in terms of their regulation index, displaying top, average and lower quartile 
lines. As attested by the approaching trends of the average and lower 
quartile lines towards the top line, the figure shows the improvements made 
in economic regulation throughout the interval for which regulation index 
data are available (2002-2011)35. A deeper study of the regulatory 
performances for individual railway systems is included in Appendix E, 
where scores for each sub-driver across the temporal interval 2002-2011 
are presented. 
                                            
35 It should be noted that the cost data for 10 railway systems was only 
available up to 2007. Therefore, the regulation index data for these 
railway systems had to be dropped for the sub-period 2008-2010 in the 
econometric analysis. This implies that the extent of the improvement 
in economic regulation (as depicted by the growth in the average and 
lower quartile lines) is only partially accounted for in the econometric 
models. 
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Figure 6.1  Regulation index trends for top, average and lower quartile in 
the sample (2002-2011) 
Source: Author based on scores included in IBM and Kirchner (2002, 
2004, 2007 and 2011). 
 
6.2.2  Methodological limitations 
As explained previously, the regulation index strongly builds on the IBM 
Rail Liberalisation Index Reports (IBM and Kirchner, 2002, 2004, 2007 and 
2011), thus inheriting difficulties affecting those studies. Firstly, their 
irregular publication path does not allow access to a readily employable 
dataset. Filling the data for the gap years has implied using interpolative 
methods based on average and constant scores (as explained in the 
previous Section), forcing to rely on a second-best option. Naturally, the 
accuracy of this scoring system bears the effects of this methodological 
expedient, calling for in-depth documental reviews able to improve the 
temporal combination of the regulatory changeovers with the respective 
scores. This combining activity has been partially carried out during the 
research by looking at relevant references, and may represent a strand to 


















- 79 - 
Secondly, the sets of macro-areas, drivers and sub-drivers (detected in the 
designing process of the regulation index) require to be enriched with new 
features. An attempt in this sense has been made by developing the 
questionnaire on the ideal rail regulator characteristics, formalised on the 
basis of the most recent findings in this area, and potentially able to 
complement the regulation index results. For example, the questionnaire 
responses cover the implementation of the measures on economic 
regulation and regulators’ role envisaged by the Recast, which is not 
analysed by the regulation index. Clearly, this enhancing process needs 
continuous revision, which should not stop at just attempting to expand the 
set of macro-areas, drivers and sub-drivers. These new additions should 
also be measurable and quantifiable, and the overall system of weights 
should be adjusted in order to account for modifications in the relative 
importance of the regulatory features included. 
Thirdly, an intervention on the interval of the regulation index is desirable. 
The current dataset of the regulation index provides data for the period 
2002-201036, accordingly shortening the interval considered for the other 
variables utilised in the econometric estimates. The original cost dataset 
indeed relies on data starting from 1994, triggering a work on the temporal 
extension of the regulatory data. As with the process of filling the gaps in 
the 2002-2010 period, this type of exercise requires a careful review of 
main regulatory alterations occurred across European railway systems 
before 2002. It should be noted that a number of sub-drivers were assigned 
the minimum score (equal to 1) in the Rail Liberalisation Index Report 
published in 2002 (IBM Business Consulting Services and Kirchner, 
2002)37. Presumably, these scores remained unaltered in the pre-2002 
period and may not require further scrutiny.  
Fourthly, as pointed out previously, economic regulation presents 
interrelation with other characteristics of a railway system. Given the 
overarching connotation of the IBM and Kirchner’s index, collection and 
manipulation of data inherent in the competition levels of European railway 
systems may be carried out. This would generate further indices which may 
                                            
36 Even if the regulation index covers the period 2002-2011, data only up to 
2010 was used for the econometric analysis, as the cost data for the 
railway systems in the sample is available until at most 2010. 
37 Approximately 44% of the data points present a score equal to 1 in the 
2002 report. 
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replace the competition dummies currently employed econometrically, and 
generate more sensible data. 
Fifthly, the Rail Liberalisation Index Reports, albeit providing with a unique 
stock of data on the European railway systems, strongly relies on the 
arbitrary decisions of the authors who pre-determined weights and 
assigned scores. This possibly represents an insurmountable limitation of 
this type of survey, and careful examinations need to be carried out in order 
to verify the reliability of the authors’ interpretation, which in some cases 
turned out to be dubious. Therefore, efforts to augment the soundness of 
available data ought to be considered in future research. 
6.3  Data sources and model 
The regulation index represents an important policy variable which forms 
integral part of the dataset utilised for the econometric estimations. These 
are aimed to mainly provide the reader with an analysis in which the 
regulatory aspects might convey their significance in terms of impacts on 
costs. Importantly, by using a multi-faceted regulation index, as compared 
to simple dummy variables, this research benefits from a major innovation 
compared to the previous literature. While the related econometric results 
will be illustrated in depth in Chapter 7, herein the characteristics of the 
dataset will be presented.  
The dataset was developed in Mizutani et. al. (2014) and earlier in van de 
Velde et. al. (2012) and Mizutani and Uranishi (2013). The data utilised in 
this study mostly derives from the UIC, as detailed by Mizutani and 
Uranishi (2013) (Table 6.3). Further data was provided by CER members 
thanks to a questionnaire aimed to check and revising the data collected by 
Mizutani and Uranishi (2013), while enriching the dataset with figures 
related to most recent years. Relevant information is traceable in van de 
Velde et al. (2012). 
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Table 6.3  Major data sources 
Source: Mizutani and Uranishi (2013, p.45). 
Item Source 
Costs, output measures, wage, 
number of employees, energy 
price, energy consumption, rolling 
stock, route length, etc. 
International Railway Statistics by 
the UIC 
 Jane’s World Railways 
 “Energy Prices and Taxes” by 
International Energy Agency (IEA) 
 “Supply, Transformation, 
Consumption – Rail” by Eurostat 
 Annual reports by each individual 
railway organisation 
 Danish Ministry of Transport for 
missing data of Danske Statsbaner 
(DSB) and Banedanmark (BDK) 
Exchange rate Eurostat 
GDP deflator World Development Indicators by 
the World Bank 
 Economic Outlook 83 Database by 
OECD 
 
The analysis in this research, as opposed to the above studies, only 
involves the time period and countries analysed by the IBM and Kirchner’s 
index.  The sample includes 18 European railways for the period 2002-
2010, and is therefore smaller than that used in Mizutani et. al. (2014), 
which covered earlier years and also contained non-European railways. 
However, since the focus is on the impact of European legislation, the 
sample can be deemed to be appropriate. In total 130 observations are 
considered. The railway systems and the regulatory bodies included in the 
sample are listed in Table 6.4. 
 
- 82 - 
Table 6.4  Country networks and transport (or rail) regulatory body 
Country network Interval Number of 
observations 
Regulatory body Institutional model 







Belgium (NMBS / SNCB) 2002-2007 6 Dienst Regulering van 
het Spoorwegvervoer en 
van de Exploitatie van 
de Luchthaven Brussel-
Nationaal / Service de 
Régulation du Transport 
Ferroviaire et de 
l'Exploitation de 




Denmark (DSB) 2002-2007 6 Jernbanenævnet / 
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Country network Interval Number of 
observations 
Regulatory body Institutional model 
Finland (VR) 2002-2010 9 Liikenteen 
Turvallisuusvirasto / 




France (SNCF) 2002-2007 6 Autorité de Régulation 
des Activités 




Germany (DB AG) 2002-2010 9 Bundesnetzagentur / 
Federal Network Agency 
for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, 
Post and Railway 
Special regulatory 
authority 




Ireland (CIE) 2002-2007 6 No regulatory body - 
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Country network Interval Number of 
observations 
Regulatory body Institutional model 
Italy (FS) 2002-2007 6 Autorità di Regolazione 





Luxembourg (CFL) 2002-2007 6 Institut Luxembourgeois 
de Régulation (ILR) 
Special regulatory 
authority 
Netherlands (NS) 2002-2010 9 Autoriteit Consument & 
Markt (ACM) / Authority 




Norway (NSB) 2002-2009 8 Statens Jernbanetilsyn 
(SJT) / Norwegian 
Railway Authority  
Railway Authority 
Portugal (CP) 2002-2007 6 Autoridade da 
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Country network Interval Number of 
observations 
Regulatory body Institutional model 
Spain (RENFE) 2002-2007 6 Comisión Nacional del 
Mercado y la 
Competencia (CNMC)  
Direccion de 
Transportes y del Sector 









Switzerland (BLS) 2002-2010 9 Railways Arbitration 




- 86 - 
Country network Interval Number of 
observations 
Regulatory body Institutional model 
Switzerland (SBB / CFF / 
FFS) 
2002-2010 9 Railways Arbitration 








All observations 2002-2010 130   
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Moving to the model formalisation, the approach adopted in Mizutani and 
Uranishi (2013) and Mizutani et. al. (2014) is followed. The analysis in 
those papers is based around two models: a single-output model, denoted 
by a hedonic examination of the two services (passenger and freight 
transport); and a multiple-output model, with separate variables for both 
types of operations. A special multiple-output model is added as set out 
below. A translog total cost function is employed, deemed to enjoy more 
flexibility than other solutions such as the Cobb-Douglas model, which 
implies constant elasticities and substitution elasticity equal to unity for all 
companies.  
The models and the variables are conceived upon conditions that need to 
be underlined. The total cost measure is equal to the sum of the total 
infrastructure costs of the main network manager38 and the costs incurred 
by the totality of passenger and freight companies operating on that 
system. While the computation of this cost measure is straightforward for 
integrated organisations, in the case of separated entities, the 
infrastructure charges are subtracted before inserting the data for railway 
operators to avoid double counting. This and further precautions involving 
the computation of costs in the dataset are included in Mizutani and 
Uranishi (2013), and Mizutani et al. (2014). In particular, it is important to 
consider issues regarding the inclusion, for those countries with relatively 
high levels of entry, of the costs of new operators. Considering the market 
share of the incumbents, the related cost data have been scaled up to 
generate values approximating the total train operating company costs for 
the whole country. This nevertheless is based on the assumption that the 
different types of operators (incumbents and new entrants) are 
characterised by the same cost structure, when in reality this may not be 
the case, as aspects such as economies of scale or density, or efficiency 
levels may be greatly dissimilar. However, since this manipulation only 
concerns a few countries, it does not seem that the selected approach 
would bias the results to a great extent. 
Another prominent aspect concerns the choice around the type of output 
measurements. Following Mizutani and Uranishi (2013) and Mizutani et. al. 
(2014), models with total train km (for single-output function) and with 
revenue passenger km and revenue tonne km (for multiple-output function) 
are employed. These types of measures are widely utilised by the 
                                            
38 Only for Switzerland, two main network managers are present. 
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literature, as highlighted by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013). In addition to 
these, a third model is introduced, with two separate outputs, but defined 
as passenger and freight train km, rather than passenger km and freight 
tonne km. This third model is justified by the consideration that costs 
produced by the formation of the railway outputs are only partially 
accounted for by measurements centred on passenger km and freight 
tonne km. These presumably fail to accurately determine the costs incurred 
when specific loads underutilise the train capacity, raising issues in respect 
to journeys characterised by partly occupied or empty wagons. With 
disaggregated train km instead, the overall costs generated by moving 
trains are incorporated, counteracting difficulties arising from variations in 
loads, and contributing to the harmonisation of the outputs produced by 
journeys serving greatly differing amounts of passengers and goods. 
Moving to policy variables, issues regarding their potential endogeneity do 
not seem to be a problem. Changes in structure and regulation of railways 
have been driven by political aims rather than by economic logic. 
Reforming impulse have come primarily from the European Commission, 
and policy decisions therefore derive from variables outside the sample, 
neutralising problems related to endogeneity, along the same lines as past 
literature on railway reforms.   
Prior to the illustration of these and remaining variables involved in the cost 
equations, it is useful to provide their mathematical representation, based 
on the single-output model (Model 1) from which the multiple-output models 
derive (Models 2 and 3): 
(Model 1 – total train km): 


















2 + (𝛿𝑉𝑆1 + 𝛿𝑉𝑆2 ln 𝑉 + 𝛿𝑉𝑆3 ln 𝑅 +
𝛿𝑉𝑆4 ln 𝑅𝐸𝐺) 𝐷𝑉𝑆 + 𝛿𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑉𝐼 + 𝛿𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐻𝑆 + 𝛿𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐺 + 𝛿𝐶𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑃 + 𝛿𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐶𝐹        (1) 
ln 𝑌 = ln 𝑄 + ∑ 𝜂𝑓 ln 𝐻𝑓𝑓                                                                               (2) 
(Model 2 – revenue passenger km and revenue ton km): 




) ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛(ln 𝑄𝑚)(ln 𝑄𝑛) + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑗(ln 𝑄𝑚)(ln 𝑤𝑗) +𝑚𝑗𝑚𝑛
∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑁(ln 𝑄𝑚) (ln 𝑁) + ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑇(ln 𝑄𝑚)(𝑇) + (
1
2
) ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘(ln 𝑤𝑗)(ln 𝑁) +𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑚








2 + (𝛿𝑉𝑆1 +
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𝛿𝑉𝑆2 ln 𝑉 + 𝛿𝑉𝑆3 ln 𝑅 + 𝛿𝑉𝑆4 ln 𝑅𝐸𝐺)𝐷𝑉𝑆 + 𝛿𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑉𝐼 + 𝛿𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐻𝑆 + 𝛿𝑅𝐸𝐺 ln 𝑅𝐸𝐺 +
𝛿𝐶𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑃 + 𝛿𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐶𝐹                                             (3)                                                                           
(Model 3 – disaggregated train km): 




) ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛(ln 𝑌𝑚)(ln 𝑌𝑛) + ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑗(ln 𝑌𝑚)(ln 𝑤𝑗) +𝑚𝑗𝑚𝑛
∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑁(ln 𝑌𝑚) (ln 𝑁) + ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑇(ln 𝑌𝑚)(𝑇) + (
1
2
) ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘(ln 𝑤𝑗)(ln 𝑁) +𝑗𝑘𝑚𝑚








2 + (𝛿𝑉𝑆1 +
𝛿𝑉𝑆2 ln 𝑉 + 𝛿𝑉𝑆3 ln 𝑅 + 𝛿𝑉𝑆4 ln 𝑅𝐸𝐺)𝐷𝑉𝑆 + 𝛿𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑉𝐼 + 𝛿𝐻𝑆𝐷𝐻𝑆 + 𝛿𝑅𝐸𝐺 ln 𝑅𝐸𝐺 +
𝛿𝐶𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑃 + 𝛿𝐶𝐹𝐷𝐶𝐹                                                               (4) 
ln 𝑌𝑚 = ln 𝑄𝑚 + ∑ 𝜂𝑓 ln 𝐻𝑓
𝑔
𝑓=1                                                                       (5) 
ln 𝑌𝑛 = ln 𝑄𝑛 + ∑ 𝜂𝑓 ln 𝐻𝑓
𝑠
𝑓=1                                                                         (6) 
and where 𝑇𝐶: total cost, 𝑌: output measure, 𝑄: total quantity of output 
(total train km); 𝑄𝑃: quantity of passenger output (revenue passenger km), 
𝑄𝐹: quantity of freight output (revenue tonne km), 𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀: quantity of 
passenger output (disaggregated train km), 𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀: quantity of freight output 
(disaggregated train km), 𝐻𝑓: characteristics of output (𝑓 = 𝑃𝑅 (passenger 
revenue share), 𝐿𝐹 (load factor of passenger service), 𝑃𝑇𝐿 (passenger 
travel length), 𝐹𝑅𝐶 (number of freight cars per train), 𝑔 = 𝑃𝑇𝐿, 𝑃𝑋𝐶 (number 
of passenger cars per train), 𝑠 = 𝐹𝑅𝐶), 𝑤𝑗: input factor price (𝑗 (or 𝑘) = 𝐿 
(labour), 𝐸 (energy), 𝑀 (material), 𝐾 (capital)), 𝑁: total route length, 𝑇: 
technology (percentage of electrified length), 𝑉: train density, 𝐷𝑉𝑆: vertical 
separation dummy (vertical separation = 1, otherwise = 0), 𝐷𝐻𝑆: horizontal 
(passenger-freight) separation dummy (horizontal separation = 1, otherwise 
= 0), 𝐷𝑉𝐼: vertical integration (vertical integration = 1, otherwise = 0), 𝐶𝑀𝑃: 
measure of passenger competition (0 = no competition, 1-4 based on 
extent of competition), 𝐷𝐶𝐹: freight entry dummy (actual entry has occurred 
= 1, otherwise = 0), 𝑅𝐸𝐺: regulation index. 
A list of definitions of all variables for the three models is provided in Table 
6.4. The alterations for Model 2 (revenue passenger km and revenue tonne 
km) and Model 3 (disaggregated train km), in comparison with Model 1, 
concern the different variables for the outputs and the outputs hedonic 
characteristics, as detailed in the next Section. As attested above, the 
functional form remains the same. 
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Constraints are incorporated in the models affecting input prices39, such 
that  ∑ 𝛽𝑗 = 1, ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘 = 0, ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑁 = 0, ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇 = 0, ∑ 𝛼𝑌𝑗 = 0, ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑗 = 0,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑗
𝛽𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽𝑘𝑗, 𝛽𝑗𝑁 = 𝛽𝑁𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗𝑇 = 𝛽𝑇𝑗, 𝛼𝑌𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑌 , 𝛼𝑌𝑁 = 𝛼𝑁𝑌, 𝛼𝑌𝑇 = 𝛼𝑇𝑌, 𝛼𝑚𝑛 =
𝛼𝑛𝑚, 𝛼𝑚𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑚, 𝛼𝑚𝑁 = 𝛼𝑁𝑚, 𝛼𝑚𝑇 = 𝛼𝑇𝑚, 𝛾𝑁𝑇 = 𝛾𝑇𝑁. Also, Shephard’s 
Lemma is applied to the total cost function, from which the input share 
equations are obtained as follows:  
(Model 1): 
 𝑠𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛼𝑌𝑗(ln 𝑌) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑘 𝑤𝑘) + 𝛽𝑗𝑁(𝑙𝑛𝑁) + 𝛽𝑗𝑇(𝑇)                            (7)     
(Models 2 and 3):  
𝑠𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑗(𝑙𝑛𝑚 𝑄𝑚) + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑘 𝑤𝑘) + 𝛽𝑗𝑁(𝑙𝑛𝑁) + 𝛽𝑗𝑇(𝑇)                   (8) 
where 𝑠𝑗: input 𝑗’s share of total cost.  
6.4  Estimation method and characteristics of the variables 
The estimations are performed by employing the seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) method to the total cost function and the input share 
equations. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, the 
observations of each variable are divided by the sample mean. 
Table 6.5 reports the characteristics of the variables included in the model. 
Total cost (𝑇𝐶) represents the sum of costs deriving from utilising labour, 
energy, material and capital. In conformity to what specified in Section 6.3, 
infrastructure charges imposed to railway undertakings belonging to 
vertically separated contexts are not taken into account. This avoids double 
counting, as the total costs of infrastructure companies are already 
computed as part of the total system cost measure. 
Output measures involve revenue passenger km (𝑄𝑃) and revenue tonne 
km (𝑄𝐹) - as in previous literature as well
40 - and total train km, as 
considered by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013). An additional specification is 
given by disaggregated train km, separated for the two types of services 
(passenger, 𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀, and freight, 𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀). The latter models, based on total 
and disaggregated train km, are accompanied by output characteristics. 
For total train km, this is carried out for the purpose of avoiding estimation 
                                            
39 For a full list of the constraints imposed, the reader can refer to the 
example provided in Baum and Linz (2009), based on the utilisation of 
the software Stata. 
40 See Cantos and Maudos (2001), Mancuso and Reverberi (2003), Farsi 
et al. (2005) and Mizutani and Uranishi (2013). 
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bias caused by the different kinds of outputs, whilst for disaggregated train 
km the rationale lies on the attempt to include the best features of the 
single and multiple-output models. Including some of the hedonic output 
characteristics in a multiple-output model is argued to enrich the 
specifications utilised by past contributions, by simultaneously considering 
physical measures of the output (disaggregated train km, passenger travel 
length and number of cars per passenger and freight trains), financial 
factors (passenger revenue share) and intermediate aspects (load factor of 
passenger services).  
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Table 6.5  Definition of variables used for the estimation of cost function41 
Variable Definition Unit Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
𝑇𝐶 (total cost) Sum of labour, energy, 
material and capital cost 
Million 
Euro 
5,767 7,266 262 26,492 
𝑄 (total output) Total train km Thousand 
km 
198,480 263,704 6,899 1,029,699 
𝑄𝑃 (passenger 
output) 
Passenger km Thousand 
km 
19,238 24,735 262 82,837 
𝑄𝐹 (freight output) Tonne km Thousand 
km 
16,461 24,797 129 115,652 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 (passenger 
output) 
Train km Thousand 
km 
151,833 194,791 5,516 717,902 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 (freight 
output) 
Train km Thousand 
km 
35,906 47,741 971 198,206 
                                            
41 For full notes on the construction of these variables, the reader may refer to Mizutani and Uranishi (2013) and van de Velde et al. 
(2012). 
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Variable Definition Unit Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
𝑤𝐿 (wage) Labour costs per employee Euro 50,331 15,123 20,343 92,492 
𝑤𝐸  (energy price) Energy price per 1000 TOE Euro 650,917 177,508 366,442 1,290,508 
𝑤𝑀 (material price) Material costs per rolling 
stock 
Euro 72,140 57,849 6,462 322,519 
𝑤𝐾 (capital price) Capital costs per route 
length 
Euro 239,122 174,308 12,507 798,211 
𝑁 (total route 
length) 
Total route km Km 8,662 9,853 241 36,044 
𝑇 (technology 
index) 
Percentage of electrified 
lines 
% 59.81 27.45 2.72 100.00 
𝐻𝑃𝑅 (passenger 
revenue share) 
Share of passenger 
revenue to total revenue 
- 0.7990 0.0883 0.6235 0.9527 
𝐻𝐿𝐹 (load factor of 
passenger) 
Passenger per train to 
capacity 
- 0.3320 0.1193 0.1264 0.6866 
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Revenue passenger km per 
passenger 




Number of passenger cars 
per train 
Car 4.97 1.09 2.91 7.64 
𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶 (average 
freight train length) 
Number of freight cars per 
train 
Car 19.04 6.49 6.67 52.20 
𝑉 (train density) Train km per route length 
per day 
- 66.06 36.96 18.67 159.75 
𝐷𝑉𝑆 (vertical 
separation) 
Vertical separation dummy 
(vertical separation = 1) 
- 0.4692 0.5010 0.0000 1.000 
𝐷𝑉𝐼 (vertical 
integration) 
Vertical integration dummy 
(vertical integration = 1) 
- 0.3231 0.4695 0.000 1.000 
𝐷𝐻𝐶 (holding 
company) 
Holding company dummy 
(omitted) 
- - - - - 
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separation = 1) 
- 0.3462 0.4776 0.000 1.000 
𝑅 (proportion of 
freight revenues) 
Freight revenues to total 
revenues 
% 31.38 16.18 6.31 69.44 
𝑅𝐸𝐺 (regulation 
index) 
Manipulated scores from 
Rail Liberalisation Index 
reports 
- 7.30 2.29 1.51 9.85 
𝐶𝑀𝑃 (passenger 
competition) 
Passenger competition (0 = 
no competition, 1~4) 
- 1.2846 1.2466 0.000 4.000 
𝐷𝐶𝐹 (freight 
competition) 
Freight competition dummy 
(freight competition = 1) 
- 0.5846 0.4947 0.000 1.000 
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The output characteristics are represented by passenger revenue share 
(𝐻𝑃𝑅), load factor of passenger service (𝐻𝐿𝐹), passenger travel length 
(𝐻𝑃𝑇𝐿), number of freight cars per train (𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶) and number of passenger 
cars per train (𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶). 𝐻𝑃𝑅, 𝐻𝐿𝐹, 𝐻𝑃𝑇𝐿 and 𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶 are part of total train km 
specification, and 𝐻𝑃𝑇𝐿, 𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶 and 𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶 are included with disaggregated 
train km. While the selection of the output variables for total train km 
reflects what is taken into account by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013), the 
choice for the model with separate passenger and freight train km involves 
the exclusion of passenger revenue share (𝐻𝑃𝑅) and the replacement of 
load factor for passenger transport (𝐻𝐿𝐹) with number of passenger cars 
per train (𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶). The removal of 𝐻𝑃𝑅 is justified by the fact that the shares 
of passenger and freight traffic are allowed for directly in the disaggregated 
train km variables. Replacing load factor of passenger service (𝐻𝐿𝐹) with 
number of passenger cars per train (𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶) is led by the belief that it is the 
formation of the train rather than the number of passengers carried that is 
the primary influence on costs. The way these hedonic variables are 
calculated is summarised in Table 6.5 following Mizutani and Uranishi 
(2013). Passenger revenue share (𝐻𝑃𝑅) represents the ratio of revenues 
from passenger transport to total rail transport revenues. More complex is 
the derivation for passenger load factor (𝐻𝐿𝐹), which is obtained by dividing 
the number of passenger per train by the designated capacity of a 
passenger vehicle. The numerator term is the result of revenue passenger 
km over passenger train km. Capacity, in turn, is the product between the 
number of vehicles per train and number of seats per passenger vehicle. 
Passenger travel length (𝐻𝑃𝑇𝐿) is the ratio of revenue passenger km to the 
total number of passengers. Number of freight cars per train (𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶) 
consists of gross tonne km of freight transport divided by train km of freight 
transport, assuming that the weight of a freight car is 50 tons per vehicle. 
Lastly, the added variable, number of passenger cars per train (𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶), is 
defined as gross passenger km of passenger service divided by train km of 
passenger service. 
Also for input prices (labour, energy, materials and capital), control 
variables (network length and technology) and density, details of the 
related mathematical constructions are provided in line with Mizutani and 
Uranishi (2013) and summarised in Table 6.5.  Labour price (𝑤𝐿) is equal to 
labour costs over total number of employees. Energy price (𝑤𝐸) represents 
energy expenditures divided by the energy consumption measure which, 
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already utilised by many studies in the past42, is defined by TOE43. Material 
price (𝑤𝑀) is computed by dividing service and material expenditures by 
rolling stock, while capital price (𝑤𝐾) is equal to capital cost per route 
length44. In particular, depreciation, amortisation, value adjustments 
provision for contingencies, and financial expenses as interest payments 
compose the capital costs45. 
Moving to the control variables, total route length (𝑁) is simply calculated 
as total route km, whereas technology (𝑇) is the percentage of electrified 
lines. Technology is also utilised as time trend variable, assuming that the 
technological progress of the railway systems is linear and their access to 
technological innovations is equal (following Mizutani and Uranishi, 2013). 
Lastly, density (𝑉) is the result of the division of the number of train km by 
𝑁 and, in turn, by 365 in order to obtain a per-day variable. 
Among the policy and environmental variables, the proportion of freight in 
total revenues (𝑅) is the ratio of revenues from freight transport to total rail 
transport revenues. Vertical and horizontal separations are respectively 
expressed by 𝐷𝑉𝑠 and 𝐷𝐻𝑆: they assume value equal to 1 when these 
structural conditions are present in a particular railway system and 0 
otherwise. Competition dummies are indicated by 𝐶𝑀𝑃 for passenger 
markets and by 𝐷𝐶𝐹 for freight markets: the computations of these variables 
are defined in Mizutani et al. (2014) and outlined in Table 6.5. As explained 
by the authors, 𝐶𝑀𝑃 is a rather composite index attempting to measure the 
degree of passenger competition in a more sophisticated and accurate 
manner than what was measured in past studies, in order to take into 
account the extent of entry. It consists of four dummies (0-1), reporting for 
increasing levels of competition: 
                                            
42 As pointed out by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013) with reference to 
Christopoulos et al. (2000, 2001), Kim and Kim (2001), Loizides and 
Tsionas (2002), Mancuso and Reverberi (2003), and Smith (2006).  
43 TOE, as explained by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013, p.48), is a Eurostat’s 
energy index accounting for caloric values (MJ) for each energy 
source. Related European railway data are also available from 
Eurostat. 
44 Computations for material price and capital price follow Cowie (2002) 
and Kim and Kim (2001), as indicated by Mizutani and Uranishi (2013). 
45 In Mizutani and Uranishi (2013), alternative models were constructed 
based on the combination of energy and material costs, but were not 
selected as preferred models, in favour of those with four input prices. 
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1) The first level accounts for the possibility for competition to occur and for 
the effects produced by competition threats; 
2) The second level records the presence of a small proportion of the network 
(around 10%) which has been allocated through open access or tendering 
procedures; 
3) The third level moves a step forward, by considering contexts wherein 
around 25% of the network has experienced competition; 
4) In the fourth level, competition is spread throughout the whole network. 
By summing the individual dummies, an overall measure is then obtained 
for each railway system. Freight competition (𝐷𝐶𝐹) measurement also 
attempts to record actual entry, by assigning value equal to 1 when this has 
occurred and 0 otherwise.  
In the model the holding company structure represents the omitted dummy 
variable: that implies that railway systems in the sample are categorised as 
having vertical separation, vertical integration, or none of these. Additional 
variables are vertical integration (𝐷𝑉𝐼), measured by a dummy assuming 
value of 1 when vertical separation and holding company configurations 
are not present (and 0 otherwise), and regulation index (𝑅𝐸𝐺), the 
construction of which was explained previously46. 
6.5  Economic rationale behind the model choice 
After illustrating the model and variables from which the econometric 
estimations are generated, it may be worthy delineating what is expected 
from these estimations, in order to then verify which results are in line with 
previous literature and which are unforeseen. This Section will present this 
brief discussion, by concentrating on the effects of the so-called policy 
variables on cost levels, onto which most of the interest is placed.  
The a priori expectations regarding regulation, which represents the critical 
variable of this study, are to be investigated from two points of view: the 
effects of this variable when considered on its own on the one hand, and 
                                            
46 It should be noted at this point that the decision of interacting regulation 
only with vertical separation follows different attempts to include 
interactions with other variables (density, freight revenue share, vertical 
integration and horizontal separation). These were excluded as a 
consequence of their moderate statistical significance or their 
counterintuitive sign or magnitude. 
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when the interaction with vertical separation and the introduction of 
competition are considered on the other. On the direct interventions, the 
regulators’ control may produce a better employment of financial resources, 
investment strategies and quality of performance on the part of the 
infrastructure managers. These activities, while determining more efficient 
practices in deficient systems, may overburden the network managers’ 
operations in those better functioning contexts, generating regulatory costs 
which are not justified by actual necessities.  
Similar considerations arise with regards to the indirect repercussions 
supporting competition. Ensuring non-discriminatory access together with 
fair charges and capacity allocation may lead to the entrance of new actors 
able to compete with incumbents, facilitating the reduction of costs in the 
industry. Nonetheless, it should be noted that losses in economies of 
density may occur for a given traffic level when on-track competition takes 
place.  On the other hand, when actual competition does not occur, even if 
allowed by the legislation, the employment of regulatory resources 
targeting the promotion of non-discriminatory practices may appear 
redundant and, again, financially unjustified. 
Vertical separation represents another variable whose characteristics can 
be observed positively and negatively from the point of view of efficiency, 
as pointed out by van de Velde et al. (2012) and Mizutani et al. (2014). The 
level of interdependence between the infrastructure manager and the train 
operating companies can be particularly high, especially when decisions on 
investments, access and timetabling, and real-time operations need to be 
taken. Here the regulatory presence may play the role of an impartial third 
party overseeing the transaction process, pointing to the safeguard of non-
discriminatory principles in integrated (or holding company) structures and 
to the reduction of transaction costs created by unbundled configurations. 
However, it is possible that even a strong regulator may not adequately 
overcome the potentially discriminatory behaviour of an integrated 
incumbent. Of course, it may also be argued that, on the contrary, when the 
mechanisms dealing with transactions between different parties, and within 
the same holding company structure, are well oiled, the presence of a 
regulatory third party may be superfluous, generating unnecessary costs. 
Therefore, there seems not to be an unequivocal expectation on the impact 
of regulation role, though overall it is expected to bring about a reduction in 
costs. However, regulation and its impacts will be closely interrelated with 
the structural setting and the degree of competition. The econometric 
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Chapter 7 
Econometric results 
7.1  Introduction 
Following the presentation of the methodological approach and the total 
cost function models, this Chapter will illustrate the results obtained from 
the econometric estimations. These results will be discussed, particularly 
focusing on the effects of the regulation index on efficiency. This focus will 
help to determine the impacts of the reforms affecting economic regulation 
on the level of costs of a sample of European railway systems, which 
represents the overall aim of the thesis. Understanding the size of the 
regulatory impacts will be relevant when policy implications will be drawn in 
the concluding Chapter 8, where also qualitative findings emerged from the 
questionnaire on rail regulation will be deeply analysed.  
In the next Section (7.2), considerations on the general statistics of the 
models and on the results of the traditional production-related variables will 
be presented. Section 7.3 will instead focus on the policy variables, central 
to the objectives of this paper. Conclusions are provided in Section 7.4. 
7.2  General statistics properties and production-related 
variables 
The SUR econometric results are presented in Table 7.1, subdivided 
according to the specifications taken into account. Moreover, Table 7.2 
presents a comparison between the coefficients characterising a number of 
key variables in the preferred model of this study and those reported by the 
previous literature. Starting from the three original models based on the 
different types of output measurement, these are integrated with three further 
models including competition dummies. Hence, six models are estimated:  
(i) Case 1 (total train km with output hedonic characteristics as in 
Mizutani and Uranishi (2013));  
(ii) Case 2 (revenue passenger km and revenue tonne km as in Mizutani 
and Uranishi (2013));  
(iii) Case 3 (disaggregated train km with a new output hedonic 
characteristic variable);  
(iv) Case 4 (Case 1 + competition dummies);  
(v) Case 5 (Case 2 + competition dummies);  
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(vi) Case 6 (Case 3 + competition dummies). 
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Table 7.1  Full econometric estimation results 
Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄 0.5735*** 
(0.0829) 
- - 0.6236*** 
(0.0936) 
- - 
𝑄𝑃 - 0.1695*** 
(0.0575) 
- - 0.1840*** 
(0.0577) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 - 0.3657*** 
(0.0466) 
- - 0.3693*** 
(0.0463) 
- 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 - - 0.3102*** 
(0.0753) 
- - 0.3516*** 
(0.0741) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 - - 0.2374*** 
(0.0549) 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶 - - -0.3899*** 
(0.0886) 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑄 0.2205 
(0.1500) 
- - 0.1700 
(0.1497) 
- - 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑄𝑃 - 0.3349*** 
(0.0934) 
- - 0.2765*** 
(0.0980) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑄𝐹 - -0.1362 
(0.1016) 
- - -0.1139 
(0.1059) 
- 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 - - 0.3126*** 
(0.1198) 
- - 0.3674*** 
(0.1199) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 - - -0.0564 
(0.1097) 
- - -0.0855 
(0.1076) 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑤𝐿 0.1545*** 
(0.0188) 
- - 0.1548*** 
(0.0188) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑤𝐸 0.0171*** 
(0.0060) 
- - 0.0166*** 
(0.0061) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 0.0177 
(0.0140) 
- - 0.0200 
(0.0140) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑤𝐾 -0.1894*** 
(0.0160) 
- - -0.1915*** 
(0.0160) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑁 0.1011 
(0.1557) 
- - 0.2130 
(0.1644) 
- - 
𝑄 ∙ 𝑇 -0.0945 
(0.0926) 
- - -0.0521 
(0.0939) 
- - 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑄𝐹 - 0.0646 
(0.0761) 
- - 0.0549 
(0.0836) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑤𝐿 - 0.1258*** 
(0.0129) 
- - 0.1258*** 
(0.0129) 
- 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑤𝐸 - 0.0085** 
(0.0044) 
- - 0.0086** 
(0.0043) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 - -0.0034 
(0.0103) 
- - -0.0038 
(0.0103) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑤𝐾 - -0.1310*** 
(0.0132) 
- - -0.1307*** 
(0.0132) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑁 - -0.2448* 
(0.1481) 
- - -0.1629 
(0.1561) 
- 
𝑄𝑃 ∙ 𝑇 - -0.1818* 
(0.1006) 
- - -0.1335 
(0.1033) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑤𝐿 - 0.0901*** 
(0.0135) 
- - 0.0902*** 
(0.0135) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑤𝐸 - -0.0033 
(0.0050) 
- - -0.0035 
(0.0049) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 - 0.0132 
(0.0121) 
- - 0.0136 
(0.0121) 
- 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑤𝐾 - -0.1000*** 
(0.0146) 
- - -0.1003 
(0.0146) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑁 - 0.2741*** 
(0.0869) 
- - 0.2763*** 
(0.865) 
- 
𝑄𝐹 ∙ 𝑇 - 0.1421* 
(0.0870) 
- - 0.1239 
(0.0901) 
- 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 - - -0.1833* 
(0.1073) 
- - -0.1914* 
(0.1055) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐿 - - 0.1016*** 
(0.0168) 
- - 0.1025*** 
(0.0167) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐸 - - 0.0200*** 
(0.0053) 
- - 0.0195*** 
(0.0052) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 - - 0.0083 
(0.0121) 
- - 0.0085 
(0.0118) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐾 - - -0.1299*** 
(0.0144) 
- - -0.1305*** 
(0.0144) 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑁 - - 0.15478 
(0.1410) 
- - 0.1822 
(0.1365) 
𝑄𝑃𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑇 - - -0.1450 
(0.0957) 
- - -0.1273 
(0.0927) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐿 - - 0.0735*** 
(0.0159) 
- - 0.0739*** 
(0.0158) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐸 - - -0.0107** 
(0.0055) 
- - -0.0107** 
(0.0054) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝑀 - - 0.0152 
(0.0133) 
- - 0.0158 
(0.0130) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑤𝐾 - - -0.078*** 
(0.0150) 
- - -0.0790*** 
(0.0150) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑁 - - 0.3768*** 
(0.1273) 
- - 0.4150*** 
(0.1236) 
𝑄𝐹𝑇𝐾𝑀 ∙ 𝑇 - - 0.1848*** 
(0.0719) 
- - 0.2075*** 
(0.0699) 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
































































































- 112 - 
Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
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Variable Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 






































800.086 812.099 823.518 801.493 813.473 826.862 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.991 0.991 0.989 0.991 0.991 0.990 
AIC -1522.172 -1538.197 -1555.036 -1520.986 -1536.944 -1557.725 
BIC -1410.338 -1414.893 -1423.129 -1403.417 -1407.905 -1420.083 
Number of 
observations 
130 130 130 130 130 130 
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Table 7.2  Historical comparison between coefficients of key variables 
Study Sample / Interval Variable 
𝑅𝐸𝐺 𝐷𝑉𝑆 𝑉 ∙ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 𝐷𝐻𝑆 𝐶𝑀𝑃 𝐷𝐶𝐹 
Case 6 herein 18 European railway 
networks - 2002-2010 
0.0741 -0.0169 0.3258** -0.3041*** -0.0684*** 0.0584* 
Mizutani and 
Uranishi (2013) 
30 European and East 
Asian railway organisations 
- 1994-2007 
- 0.1123*** 0.2469*** -0.2099*** - - 
van de Velde et al. 
(2012) 
33 European and Asian 
railway networks - 1994-
2010 
- 0.0041 0.3760*** -0.2718*** -0.0081 0.0388 
Cantos et al. (2012) 23 European railway 
networks - 2001-2008 
- -0.022 - - -0.087 -0.072 
Wetzel (2008) 31 European railway firms - 
1994-2005 
-0.255** - - - 0.257** -0.253** 
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Models based on disaggregated train km (Cases 3 and 6) are preferred 
based on log likelihood, Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC)47. Besides the imposition of constraints to ensure 
homogeneity and symmetry conditions, monotonicity and global concavity 
were tested and verified for all the six cases. The partial derivatives of the 
total cost function with respect to output and input factor prices turn out not 
to be negative, therefore satisfying the monotonicity requirements at the 
sample mean for all the six cases. In relation to global concavity in input 
prices, for all the six cases Hessian matrices were constructed in order to 
determine whether their eigenvalues are nonpositive. Albeit around 75% of 
observations conform to concavity48, positive eigenvalues were present, 
potentially forcing to impose global concavity as an ex-ante restriction, as 
suggested by Baum and Linz (2009). Nevertheless, this may lead to the 
loss in the flexibility denoting the translog function, as pointed out by the 
relevant literature (Coelli et al., 2005, and Baum and Linz, 2009). Also, 
concavity violations should not imply insurmountable issues affecting the 
optimisation problems, whose underlying resolution may still be achieved 
(Wales, 1977). 
The coefficients obtained for outputs, input prices, and control variables 
(route length and technology) are sensible and in line with previous studies. 
The values of the newly introduced output measurement, based on 
disaggregated train km, do not particularly seem surprising as well. 
Moreover, most of the elasticities of the output hedonic characteristics 
conform to what expected. Passenger revenue share (𝐻𝑃𝑅) does not 
appear to possess high statistical significance, while passenger travel 
length (𝐻𝑃𝑇𝐿) and average freight train length (𝐻𝐹𝑅𝐶) are expected to 
increase costs and the related results confirm this. 
The strangest result is the negative sign for passenger load factor (𝐻𝐿𝐹) in 
Case 1 and average passenger train length (𝐻𝑃𝑋𝐶) in Case 3. It should be 
recalled that the former is based on a complex measurement of passenger 
per train to capacity (Mizutani and Uranishi, 2013), while the latter is simply 
equal to number of passenger cars per train. What is unexpected, given the 
other variables in the regression, is the potentially cost reducing effect 
deriving from the exploitation of high load factors which, intuitively, should 
                                            
47 All specifications are denoted by high goodness-of-fit. Pseudo 𝑅2 are all 
around 99%, in line with Mizutani and Uranishi (2013). 
48 This figure appears satisfactory when compared with previous literature 
(for instance, Mizutani and Uranishi, 2013). 
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increase the cost levels. Perhaps these effects arise from the benefits of 
particularly high-traffic contexts, even though the presence of a density 
variable should be able to capture them. Attempting to exclude these 
variables does not affect the policy implications for the multiple-output 
models (which, as noted above, are the preferred models) in terms of the 
interrelationships between regulation, competition and structure. Total train 
km models instead undergo significant alterations once these exclusions 
are carried out. Therefore, multiple-output specifications enjoy greater 
stability and the disaggregated train km cases (belonging to this group of 
specifications) gain another point in terms of model selection.  
In conclusion, multiple-output cases seem to be characterised by higher 
stability when different specifications are considered. In line with the 
preference to these models accorded by van de Velde et al. (2012) and 
Mizutani et al. (2014), and looking at the results on general statistics earlier 
discussed, favouring multiple-output models over single-output models 
appears to be a reasonable choice. Of the disaggregated models, Cases 3 
and 6 are particularly preferred, partly because they contain a simpler and 
more intuitive measure of passenger load factor as noted above, and partly 
based on the standard AIC and BIC model selection criteria already 
explored. The discussion on policy variables will better clarify this selection. 
7.3  Policy variables 
Looking into the specific results for policy variables, regulation seems to 
lead to reduced railway system costs; however, the way this occurs (direct 
or indirect) depends on the output measurement chosen. Considering firstly 
the models without competition dummies (Cases 1 to 3), only in the model 
with railway output represented only by total train km (Case 1) does 
regulation as such (𝑅𝐸𝐺) play an important role in reducing costs (direct 
effect). In particular, and bearing in mind that the model is logarithmic, with 
a statistical significance level of 5%, a 10% increase in the regulation index 
would produce a total costs reduction of approximately 1.2%. In the 
multiple-output models (Cases 2 and 3), the effect of regulation occurs only 
when combined with vertical separation (the coefficient of 𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆 is 
negative and statistically significant, attesting the presence of indirect 
effects).  
Vertical separation and vertical integration as such (𝐷𝑉𝑆 and 𝐷𝑉𝐼), both at 
the sample mean, instead are never statistically significant (relative to the 
holding company model). These modest results for vertical separation 
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confirm what was determined by previous studies (van de Velde et al., 
2012 and Mizutani et al., 2014). When moving away from the sample mean 
level, strong and detrimental effects on costs are determined by vertical 
separation (relative to the holding company model) in association with 
higher levels of traffic (density), confirming what Mizutani et al. (2014) 
report. Here, however, these effects pertain to European policies only, as 
solely European railways are considered, ruling out any impact that the 
inclusion of Japanese railways may be argued to have on previous studies’ 
findings. In addition, another recurring pattern is that horizontal separation 
strongly reduces costs for each of the specifications. 
The inclusion of competition dummies (Cases 4 to 6) changes the scenario 
in a number of ways. While regulation as such (𝑅𝐸𝐺) reproduces similar 
results to the first three cases, the coefficients for the interaction between 
regulation and vertical separation (𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆) (in Cases 5 and 6) still 
document a substantial cost-reducing effect (relative to the holding 
company model), even if this is now slightly smaller and less statistically 
significant. Further tests on 𝑅𝐸𝐺 and 𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆  for Cases 4 to 6 
corroborate this. Their joint significance is indeed moderate, reaching 
values around the 10% level. Moreover, the significance of the overall 
effect of regulation on total costs in vertically separated systems (given by 
the sum of the coefficients of 𝑅𝐸𝐺 and 𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆, -0.1402) is over the 10% 
level. The introduction of passenger competition (𝐶𝑀𝑃) seems to be partly 
replacing this vacuum, especially in Case 6 (with disaggregated train km) 
where its statistical significance reaches the highest level and its coefficient 
the strongest size. This role for passenger competition overturns the 
evidence of previous studies, which tended not to find an impact from this 
variable. Importantly then, this study finds a cost-reducing effect for 
passenger competition in line with expectations. On the other hand, freight 
competition (𝐷𝐶𝐹) seems to follow similar paths indicated by past work; its 
statistical significance borders 5% level only in one occasion (Case 4) and 
its sign denotes an adverse influence on costs.  
In line with previous findings (van de Velde et al, 2012 and Mizutani et al., 
2014), the interaction between density and vertical separation (𝑉 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆) in 
the disaggregated train km specification is positive and statistically 
significant (Case 6 compared with Case 3). Overall, with competition 
included in the model, the role played by density seems to be validated 
throughout the whole set of estimations. 
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In general, the introduction of competition variables has little effect on the 
results for single-output models (see Cases 1 and 4). Significantly, with 
competition included in the analysis, the multiple-output models (Cases 5 
and 6) appear more realistic: the interaction between regulation and vertical 
separation (𝑅𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑆) is still strongly beneficial in terms of efficiency, and 
its slightly reduced influence allows competition to play a decisive role, at 
least for the passenger sector. As reported previously, this is particularly 
true for Case 6 which best demonstrates the benefits from passenger 
competition. 
7.4  Conclusions 
In this Chapter econometric results were presented in order to assess the 
regulatory effects on the efficiency levels of European railways. Traditional 
production-related and policy variables were also estimated, thereby 
providing the necessary evidence to draw comparison with previous 
literature. The econometric results corroborate the accuracy of past 
findings in a number of ways, but also point out important divergences. 
Similarities and differences can be summarised as follows:  
 The elasticities reported for input prices, outputs and control 
variables are in line with previous studies utilising a similar dataset (van de 
Velde et al., 2012 and Mizutani et al., 2014); 
 The scarce significance of freight competition and vertical separation 
as such, together with the strong and beneficial relevance of horizontal 
separation on railway efficiency are also confirmed; 
 This study reiterates the detrimental role played by density on costs, 
critically hampering the success of vertical separation; 
 Regulation generally produces cost reductions, either via direct or 
indirect effects. However, in the preferred models (multiple-output models) 
the latter are exalted, observing the advantages deriving from the 
interaction between regulation and vertical separation, accompanied by 
strong passenger competition; 
 Relevantly, passenger competition appears to bring down railway 
costs, contrasting previous findings which did not identify benefits deriving 
from this market reform. 
As noted earlier, Cases 3 and 6 are preferred based on selection criteria 
and on the results and stability of these models. Finally, taking into account 
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the important role emerging for passenger competition in Case 6, the richer 
specification ultimately provides this Case with the edge.  
This choice leads to take into account the policy implications originating by 
Case 6 findings. These will be discussed in depth in the next Chapter, 
where the quantitative and qualitative analyses (based on econometric and 
questionnaire results) will come together in order to illuminate how 
economic regulation and the regulators’ role are and should be impacting 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
8.1  Introduction 
The modern era of European railways has been inaugurated by a series of 
reforms aimed to transform this industry. The stimulus behind this 
reforming wave was mainly propelled by the worrying decline affecting 
railways, especially in relation to the falling modal share and to the 
unsustainable financial conditions characterising state-owned railways. A 
revamp was considered necessary above all by the European Commission 
which, in order to guarantee the consolidation of a common economic area 
also for railways, decided to legislate, among the others, for a gradual 
liberalisation of international and national services whilst promoting 
organisational models detached from the previously sole form, based on 
vertically integrated structures. 
The popular focus on the impacts of some of these reforms (for instance, 
structural unbundling and competition), robustly examined by many authors 
in the past years, has led to destine only a marginal space to the effects of 
the interventions on economic regulation in general, and the role played by 
regulators in particular. Therefore, this thesis has conducted an 
investigation of these regulatory effects on European railways efficiency, 
attempting to reach objectives which can be summarised as follows: 
i.Reviewing the literature on the ideal rail regulator characteristics in order to 
trace those key areas around which designing a questionnaire on the role 
played by European rail regulators; 
ii.By involving the principal actors in the European railway industry - 
regulators, infrastructure managers and railway undertakings -, analysing 
first-hand evidence on the current regulatory trends in railways; 
iii.Providing a rigorous quantitative analysis of the impacts of economic 
regulation in railways, starting from the construction of a purposely 
developed regulation index; 
iv.By including this index in an econometric model, measuring the effects of 
economic regulation on railway systems’ cost efficiency; 
v.Establishing whether and how strong economic regulation leads to tackle 
railway inefficiency and, overall, in which ways economic regulation 
interrelate with other important aspects connoting a railway system, such 
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as the structural model, the competition level and the density of the 
network. 
This study has firstly presented an illustration of the main railway reforms 
implemented in the European Union in the last decades. Their effects were 
reviewed in terms of the different and, at times, contrasting contributions 
emerging from the relevant literature. Therein, the rationale behind the 
choice of analysing the impacts of economic regulation on the cost levels of 
European railways has been explained. The following literature reviews 
have shifted the attention on how an ideal rail regulator should look like, 
and on how regulation in railways can be measured, a somewhat 
unexplored field. The findings from the review on ideal rail regulator 
characteristics have been exploited in order to design a questionnaire 
addressed to regulators, infrastructure managers and railway undertakings 
across Europe. The purpose of this questionnaire was to understand how 
European rail regulators perform against the ideal characteristics surfacing 
from the literature. Moving to more quantitative exercises, the insights 
traced by looking at methodologies employed in non-railway but 
comparable industries inform the choice to measure regulation by using a 
newly developed regulation index. This regulation index has been included 
in a total cost function model, whose econometric estimations have been 
presented. Finally, this chapter summarises the novelties of this thesis 
(8.2), along with its main findings (8.3) and future strands of research (8.4). 
The final section (8.5) will then be dedicated to the discussion of policy 
implications resulting from the questionnaire responses and the 
econometric outcomes, providing linkages between these two analyses.  
8.2  Novelties of the thesis 
The qualitative and quantitative analyses of this thesis have introduced 
some innovations in the field of economic study of railway reforms. These 
can be summarised as follows: 
1) By deeply examining the role played by regulators in railways, this 
research fills a relevant gap in the literature on the impacts of railway 
reforms, by combining quantitative and qualitative analyses on economic 
regulation and highlighting how rail regulators provide a unique function of 
support and safeguard of efficient market mechanisms;  
2) Utilising a questionnaire addressed to regulators and other industry 
representatives has enabled the collection of updated and first-hand 
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evidence on the current status of rail regulation across Europe, particularly 
valuable given the several reforms implemented in recent years. This 
questionnaire was designed according to the findings emerged from an 
extensive review of the literature on the ideal rail regulator characteristics, 
for which similar examples were not found in this research area, suggesting 
that potential improvements and expansions are possible; 
3) The introduction of a newly developed regulation variable aims to 
tackle a lack in the literature on railway reforms, accounting for regulatory 
characteristics which do not end with the independence of the regulators, 
but now embrace the activities, powers and role of these bodies as well; 
4) The construction of this variable moves from the formalisation of a 
dummy (as elaborated by previous literature) to the definition of a 
composite index, conceived over selected sub-drivers from the Rail 
Liberalisation Index reports (IBM and Kirchner, 2002, 2004, 2007 and 
2011). This leads to the creation of a panel involving 17 European 
countries (for the period 2002-2010), with a view to obtain a better 
representation of the regulatory features; 
5) This index is incorporated into a translog total cost function, and 
estimations are performed. The models involve different types of output 
measurement, among which the disaggregated train km specifications -  
importantly introduced in addition to specifications analysed in past studies 
- are the preferred ones. This choice is motivated by the more sensible 
representation offered compared with that provided by alternative models. 
Regulation, structural reforms and competition are argued to be accurately 
captured by disaggregated train km models, especially in relation to their 
interdependencies, not robustly examined as parts of the same scheme by 
past contributions on this field. 
8.3  Main findings of the thesis 
Building on the innovations summarised above, this thesis has produced 
important results which would potentially be able to shed some light on the 
role played by economic regulation and regulators within the European 
railway systems. The main findings highlighted by this research are: 
1) On the basis of the qualitative and quantitative analyses, reforms on 
the regulatory role are argued to have significant incidence on railway 
systems, in terms of beneficial effects on efficiency; 
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2) The results of the questionnaire allow a detailed analysis of the 
regulatory practices implemented by rail regulators across Europe. The 
related impacts for researchers and industry actors are mixed: while 
regulators’ potential decisively improved in recent years and these bodies 
seem to formally reach the necessary requirements to effectively operate 
(as emerging from the adequate levels of independence, resources and 
transparency achieved, for instance), in practice regulatory powers appear 
variegated and cannot be considered to be fully exploited yet in the 
majority of the sample. This is particularly evident for crucial activities such 
as the approval of track access charging schemes and the monitoring of 
the efficiency and quality of the infrastructure managers’ performance, for 
which several regulators play no or minimal role because multi-annual 
contracts are in place or other bodies (typically governments) carry out 
these tasks. Further strengthening these powers and role of economic 
regulators would seem beneficial, especially in light of what emerging from 
the complementing econometric results, wherein stronger economic 
regulation was associated with positive effects on the efficiency 
performance of European railway systems. Exploiting the regulators’ 
independence, autonomy and expertise seems recommendable, 
considering the possibilities granted by the Recast, especially when 
governmental lacks require regulators to step in. More evidence on these 
aspects is required, possibly through the design of even larger surveying 
projects involving, among the others, new operators and governments; 
3) The impacts of regulation on costs are analysed more precisely than 
previously. In the preferred model, regulation combined with vertical 
separation produces benefits on costs (when density is below average), 
and passenger competition can further improve railway efficiency. An 
important contribution to the literature is that strong regulation can 
overcome some of the negative impacts of vertical separation at higher 
density levels, thus increasing the proportion of railways for which vertical 
separation may be a sensible policy option from a cost reduction 
perspective. This finding will be further explored in Section 8.5. 
Overall this work, while documenting the state of play of regulation 
practices, moves in the direction of a more bottom-up identification of the 
areas where (and the conditions through which) regulation, structure and 
competition may interact and produce advantages for the railways’ 
efficiency. Exploring this research strand may clarify why ideal rail 
regulatory practices are more or less implemented in certain countries, 
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which is crucial in order to justify the appropriate amount of resources 
allocated to rail regulatory activities across Europe. 
8.4  Future research 
Throughout the thesis, suggestions of future strands of research have been 
indicated as emerging from both the qualitative and quantitative analyses. 
Starting with the former, the originality of the questionnaire as one of the 
first attempts seeking views from railway actors about the regulators’ role 
has implied dealing with weaning difficulties. The selection of the key areas 
informing the design of the questionnaire is yet to be completed, and 
stands as one of the first attempts to deepen the understanding of 
regulatory mechanisms in railways. Looking at railway-related studies but 
also and especially at studies on comparable network industries constitutes 
a recommendable option in terms of tracing further key areas which may 
help to better clarify the role played by regulators in railways.  
The risk of receiving biased answers is another delicate point which has 
been tried to be overcome, as explained in Chapter 4. It appears 
reasonable to encourage the involvement of at least two further types of 
actors in future surveying projects. On the one hand, involving non-
incumbent operators may re-define the analysis in terms of discriminatory 
practices and regulatory promptness. On the other hand, involving the 
governments may be crucial in order to better examine those contexts 
wherein the regulators’ scope is squeezed due to the widespread 
governmental presence within the railway governance. 
On the whole, the choice of designing a questionnaire seemed the natural 
solution given the clear lack of up-to-date data and information on the 
regulatory state of European railways. Building on this questionnaire, 
developments may arise from employing different yet presumably smoother 
methods. At times, interviews have been utilised in this project in order to 
complement or update the questionnaire responses: these may ensure an 
appropriate alternative in future. Round tables involving diverse railway 
actors represent another option which, albeit logistically problematic, 
potentially provides with valuable debates for the research in this field. 
Moving to the quantitative side of the thesis, it should be noted that typical 
measurement issues and potential corrective actions pertaining to the 
general literature on the impacts of railway reforms have previously been 
illustrated in Chapter 2. Here suggestions will be pointed out in relation to 
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the construction and employment of one of the major novelties of the 
econometric analysis, namely the regulation index. Relevantly, issues 
regarding the authors’ interpretation and the subsequent scoring system 
have emerged and further documental reviews are needed, in order to 
reasonably justify at least the occurrence of the biggest regulatory 
changeovers within a particular railway system. 
Moreover, additions or modifications may concern the sets of macro-areas, 
drivers and sub-drivers. Following the methodology of the questionnaire on 
the ideal rail regulator characteristics, designed on the basis of the most 
recent findings in this area, may enrich the current structure of the 
regulation index. It should be however borne in mind that such additions or 
modifications should harmoniously be inserted into the index, calling for 
measurable criteria and reasonable alterations in the overall system of 
weights. 
Importantly, economic regulation presents interrelations with other 
characteristics of a railway system which should be considered when 
adding new themes in the regulation index. A sound example is given by 
the competitive conditions, whose exploration within the Rail Liberalisation 
Index reports (IBM and Kirchner, 2002, 2004, 2007 and 2011) may be 
carried out. Competition sub-indices may emerge from this work, potentially 
employable in econometric analyses in lieu of dummies.  
In particular, these further sub-indices would help shed some light on the 
impacts of economic regulation on different passenger end-user markets, 
such as the long distance routes on the one hand, and the regional and 
urban segments on the other. As shown by the questionnaire results, 
“competition in the market” is actually implemented into national 
commercial routes in 5 countries in the sample, while “competition for the 
market” is typically applied by using direct awards rather than tenders. As 
suggested earlier, an appropriate starting point to measure competition in 
these sub-markets may be those specific sub-drivers included in the Rail 
Liberalisation Index reports (IBM and Kirchner, 2002, 2004, 2007 and 
2011) which, for instance, look at the market share and at the growth in 
market share of external railway undertakings both in the passenger routes 
under public service contracts and in the purely commercial passenger 
routes. By analysing the interrelationships between the existing regulation 
index and the newly created competition sub-indices, the effects of 
economic regulation on costs may be better clarified and disentangled 
according to the competitive characteristics of national sub-markets. 
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Conducting this enriching analysis would potentially demonstrate its 
importance especially considering the future implementation of the 
provisions contained in the “market pillar” of the Fourth Railway Package 
(COM, (2013) 25, final), which is set to open the market for domestic 
commercial passenger transport from 2020 and make competitive 
tendering the norm for routes covered by public service contracts.  
Besides a thematic expansion, a temporal one is encouraged. Tracing 
regulatory changeovers dating back to the first European reforms on 
railways may help to delineate how economic regulation has gradually 
shaped its impacts on the efficiency of European railway system. Rigour is 
again needed when scores are to be assigned to specific sub-drivers, 
calling again for documental support able to justify a particular changeover. 
This type of expansion would produce benefits for the econometric analysis 
as well since, as noted in Chapter 6, the cost data, currently used for its 
2002-2010 period, is actually available from 1994 onwards and may 
therefore be better exploited.  
A temporal expansion is certainly encouraged to cover the most recent 
years as well. As described in this thesis, the Recast marked an important 
effort in improving economic regulation and empowering the actions of 
regulatory bodies in European railways. Therefore, in light of these 
changes, there seems to emerge the necessity of quantitatively capturing 
the recent impacts of economic regulation and regulatory bodies’ activities 
on railway costs. Besides adjusting and updating cost data, highlighted by 
the multiple measurement problems faced by past literature, a new 
exercise attempting to collect up-to-date quantitative data on regulation 
appears essential. Replicating the data collection undertaken with the Rail 
Liberalisation Index reports (IBM and Kirchner, 2002, 2004, 2007 and 
2011) to cover post-Recast years may be here suggested. However, this 
exercise should attempt, as mentioned earlier, to incorporate new themes. 
Looking more closely at the critical areas pointed out by the questionnaire 
would possibly represent a future approach, in order to appropriately 
quantify the degree of implementation of the Recast in individual national 
systems. More quantifiable details on, for instance, the role played by 
regulatory bodies in approving track access charging schemes, or 
regulating the efficiency and quality of the infrastructure managers, would 
potentially detect to which extent individual Member States have 
implemented the Recast and how their rail regulatory systems compare 
with each other. 
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Comparing different railway systems on important regulatory processes, 
such as those aiming to increase efficiency, represents a lesson that 
should be applied from practices utilised in other network industries. The 
studies by Haney and Pollitt (2009, 2011 and 2013) on the energy sector 
are here exemplary and prompt potential research exercises concerning 
the railway sector. Assessing whether and how regulators use incentive 
regulation to improve railway efficiency, identifying also what lies behind 
the regulators’ choice, would follow the lines pursued by Haney and Pollitt 
surveying work (2009). Constructing a best practice index on the extent to 
which incentive regulation is applied, based on appropriate scores 
assigned to each country, would not only allow for a specific cross-country 
comparison on efficiency-seeking regulation, but also enrich the analysis of 
rail regulation captured by the overall regulation index utilised in this 
research.  
The two remaining studies underline the relevance of understanding what 
influences the regulators’ choice regarding the adoption of incentive 
regulation and international benchmarking. Haney and Pollitt (2011) model 
the degree of best practice incentive regulation, attempting to investigate 
the impact of industry size, political and economic institutions. This 
modelling approach may be equally instrumental in deciphering what 
impacts on the regulatory role in rail efficiency. Lastly, the gap between 
theoretical and practical aspects on international benchmarking is explored 
in Haney and Pollitt more recent work (2013). Factors that may obstruct 
regulators’ capability of employing benchmarking techniques are here 
detailed, and future research may detect whether these factors affect rail 
regulatory experiences as well. Data requirements, choice of variables and 
sophistication of the benchmarking methodology may be among the factors 
that potentially push rail regulators towards adopting softer approaches, 
such as regulation discretion, which may be deemed as more incisive in 
satisfying regulatory purposes. Overall, this set of works on a comparable 
network industry allows to ascertain how certain regulatory areas are 
somewhat unexplored in railway studies. At the same time, these works 
highlight the importance of producing cross-comparisons between railway 
systems in future research. By comparatively examining rail regulation 
across systems, best practices will be pinpointed and deficiencies will be 
assessed, fostering the research path pursued by this thesis. 
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8.5  Policy implications 
This final section discusses the main insights emerging from the qualitative 
and quantitative analyses reported in the previous chapters. Building on the 
questionnaire responses and the econometric estimates, policy implications 
will be drawn for both analyses, also attempting to provide linkages 
between them. 
Starting from the questionnaire responses, a clear pattern seems to 
connect most of European rail regulators. Formal requirements involving 
the independence from political influence, and the necessary autonomy 
given by appropriate financial and human resources, except for a few 
contexts, appear to be met. This noticeable achievement is accompanied 
by high regulatory transparency levels and a generalised perception of 
stability and commitment in the industry.  Significantly, these are features 
that not only reflect what was recommended by the literature on the ideal 
rail regulator characteristics, but also represents positive aspects that need 
to be nourished in future, strengthening existing configurations and 
resolving thorny issues in delayed systems. It seems that the European 
Commission intention of establishing an impartial and accountable third 
party in the national rail markets has been fulfilled in most of the countries 
analysed, where these bodies have emerged particularly in recent times.  
Operationally, a more problematic scenario seems to arise. While the 
promptness of the regulators is generally commended by the set of 
regulatees, leading to actions able to tackle discriminatory practices, this 
constitutes only one side of the range of functions that European regulators 
are required and should be equipped to perform in the rail industry. This 
type of interventions, classed as indirectly producing beneficial effects on 
the level of costs, needs to be combined with direct activities targeting and 
pressuring the infrastructure managers. In reality, a handful of regulators 
are involved in the approval of all track access charging schemes, and 
even fewer regulators actually regulate the performance and efficiency of 
the network managers. As a matter of fact, in the majority of the countries 
surveyed, these regulatory powers may be argued to be at best partial or 
hesitant. Unfortunately, in this area the normative desiderata suggested by 
the Recast are not fully realised yet. Granting independence and destining 
resources to bodies that, except for a few advanced cases, are almost 
exclusively concerned with discriminatory practices does not seem to 
exploit the full regulatory potential. Relevantly, this thesis has attempted to 
point out that the efforts towards minimising railway costs should be 
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supported by the implementation of strong economic regulation, as the 
econometric evidence documents.  
Looking firstly at the model selection, the econometric results (presented in 
Chapter 7) have highlighted the preference for the models based on 
disaggregated train km (Cases 3 and 6). In particular, the richer 
specification given by the emergence of the role played by passenger 
competition provides Case 6 with the edge. 
The implications of the results in Case 6 attest that vertical separation and 
regulation are both needed in order to bring beneficial impacts in the form 
of cost reductions. To understand this finding, it is important to consider 
what occurs when the two reforms are not associated. On the one hand, 
strong economic regulation combined with the holding company (or vertical 
integration models), may not always be able to decipher the potentially 
discriminatory web of inner connections characterising these contexts. On 
the other hand, albeit without evidence, it seems reasonable to presume 
that vertical separation, in the absence of a strong economic regulator, may 
increase inefficiency due to transaction or misalignment costs, and 
because separated actors are not pressurised on efficiency to the same 
extent they would be with holding company or vertical integration. In 
partially or fully integrated structures, competitive pressure impacts on the 
firm as a whole, thus also pressuring the infrastructure division of the 
integrated structure. Therefore, in vertically separated contexts, strong 
regulation may guarantee that necessary pressure on the efficiency of 
infrastructure managers that railway operators are not able to exert.  In 
sum, both vertical separation and regulation seem to function better when 
associated, as the results show. As a caveat, it should be noted that only a 
few regulators directly act or have the powers to request data on the 
efficiency levels of infrastructure managers. The beneficial role played by 
regulators in vertically separated contexts may therefore be associated 
primarily in the increase in operational transparency, leading to costs 
reduction and potentially enabling competition (though this effect may be 
captured by the competition variables in the models presented). 
Given the findings of Mizutani and Uranishi (2013) and Mizutani et al. 
(2014), the overall effect of the interaction between vertical separation and 
regulation needs to be carefully considered in respect to the level of traffic 
density, which represents a detrimental factor in terms of railway costs. 
These previous studies computed specific density cut-off points, beyond 
which vertical separation stops producing beneficial effects on efficiency. In 
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this study, this critical level of density has been identified according to three 
different strengths of regulation (at its minimum, mean and maximum 
values), all combined with vertical separation: graphically, Figure 8.1 
includes the three curves derived. In situations where regulation is weak 
(minimum value), vertical separation reduces costs when density is 
approximately below 0.38 times its average level (corresponding to just 26 
data points). Increasing the strength of regulation to its mean value brings 
this critical value up to 1.06 times (which is the case for 68 observations). 
Further intensification of regulation (maximum value) augments the critical 
value for density (approximately below 1.29 times its average level) and 
involves 98 observations. Mizutani and Uranishi (2013) and Mizutani et al. 
(2014) find critical values for density equal to, respectively, 1.5-1.9 and 
0.99 times the sample mean. The findings suggest that at mean levels 
regulation does not significantly alter the scenario in comparison with 
Mizutani et al. (2014), while a more powerful regulator, together with 
vertical separation, may greatly contribute to reduce costs for a wider range 
of density levels. 
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Figure 8.1  Cost difference between vertical separation - interacted with minimum, mean and maximum levels of regulation - and 
holding company, and its relationship with train density 
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Important linkages between the qualitative and quantitative analyses can 
here be traced. Considering the econometric implications, investing in 
stronger economic regulation would be beneficial in terms of efficiency, and 
the way to carry this out is suggested by observing the regulation index 
scores and the questionnaire responses. In particular, enlarging the width 
of functions assigned to regulators, and tackling current deficiencies, as 
envisaged by the Recast, may play a part. The identification of these critical 
sub-drivers, attempted in the next paragraphs, is led by the following 
questions: 
i.For which sub-drivers should investment in regulation yield more returns 
across the sample and the period of interest?  
ii.What are the determinants of a good regulatory performance? And how did 
these change across the interval considered? 
iii.Which sub-drivers were most crucial for those systems enjoying higher 
increases in their regulation index scores?  
i. The sub-drivers wherein a regulatory investment is potentially more 
fruitful may be detected analysing the individual railway systems’ 
performances in relation to the various sub-drivers of the regulation index. 
Thus, two lists of critical sub-drivers have been extrapolated, potentially 
able to identify where the most (or least) performing systems manifest their 
strength (or weakness). Reasonably, both consolidating these sources of 
strength and intervening in these sources of weakness can be judged as 
necessary and enhancing actions. These two types of sub-drivers were 
traced by verifying how common they are across the period considered by 
the IBM Rail Liberalisation Index reports (IBM and Kirchner, 2002, 2004, 
2007 and 2011). In particular, the strength of highly performing railway 
systems appears to mainly lie on: 
 The regulator’s achieved independence of political influence; 
 Large regulatory powers of investigation on network statement, 
allocation procedure, charging scheme, user fees and competition; 
 The independence and transparency of the body issuing licences; 
 The possibility of formalising framework contracts; 
 The existence of a clearly designed, standardised and publicly 
available infrastructure charging system. 
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On the other hand, the following sub-drivers appear to appropriately 
represent the major sources of weakness for lowly performing railway 
systems: 
 The regulatory lack of adoptable coercive means and legal certainty 
for ex-ante decisions; 
 The regulator’s limited capability to undertake investigations ex 
officio; 
 Frail preservation of non-discriminatory access to services; 
 Train path allocation processes scarcely transparent and 
standardised. 
ii. Besides listing the most common sub-drivers in terms of regulatory 
strength and weakness, further main regulatory determinants (or, in other 
words, sub-drivers) have been studied more in depth, in order to ascertain 
what drove towards a high regulation index score at the beginning and at 
the end of the interval. This has been carried out by analysing the 
snapshots in European railway regulation in 2002 and in 2011. In terms of 
the general aspects of the regulatory body, in 2002 a strong performance 
was usually driven by the transparency of its competence, the 
independence of political influence and the existence of an annual report.  
By 2011, two extra sub-drivers elevated to the role of determinants. On the 
one hand, the existence of a regulatory authority pursuant to the First 
Railway Package, and therefore responsible for non-discriminatory access; 
its presence was traceable only in some countries in 2002, and became 
fully widespread in 2011. On the other hand, the regulatory transparency in 
case of proceedings and sanctions. 
Instead, no changes have been identified when looking at the object of 
regulation: the possibility of investigating on network statement, allocation 
procedure, charging scheme, user fees and monitoring competition were 
deemed to be crucial for a good regulation index score both in 2002 and 
2011. 
In relation to the regulatory powers, common determinants in 2002 and 
2011 were centred on the formalisation of regulatory decisions. Both in 
2002 and 2011, in order to reach stronger regulatory performances, 
decisions should have had legally binding character, been able to be valid 
both ex-ante and ex-post, monitored in terms of both their processes and 
results, and informed with responsibility and rail expertise situated under 
one roof. Differences between the temporal extremities of this period 
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nevertheless arise: in 2011, the duty of starting investigations was not 
deemed as significant anymore, while relying on the legal certainty of ex-
ante decisions became a crucial sub-driver. 
Not many differences emerge when looking at the so-called administrative 
barriers, concerning the issue of licences and safety certificates, and the 
homologation of vehicles. The independence of the body (or bodies) 
issuing these documents, together with transparency of the related 
processes, greatly helped in obtaining a high regulation index score in 
2011. Only the transparency of the process involving the homologation of 
vehicles did not seem to be able to offer analogous contribution in the 2002 
situation. 
Similarly, only one sub-driver differentiates the lists of determinants in 2002 
and 2011 in relation to the train path access conditions. While transparent 
and standardised train path allocation processes were not considered 
decisive in 2002, they so became in 2011. The other determinants were 
represented, in both years, by the preservation of non-discriminatory 
access to services, transparent mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the 
possibility of formalising framework contracts and the absence of priority 
regulations for certain railway undertakings. 
Further, identical determinants inherent in the infrastructure charging 
system are observable. The clarity of the scope justifying how the charges 
are levied, along with their standardisation and publication, strongly led to 
achieve a high regulatory score both in 2002 and 2011. 
iii. Moving to the next question, the focus has here been placed onto 
another list of critical sub-drivers, which specifically characterise the most 
accentuated increases in the regulation index scores. Thus, those railway 
systems which benefitted from an overall score increase greater than 
100%49 (in the 2002-2011 period) have been investigated, determining that 
their enhancements were mostly driven by: 
 The introduction of a regulatory authority responsible for non-
discriminatory access, as well as the increased transparency of its 
competence; 
                                            
49 These strongly enhanced railway systems are Luxembourg (+369.56%), 
Greece (+146.39%), Ireland (+123.34%) and Norway (+100.87%). In 
2002, these systems had regulation index scores which corresponded 
to either “delayed” or “pending departure” scenarios. 
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 Greater powers of investigation on user fees and competition; 
 Improving the level of transparency of the body issuing safety 
certificates; 
 Within the train path access conditions, the high transparency and 
standardisation of path allocation processes, the possibility of formalising 
framework contracts and the absence of priority regulations for certain 
railway undertakings; 
 Ensuring a standardised and public infrastructure charging system. 
Building on these analyses, it could be reasonably argued that providing 
regulators with stronger powers in these specific areas may yield better 
regulatory performances and, in turn, higher benefits in terms of system 
efficiency. In particular, by looking at these areas, there seems to emerge 
the necessity to tackle deficiencies and consolidate good practices 
especially in monitoring and investigative functions. This view is 
corroborated by the responses to the questionnaire reporting more recent 
and detailed information. Therein emphasis is placed onto tackling the 
following specific matters, which in almost all contexts require 
improvements: 
 Tendering procedures are rarely implemented for the allocation of 
passenger routes covered by public service contracts and, where 
implemented, regulators only in isolated cases seem to be asked to 
collaborate on the designing stages; 
 The growing diffusion of regulatory boards, as opposed to individual 
regulators, is to be encouraged for the purpose of benefitting from more 
shared and better founded decisional processes; 
 In view of the growing liberalisation of rail markets across Europe, 
the increasing trend in human and financial resources available to 
regulators needs impulse; 
 Annual reports, which are designed to consolidate the transparency 
and accountability of regulators, are scarcely produced and inadequately 
monitored; 
 Track access charging schemes are approved by only a small 
number of regulators around Europe, even though regulators’ response 
seem strong in case of appeals; 
 Similarly, regulators’ role is limited in relation to monitoring and 
enforcing the infrastructure manager’s quality and efficiency; 
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 Access to infrastructure manager’s data on cost-efficiency and 
quality is allowed to only a few regulators. 
Counter-arguments may justify some of these deficiencies. Utilising direct 
awards instead of tendering procedures may be determined by the lack of 
competitive forces, budgetary constraints may limit the allocation of more 
resources to regulatory operations, and the control of the infrastructure 
managers’ activities may be ensured by the presence of multi-annual 
contracts between these bodies and governments. Indeed, the Recast 
leaves the decision with the Member States on whether the regulatory body 
or the government is responsible for exerting pressure to reduce costs. 
Nonetheless, the empirical results of this work importantly attest that strong 
regulation, even in the face of great levels of density, positively impacts on 
efficiency. As explained previously, strengthening regulation implies 
intervening in specific areas, highlighted by the analyses on the results of 
the regulation index and on the responses to the questionnaire. Various 
strategies may be therefore delineated in order to foster this role. Gains in 
efficiency may arise from reshuffling railway governance arrangements: 
governments seem to play a strong role in many contexts where instead 
regulatory bodies’ expertise may be exploited. Regulatory intervention may 
be enhanced for the promotion of competition, beyond the current activities 
on non-discrimination and towards the designing of tenders. Moreover, 
enforcement of efficient practices on the part of the infrastructure managers 
may be pursued, carefully avoiding duplications with safeguarding 
mechanisms already envisaged by the multi-annual contracts. However, 
there would still appear to be advantages in having the role of incentivising 
and enforcing efficiency improvements played by a body that is 
independent of government, and this approach is generally adopted in 
economic regulation in the United Kingdom, for example. 
The emerging story is not a simple one, but positive effects from regulation 
arise. Regulation seems to have beneficial effects on railway efficiency, 
particularly when associated with vertical separation, when below average 
levels of density exist, and when employed as instrumental to the creation 
of competitive practices (in the passenger sector in particular). Therefore, 
the decision on whether or when to introduce or strengthen regulatory 
powers seems to be dependent on a certain degree of market openness, a 
certain extent of structural unbundling, and a certain level of traffic. Even 
though some patterns can be detected across Europe, particularly related 
to the full attainment of formal requirements by the regulators, variegated 
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scenarios emerge and do not allow to indicate general policies valid for all 
the countries. Therefore, careful considerations need to be formulated 
when deciding on the appropriate regulatory framework, in order to avoid 
the risk of late or overcompensating interventions.  
While national characteristics seem to determine the strength of the role 
played by regulators, there however exists a need of advancement and 
harmonisation in terms of measuring this role. The qualitative and 
quantitative analyses presented in this work have attempted to shed some 
light on this somewhat unexplored area in railways. In this sense, 
conferring more powers on regulators may not only benefit the systems’ 
efficiency as shown, but also stimulate the design of much required 
international benchmarking activities in this industry. Comparable methods 
of monitoring efficiency and continental best practices would then be able 
to be employed, along the lines of what emerged in other network sectors 
(typically energy). 
In summary, the main policy implications of this research are: 
1) Strong economic regulation may lead to benefits in efficiency, but its 
effectiveness depends on specific railway systems’ characteristics, 
involving the structure, competition and network density; 
2) Following from the above point, not general but only system-based 
regulatory recommendations can be formulated. Corroborating this 
consideration are the questionnaire findings, accounting for variegated 
European rail regulatory scenarios; 
3) Rail regulatory patterns at European level are markedly identifiable 
in terms of formal features involving, among the others, the almost 
ubiquitous presence of independent and autonomous regulators. Instead, 
at a more operational level, there does not exist a unique approach, as the 
current rail regulatory activities and powers seem to substantially differ 
across Europe in terms of ranges and extents; 
4) Railway governances should be moulded according to a bottom-up 
approach, in conformity with a particular system’s conditions. Importantly, 
in terms of economic regulation and regulator’s role, what works in a 
context may not work in another, similarly to the findings highlighted by the 
literature on railway structural reforms (Mizutani et al., 2014); 
5) Therefore, learning from the debate on other reforms, European 
legislation seems to better impact when focusing on designing a clear set 
of general requirements to be met by the individual countries. When 
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instead specific powers are granted, the particular characteristics of the 
individual systems may represent a burden for the success of European 
reforms. This may occur for various reasons. For instance, when regulators 
play a limited role within the railway governance of a particular country 
because other bodies already deal with certain regulatory activities, or 
when national markets are not attractive enough to incentivise the entrance 
of new competitors. The different paces of development characterising the 
European railway systems should then be borne in mind when legislating, 
in order to avoid promulgating seemingly necessary but practically untimely 
measures. 
6) Following the direction undertaken by the Recast, enlarging the 
width of functions assigned to rail regulators is much required, if the aim of 
attaining more efficient and qualitatively satisfactory European railway 
systems is to be realised. 
In conclusion, this research aimed to enhance the discussion on the 
impacts of economic regulation and the regulators’ role in European 
railways. As noted previously, the undertaken path is yet to be completed, 
but this study importantly represents one of the first attempts able to give 
account of the critical interrelationships existing between the structure, 
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OSE Hellenic Railways Organization (Greece) 
PKP Polskie Koleje Państwowe (Poland) 
RACO / SKE Railways Arbitration Commission /Schiedskommission 
im Eisenbahnver (Switzerland) 
RAS Regulatory Authority for Railways (Greece) 
RENFE Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles (Spain) 
RU Railway Undertaking 
SBB / CFF / FFS Schweizerische Bundesbahnen /  Chemins de fer 
Fédéraux Suisses / Ferrovie Federali Svizzere 
(Switzerland) 
SNCF Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français 
(France) 
SJ   Statens Järnvägar (Sweden) 
SJT Statens Jernbanetilsyn / Norwegian Regulatory 
Authority (Norway) 
SUR Seemingly Unrelated regressions 
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TOC Train Operating Companies (United Kingdom) 
TOE   Tonnes of Oil Equivalent 
TRAFI Liikenteen Turvallisuusvirasto / Finnish Transport 
Safety Agency (Finland) 
VR   Valtion Rautatiet (Finland) 
UIC Union Internationale des Chemins de fer / International 
Union of Railways 
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Appendix A 
Summary of findings from literature on the impacts of 
railway reforms 
This appendix will summarise the findings emerged from the literature on 
the impacts of railway reforms (Chapter 2) by focusing on the following 
main aspects: 
• The sign and magnitude of the impacts of specific reforms, such as 
vertical and horizontal separation, open access, accounting separation and 
presence of an independent regulator; 
• The limitations affecting the studies, together with reflections and 
further developments arising from the results. 
Table A.1 will illustrate the former aspects, while Table A.2 will describe the 
latter. The order the studies are listed follows the way they are presented in 
the literature review in Chapter 2. 
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Table A.1  Summary of findings on impacts of specific railway reforms 
Paper Impacts 
Vertical separation Horizontal 
separation 







Positive when train density 
is low 
Positive    
van de Velde 
et al. (2012) 
Adversely influenced by 
high train density and 
freight traffic’s share 
Positive Insignificant   
Mizutani et al. 
(2014) 
Positive when train density 
is low 
Positive Insignificant   
Cantos et al. 
(2011) 
Positive with openness of 
freight market and 
horizontal separation 
Positive with vertical 
separation, high 
influence 
 Positive for 
freight market with 
vertical separation 
 Scarce influence 
of tendering procedures 
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Paper Impacts 
Vertical separation Horizontal 
separation 




Cantos et al. 
(2012) 
Positive with horizontal 
separation, low influence 
Positive with vertical 
separation 
Positive for passenger 
and freight services, 
high influence 
  
Friebel et al. 
(2010) 
Positive if full package 
implemented gradually 




Positive if full package 
implemented gradually 




Wetzel (2008)  Positive for 
domestic freight sector 
 Negative for 
international and domestic 
passenger markets 
 Positive   
Asmild et al. 
(2009) 
  Positive   
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Paper Impacts 
Vertical separation Horizontal 
separation 







Negative for most 
countries analysed 




Negative  Positive   
Merkert et al. 
(2012) 
Slightly negative     
Merkert 
(2012) 
Increase in transaction 
costs, but not to a large 
extent 
    
Drew and 
Nash (2011) 
Worse than integrated 
form 
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Paper Impacts 
Vertical separation Horizontal 
separation 






Negative effects on 
welfare 
Negative effects on 
welfare 
   
Drew (2009) Better than open access to 
freight services 
 Worse than vertical 
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Table A.2  Remarks on studies from literature on impacts of railway reforms 
Paper Remarks 




 Exclusion of United Kingdom, United States, 
Canada, Australia and Mexico 
 Investigation of numerous typologies of vertical 
separation enforced 
 Indirect effects of general competitive conditions 
van de 
Velde et al. 
(2012) 
 Competition effects appear not to be considered 
fully in their impact 
 Freight competition dummy is not sub-clustered 
into different sub-dummies (as it is for passenger 
competition) due to lack of data 
 United Kingdom was included in the sample, 
tackling the limitation of previous studies 
 Accurate information on the temporal 
implementation of the reforms was collected 
 Two further organisational intermediate models are 
included in the analysis: holding company and separation 
of essential functions (within a bundled or vertically 
unbundled configuration) 
 Reduction of costs produced by horizontal 
separation may be partly reflected by the sale of freight 
undertakings, therefore accounting for benefits not directly 
related to this type of unbundling 
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Paper Remarks 
Limitations Reflections and further developments 
Mizutani et 
al. (2014) 
  Inclusion of holding company represents a novelty 
in the literature 
 Differences in individual railway systems call for 
multiple recipes in terms of organisational choice 
Cantos et al. 
(2011) 
 Difficulties in dividing the effects of reforms.  Better results in terms of efficiency, technical 
progress and productivity for countries which undertook a 
full process of separation 
 Introduction of vertical separation is positive when 
accompanied by implementation of horizontal separation 
Cantos et al. 
(2012) 
  Dummy for implementation of full package shows 
the significance of complementarities gained thanks to 
interactions between different measures 
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Paper Remarks 
Limitations Reflections and further developments 
Friebel et al. 
(2010) 
 Absence of relevant indications regarding the 
effects of individual reforms 
 British data not complete and not considered for 
most of the regressions in the study 
 Reforms are measured on the basis of their 
formal legislative approval, rather than actual 
enforcement 
 Intensity of subsidisation across countries and 
potential impacts of qualitative factors are not illustrated 
 Simultaneous application of reforms might bring 
about negative performances 
Wetzel 
(2008) 
 Partial or total exclusion of United Kingdom, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Estonia 
 Temporal discrepancy between legislative 
promulgation of regulations and their concrete 
enforcement 
 Unsatisfactory outcome may be produced by the 
incomplete implementation of reforming package 
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Paper Remarks 
Limitations Reflections and further developments 
Asmild et al. 
(2009) 
 Data were unavailable for Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Romania which were therefore not 
included in the sample 
 Strong econometric assumption in connection 
with efficiency, considering relative changeovers only 
due to legislative innovations 
 Distinction of the effects deriving from accounting 
and complete separation, underscoring the importance of 
examining their isolated contribution on the improvement 




 Privatisation, competitive experience and rail 
modal share should be assessed 
 Most of analysed European countries show 
economies of scope 
 Further paths may be able to detect the direction of 
the impacts of economies of scope (vertical or horizontal) 




 Cost data for some new small operators were 
not obtainable and, in case an approximation was not 
feasible, discarded 
 Importance of certain sources that might exert a 
positive influence on efficiency, describing the significance 
of deregulation interventions as contributing for a 
percentage between 50% and 60% of the costs reduction 
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Paper Remarks 
Limitations Reflections and further developments 
Merkert et 
al. (2012) 
 Some operators’ data unavailable, but sample is 
considered to be adequately representative of the 
countries’ systems 
 Bottom-up process unable to take into account 
different interfaces, as well as to distinguish the costs 
for operations of monitoring of performances from 
specific interconnections between the network 
managers and the railway companies 
 Further strands suggested on wider identification of 
the effects of vertical separation on the overall efficiency 
levels, as well as on appropriate detection of the 
advantages from incentivising competition 
 Transaction costs should be monitored at regular 
intervals in order to verify whether noteworthy 
modifications have occurred 
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Paper Remarks 
Limitations Reflections and further developments 
Merkert 
(2012) 
 Limits on labour measurement, with only 
potential capacity (and not realised capacity) assessed, 
resulting in overestimation of the transaction costs 
 Difficulties in determining the parent support and 
the transaction costs related to the whole system 
 Low transaction costs for railway undertakings in 
comparison with total operating costs (on average at about 
10% at firm level) 
 Better results for German holding model, even 
though parent support and revealed scale should be 
considered in the comparison with other railway systems 
 Even little vertical separation and competition 
effects may counter transaction costs 
 Supplementary research needed on the actual 
impact of labour on transaction costs, the interrelations 
between network manager and rail operator, the 
characteristics of the decision-making process, and the 
evaluation of further typologies of cost 
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Paper Remarks 
Limitations Reflections and further developments 
Drew and 
Nash (2011) 
  The regulation environment, the financial conditions 
of the incumbent, the presence of services of public 
interest, as well as the governmental support in 
infrastructure interventions, should be taken into 
consideration 





 The counterfactual employed in the work does 
not take account of increasing costs in infrastructure 
after privatisation and, above all, Hatfield accident 
 Welfare outcomes declined after Hatfield accident 
(2000), when public control on network manager and rail 
operators became stricter 
 Reforms increased complexity of the system, 
producing a rise in costs (transaction costs, diseconomies 
of scale and principal-agent-related costs) 
 Regulation failures are pointed out in respect to low 
level of investments in infrastructure 
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Paper Remarks 
Limitations Reflections and further developments 
Drew (2009)   British study highlights how vertical separation 
might induce a rise in infrastructure and transaction costs  
 Railway reforms are linked to institutional, market 
sub-divisions, scale, scope and technical characteristics, 
configuring a multi-faced scenario where these aspects 
may change within the same country 




Rail regulation questionnaire for regulators 
I. POSITIONING IN THE MARKET 
Purpose: Understanding the historical evolution of the regulator, as well as the competition levels of passenger sub-markets 
A) General information about the regulator 
1) When was the regulator set up?  
2) 
What have been the major changes in regulatory responsibilities since 2002, and in 
which year did they occur? 
 
B) Open access and public contract services 
1a) 
What is the proportion of the passenger market covered by public service obligations? 
(in % of passenger-kilometres) 
 
1b) 
What proportion of these routes under public service contracts (as per question 1a) is 




Is competition legally permitted in the non-public service contracts domestic market? 
(exclude cases where international services compete with domestic services) [Yes / 
Partly / No] 
 
2b) Does it happen in practice? [Yes / No]  
Comments: 
  
- 163 - 
 
 
II. STABILITY AND PREDICTABILITY OF THE REGULATORY BODY 
Purpose: Delineating whether the interaction with political bodies may affect the regulator’s autonomy 
A) Terms of appointment 
1) 




Is the board appointed for a fixed term? (Where there is no board, please answer these questions 
in respect to the appointment of the regulator) [Yes / No] 
 
2b) If yes, how long is it? (in years)   
3a) Can the members of the board be re-appointed? [Yes / No]  
3b) If yes, how many times?   
B) Board’s structure 
1) 
How many persons are appointed to the board? And how many are employed full-time and part-
time? 
  
2) How does the regulator’s board formalise its decisions? [By majority voting / Unanimity / Other]   
3) How is the board appointed? [By the Government / By the board itself / Other]  
4a) 
Is the regulatory body required to take into account Government guidance with respect to its 
regulatory decisions? [Yes / Partly / No] 
 
4b) Please give examples if relevant  
Comments: 




Purpose: Identification of the extent to which operators can get fair access to the infrastructure 
A) Access to train paths and services 
1) How many complaints are received and dealt with by the regulator? (on average in a one-year period)  
2a) 
Are certain RUs favoured when disruptions affect the allocation of train paths, the access to services 
and the timetabling process? [Yes / No] 
 
2b) If yes, which operators and why?  
B) Proportion of capacity to be allocated through multi-annual agreements 
1a) What proportion of infrastructure capacity is allocated through multi-annual agreements? (in %)  











 IV. PRESENCE OF APPROPRIATE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Purpose: Verifying whether the regulator is sufficiently equipped in order to develop and achieve its tasks and objectives 
A) Consistency between requirements and available resources  
1) 
How many employees in terms of full-time equivalent are currently working for the 
authority on railway economic regulations (i.e. excluding safety and interoperability)? 
  
2) 
What is the main background of the employees working exclusively on railway economic 
regulations? [Rail industry / Economic / Legal / Other] 
  
3a) Does the regulator have adequate financial resources for the tasks required? [Yes / No]  
3b) If no, please explain the reasons   
B) Source of financial resources 
1a) 
Are the regulatory authority's operations funded by the government and/or by the 
industry? [Only by Government / Only by Industry / By Government and Industry / Other] 
 
1b) And in what proportion?  
2) Are the funders represented on the regulatory authority's board? [Yes / No]  
Comments: 







V. PRO-ACTIVITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Purpose: Detection of autonomous powers for analysis, interventions and effectiveness 
A) Obligation to start investigations 
1) Do all track access charging schemes have to be submitted to the regulator for approval? [Yes / No]  
B) Legally and financially binding decision-power  
1a) Are the decisions of the regulatory body advisory or legally binding? [Advisory / Legally binding]  
1b) Can those affected by these decisions appeal? If yes, who to?  
2a) Does the regulatory authority have the possibility of enforcing penalties such as fines? [Yes / No]  
2b) What penalties can be imposed? And how large may they be?    
Comments: 









VI. DATA ON EFFICIENCY AND MULTI-ANNUAL CONTRACTS 
Purpose: To see what mechanisms are in place to achieve efficiency 
A) Monitoring of the Infrastructure Managers 
1) 
Is a multi-annual contract involving the Infrastructure Manager and Government 
in place? [Yes /No] 
 
2) 
To what extent is the performance and efficiency of the Infrastructure Manager 
regulated by Government through this contract as opposed to by the regulator? 
 
3) 
Does the regulatory body have a role in monitoring and enforcing the quality and 
efficiency of the Infrastructure Manager? [Yes / No] 
 
3b) If so, how is this undertaken?  
4) 
Can the regulatory authority require provision of data on cost-efficiency and 
quality of service on the part of the Infrastructure Managers? [Yes / No] 
 
Comments: 





COMMENTS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Potential improvements, corrections and suggestions 
Please add here any further comments you may have: 




Rail regulation questionnaire for infrastructure managers and railway undertakings 
I. NON-DISCRIMINATION 
Purpose: Identification of the extent to which operators can get fair access to the infrastructure 
A) Access to infrastructure and services 
1) 
For which of the following aspects is discrimination considered to be a problem? 
(multiple selection is possible) [Tracks / Rolling stock / Highly specialised staff / Use of 
electrical supply equipment for traction current / Refuelling facilities / Freight terminals / 
Marshalling yards / Train formation facilities / Storage sidings / Depots / Passenger 
stations / Other] 
 
2a) Does the regulator tackle the related problems promptly and effectively? [Yes / No]  
2b) If no, please provide more detail (for instance, specific cases)   
B) Proportion of capacity to be allocated through multi-annual agreements 
1a) 
What proportion of infrastructure capacity is allocated through multi-annual agreements? 
(in %) 
 
1b) With which operators?  
Comments: 






II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE REGULATOR AND THE GOVERNMENT (OR OTHER AGENCIES) 
Purpose: Detecting overlapping of roles and accountability for regulator’s choices and measures 
A) Dependence status of decision maker for licensing, safety certificates and homologation of vehicles 
1a) 
Are connections existing between the RUs and the body (or bodies) issuing licences, safety 
certificates and vehicles certifications/permissions? [Yes / No] 
 
1b) If yes, for which body (or bodies)?   
B) Government influence 
1a) 
Is the regulatory body required to take into account Government guidance with respect to its 
regulatory decisions? [Yes / Partly / No] 
 
1b) Please give examples if relevant  
2) How is the independence of political influence ensured for the regulator?  
Comments: 





Purpose: Identifying whether the regulator displays in a public way the process and the results that substantiate specific decisions 
A) Transparency of Regulatory Authority's competence and processes 
1a) 
Are the regulatory body's roles, objectives, powers and processes publicly available and 
clearly specified? [Yes / No] 
 
1b) If no, which areas need to be better specified?   
1c) Where can the information in question 1a be traced?  
2) Is the annual report (if existing) reviewed by impartial third parties? [Yes / No]  
B) Transparency for licensing, safety certificates and homologation of vehicles 
1a) 
Are the decisional methods and processes of the relevant body (bodies) clearly specified 
and publicly available? [Yes / No] 
 
1b) If no, which areas need to be better specified?   
1c) Where can the information in question 1a be traced?  










C) Transparency for the allocation processes and conflicts 
1a) 
Are the allocation processes and decisions clearly specified and publicly available for all the 
interested RUs?  [Yes / No] 
 
1b) If no, which areas need to be better specified?   
1c) Where can the information in question 1a be traced?  
2a) 
In case of conflicts regarding allocation issues, are the related procedures for investigations 
clearly specified and publicly available for all the interested RUs? [Yes / No] 
 
2b) If no, which areas need to be better specified?   
Comments: 






IV. PRO-ACTIVITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Purpose: Detection of autonomous powers for analysis, interventions and effectiveness 
A) Obligation to start investigations 
1) Do all track access charging schemes have to be submitted to the regulator for approval? [Yes / No]  
Comments: 
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V. DATA ON EFFICIENCY AND MULTI-ANNUAL CONTRACTS 
Purpose: To see what mechanisms are in place to achieve efficiency 
A) Monitoring of the Infrastructure Managers 
1) 
Is a multi-annual contract involving the Infrastructure Manager and Government 
in place? [Yes /No] 
 
2) 
To what extent is the performance and efficiency of the Infrastructure Manager 
regulated by Government through this contract as opposed to by the regulator? 
 
3) 
Does the regulatory body have a role in monitoring and enforcing the quality and 
efficiency of the Infrastructure Manager? [Yes / No] 
 
3b) If so, how is this undertaken?  
4) 
Can the regulatory authority require provision of data on cost-efficiency and 









COMMENTS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Potential improvements, corrections and suggestions 
Please add here any further comments you may have: 




Regulation index: range of answers 
In this appendix the sub-drivers of the regulation index will be further 
investigated, presenting the respective ranges of answers employed by the 
authors of the 4 Rail Liberalisation Index reports (IBM and Kirchner, 2002, 
2004, 2007 and 2011).  As indicated in Section 6.2.1, the numeric range for 
all sub-drivers within the regulation index (and within the Rail Liberalisation 
Index) goes from 1 (minimum) to 10 (maximum). The specific meaning of 
each component of the scoring range will be detailed, as extrapolated from 
the above reports.  
In particular, given that most sub-drivers prompt a score of either 1 or 10, 
two corresponding columns will be reported while the intermediate answers 
will be provided together in a separate column (with the score in bold and 
the related answer in brackets). Since not all the sub-drivers are included in 
all the reports (see Section 6.2.1), some information turn out to be 
unavailable, especially for the earliest reports, and the related cells have 
been greyed out accordingly. The exact names of the drivers and sub-
drivers correspond to those adopted in the latest version of the report 
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Table D.1  Regulation index: range of answers from Rail Liberalisation Index 2002 report 
Source: IBM Business Consulting Services and Kirchner (2002), pp.104-112 
Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
General Aspects of the 
Regulatory Authority 
    
 Existence of Regulatory 




No Yes  
 Transparency of competence of 
Regulatory Authority 
No Yes 5 (Partly) 
 Transparency in case of 
proceedings/sanctions 
 
 Independence of political 
influence 
 
 Existence of an annual report  
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Object of the 
Regulation 
    
 Inspection of network statement 
(10 aspects) 
0-2 10+ 2 (3); 3 (4); 4 (5); 5 (6); 6 (7); 7 (8); 
8 (9); 9 (10) 
 Investigations concerning 
allocation procedure 
No Yes  
 Investigations concerning 
charging scheme 
No Yes  
 Investigations concerning level 
or structure of user fees 
No Yes  
 Monitoring competition No Yes  
Powers of the 
Regulatory Authority 
    
 Can/Must start investigations 
upon request50 
No Yes  
                                            
50 Separate questions are employed in this report to ask whether the regulator “can” or “must” start investigations upon request. 
- 179 - 
 
 
Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Can/Must start investigations ex 
officio51 
No Yes  
 Legally binding character of 
Regulatory Authority decisions 
No Yes  
 Determination by the regulatory 
body 
 
 Possibility of imposing coercive 
means 
No Yes  
 Possibility of imposing fines No Yes, major 4 (Yes, minor) 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post 
and/or ex-ante decisions 
 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante 
decisions 
 
 Monitoring processes No Yes 5 (Partly) 
                                            
51 Separate questions are employed in this report to ask whether the regulator “can” or “must” start investigations ex officio. 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Licensing     
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
Dependent Formally and 
factually 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of licensing 
process 
 
Safety certificate     
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
No Formally and 
factually 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of issue process No Yes, with 
documents available 




    
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
No Formally and 
factually 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Transparency of the issuing 
process 
No Yes, with 
documents available 
7 (Yes, but no documents 
available) 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
    
 Existence of priority regulations 
for certain RUs52 
Yes No 9 (By train type (if exclusivity of 
incumbent)) 
 Non-discriminatory access to 
services 
No Yes, with 
documents available 
7 (Yes, but no documents 
available) 
 Non-discriminatory marketing 
for all train paths 
No Yes 9 (Yes, but with socio-economic 
considerations) 
 Transparent mechanism to 
resolve conflicts 
No Yes 5 (Partly) 
 Framework contracts No Yes  
                                            
52 This sub-driver in the 2002 report focuses on “priority scheduling arrangements for the incumbent” (IBM Business Consulting 
Services and Kirchner, 2002, p.110). 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Transparent and standard train 
path allocation processes 
No Yes, with 
documents available 




    
 Coverage of infrastructure 
charging system 
No Yes  
 Publication of infrastructure 
charging system 
No Yes 5 (Partly) 
 Uniform charging system No Yes  
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Table D.2  Regulation index: range of answers from Rail Liberalisation Index 2004 report 
Source: IBM Business Consulting Services and Kirchner (2004), Annex VII. Weightings and range of answers 
Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
General Aspects of the 
Regulatory Authority 
    
 Existence of Regulatory 









(as per Art.30 
Directive 
2001/14/EC) 
5 (A kind of Regulatory Authority); 7 
(Several appropriate institutions) 
 Transparency of competence of 
Regulatory Authority 
No Yes 5 (Yes, but no documents) 
 Transparency in case of 
proceedings/sanctions 
No Yes 5 (Yes, but no documents) 
 Independence of political 
influence 
 
 Existence of an annual report  
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Object of the 
Regulation 
    
 Inspection of network statement 
(10 aspects) 
No (0) Yes (10) 2 (Yes (1+2)); 3 (Yes (3)); 4 ((Yes 
(4)); 5 (Yes (5)); 6 (Yes (6)); 7 (Yes 
(7)); 8 (Yes (8)); 9 (Yes (9)) 
 Investigations concerning 
allocation procedure 
No Yes  
 Investigations concerning 
charging scheme 
No Yes  
 Investigations concerning level 
or structure of user fees 
No Yes  
 Monitoring competition  
Powers of the 
Regulatory Authority 
    
 Can/Must start investigations 
upon request 
Neither nor Must 5 (Can) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Can/Must start investigations ex 
officio 
Neither nor Must 5 (Can) 
 Legally binding character of 
Regulatory Authority decisions 
No Yes  
 Determination by the regulatory 
body 
 
 Possibility of imposing coercive 
means 
No Yes  
 Possibility of imposing fines No Yes, high 4 (Yes, low) 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post 
and/or ex-ante decisions 
 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante 
decisions 
 
 Monitoring processes  
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Licensing     
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
Dependent Formally and de 
facto independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of licensing 
process 
No Yes 5 (Yes, no documents) 
Safety certificate     
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
No Formally and de 
facto independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of issue process No Yes  
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
    
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
No Formally and de 
facto independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of the issuing 
process 
No Yes, with 
documents available 
7 (Yes, but no documents 
available) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
    
 Existence of priority regulations 
for certain RUs 
Yes No  
 Non-discriminatory access to 
services53 
No Yes 5 (Yes, no experiences) 
 Non-discriminatory marketing 
for all train paths54 
No Yes, unsolicited 6 (Yes, upon request) 
No Yes, no restrictions 5 (Yes, with restrictions) 
 Transparent mechanism to 
resolve conflicts 
No Yes 5 (Not clear) 
 Framework contracts No Yes  
                                            
53 This sub-driver comprises the responses to the following: “Processing of applications for the allocation of train paths”, “Right to use 
allocated train paths”, “Use of running train path points and junctions”, “Control of train (signals, regulation etc.)” and “Other 
essential information” (IBM Business Consulting Services and Kirchner, 2004, Annex VII. Weightings and range of answers, p.6). 
54 Marketing for all train paths is measured by two sub-drivers in the 2004 report: higher cells refer to “Recording and communicating 
of available train paths” and lower cells refer to “Provision of relevant train path information” (IBM Business Consulting Services 
and Kirchner, 2004, Annex VII. Weightings and range of answers, p.6). 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Transparent and standard train 
path allocation processes 
No Yes  
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
    
 Coverage of infrastructure 
charging system55 
No Yes  
 Publication of infrastructure 
charging system56 
No Yes 4 (Unclear formula) 
 Uniform charging system57 No Yes  
                                            
55 This sub-driver comprises the responses to the following: “Processing of applications for assignment of Train Path Price System”, 
“Right to use assigned Train Path Price System capacity”, “Use of turnouts and junctions”, “Train control”, “Provision of all other 
essential information” and “Use of utilities for traction current” (IBM Business Consulting Services and Kirchner, 2004, Annex VII. 
Weightings and range of answers, p.7). 
56 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Business Consulting Services and 
Kirchner, 2004, Annex VII. Weightings and range of answers, p.7). 
57 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Business Consulting Services and 
Kirchner, 2004, Annex VII. Weightings and range of answers, p.7). 
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Table D.3  Regulation index: range of answers from Rail Liberalisation Index 2007 report 
Source: IBM Global Business Services and Kirchner (2007), Annex IV – Weightings and response scale 
Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
General Aspects of the 
Regulatory Authority 
    
 Existence of Regulatory 




No Yes  
 Transparency of competence of 
Regulatory Authority 
No Yes, with 
documentation 
5 (Yes, but no documentation / only 
partly transparent) 
 Transparency in case of 
proceedings/sanctions 
No Yes, with 
documentation 
5 (Yes, but no specific regulations) 
 Independence of political 
influence 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Existence of an annual report No Yes, available to 
public 
 
Object of the 
Regulation 
    
 Inspection of network statement 
(10 aspects) 
No Yes (10 out of 10) 2 (Yes (1, 2 out of 10)); 3 (Yes (3 
out of 10)); 4 (Yes (4 out of 10)); 5 
(Yes (5 out of 10)); 6 (Yes (6 out of 
10)); 7 (Yes (7 out of 10)); 8 (Yes (8 
out of 10)); 9 (Yes (9 out of 10)) 
 Investigations concerning 
allocation procedure 
No Yes  
 Investigations concerning 
charging scheme 
No Yes  
 Investigations concerning level 
or structure of user fee 
No Yes  
 Monitoring competition No Yes  
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Powers of the 
Regulatory Authority 
    
 Can/Must start investigations 
upon request 
Neither nor Must 5 (Can) 
 Can/Must start investigations ex 
officio 
Neither nor Must 5 (Can) 
 Legally binding character of 
Regulatory Authority decisions 




3 (Yes, but objections have 
suspensive effect) 






not under one 
roof 
Responsibility for 
decisions and rail  
expertise are 
under one roof 
 
 Possibility of imposing coercive 
means 
No Yes, high 3 (Yes, but no or few figures given); 
5 (Yes, medium) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Possibility of imposing fines No Yes, high 3 (Yes, but no or few figures given); 
5 (Yes, medium) 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post 
and/or ex-ante decisions 
Neither nor Ex-ante possible 4 (Only ex-post) 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante 
decisions 
No Yes 3 (No empirical values available) 
 Monitoring processes No Both 6 (Only the results); 8 (Processes 
only) 
Licensing     
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
Dependent Formally and de 
facto 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of licensing 
process 




3 (Negative experience); 5 (No 
documentation / no experience) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Safety certificate     
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
No Formally and de 
facto 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 




3 (Negative experience); 5 (No 
documentation / no experience) 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
    
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
No Formally and de 
facto 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of the issuing 
process 




3 (Only partially) 5 (No 
documentation) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
    
 Existence of priority regulations 
for certain RUs 
Yes No  







Yes 2 (Yes, but no empirical values); 5 
(“Subjectively believed 
discrimination” (Not reported to 
Regulatory Authority / proceedings 
pending)) 
 Non-discriminatory marketing 
for all train paths59 
No Yes, voluntarily 6 (Yes, only on request); 8 (Partially 
voluntarily / partially on request) 
No Yes, no 
restrictions 
5 (Yes, with restrictions) 
                                            
58 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport in terms of the following: “Application for the 
allocation of train paths”, “Right to use allocated train paths”, “Use of points, switches and junctions”, “Train control” and “Other 
information” (IBM Global Business Services and Kirchner, 2007, Annex IV – Weightings and response scale, p.9). 
59 Marketing for all train paths is measured by two sub-drivers in the 2007 report: higher cells refer to “Recording and communication 
of available train paths” (combining responses related to both freight and passenger transport) and lower cells refer to “Provision 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Transparent mechanism to 
resolve conflicts60 
No Yes, documented 5 (Yes, no documentation / 
partially) 
 Framework contracts No Yes  
 Transparent and standard train 
path allocation processes61 







                                            
of train path information relevant for the offer” (IBM Global Business Services and Kirchner, 2007, Annex IV – Weightings and 
response scale, p.10) 
60 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Global Business Services and 
Kirchner, 2007, Annex IV – Weightings and response scale, p.10). 
61 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Global Business Services and 
Kirchner, 2007, Annex IV – Weightings and response scale, p.10). 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
    
 Coverage of infrastructure 
charging system62 
No Yes  
 Publication of infrastructure 
charging system63 
No Yes  
 Uniform charging system64 No Yes  
 
 
                                            
62 This sub-driver comprises the responses to the following: “Application for the allocation of train paths”, “Right to use allocated train 
paths”, “Use of points, switches and junctions”, “Train control”, “Provision of other information” and “Use of utilities for traction 
current supply” (IBM Global Business Services and Kirchner, 2007, Annex IV – Weightings and response scale, p.11). 
63 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Global Business Services and 
Kirchner, 2007, Annex IV – Weightings and response scale, p.11). 
64 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Global Business Services and 
Kirchner, 2007, Annex IV – Weightings and response scale, p.11). 
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Table D.4  Regulation index: range of answers from Rail Liberalisation Index 2011 report 
Source: IBM Deutschland GmbH and Kirchner, 2011, Annex IV – Weightings and range of answers 
Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
General Aspects of the 
Regulatory Authority 
    
 Existence of Regulatory 




No Yes  
 Transparency of competence of 
Regulatory Authority 
No Yes, with 
documentation 
5 (Yes, but without documentation / 
only partly transparent) 
 Transparency in case of 
proceedings/sanctions 
No Yes, with 
documentation 
5 (Yes, but not specified) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Existence of an annual report No Yes, public  
Object of the 
Regulation 
    
 Inspection of network statement 
(10 aspects) 
No Yes (10 of 10) 2 (Yes (1, 2 of 10)); 3 (Yes (3 of 
10)); 4 (Yes (4 of 10)); 5 (Yes (5 of 
10)); 6 (Yes (6 of 10)); 7 (Yes (7 of 
10)); 8 (Yes (8 of 10)); 9 (Yes (9 out 
of 10)) 
 Investigations concerning 
allocation procedure 
No Yes  
 Investigations concerning 
charging scheme 
No Yes  
 Investigations concerning level 
or structure of user fees 
No Yes  
 Monitoring competition No Yes  
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Powers of the 
Regulatory Authority 
    
 Can/Must start investigations 
upon request 
Neither nor Must 5 (Can) 
 Can/Must start investigations ex 
officio 
Neither nor Must 5 (Can) 
 Legally binding character of 
Regulatory Authority decisions 
No Yes and without 
suspensive 
effects 
3 (Yes and with suspensive effect) 










and rail  
expertise are 
under one roof 
 
 Possibility of imposing coercive 
means 
No Yes, high 3 (Yes, but no or few figures given); 
5 (Yes, middle) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Possibility of imposing fines No Yes, high 3 (Yes, but no or few figures given); 
5 (Yes, middle) 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post 
and/or ex-ante decisions 
Neither nor Ex-ante 
possible 
4 (Only ex-post) 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante 
decisions 
No Yes 3 (No empirical values available) 
 Monitoring processes No Both 6 (Only the results); 8 (Processes 
only) 
Licensing     
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
Dependent Formally and de 
facto 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of licensing 
process 




3 (Negative experience); 5 (No 
documentation / no experience) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Safety certificate     
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
No Formally and de 
facto 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 




3 (Negative experience); 5 (No 
documentation / no experience) 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
    
 Independence of decision 
maker from incumbent 
No Formally and de 
facto 
independent 
3 (Formally independent) 
 Transparency of the issuing 
process 




3 (Partially) 5 (No documentation) 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
    
 Existence of priority regulations 
for certain RUs 
Yes No  
 Non-discriminatory access to 
services65 
No  Yes 2 (Yes, but no experience); 5 
(“Perceived discrimination” (Not 
shown in the Regulatory Body or 
serial process)) 
 Non-discriminatory marketing 
for all train paths66 
No Yes, unsolicited 6 (Yes, only on request) 
No Yes, no 
restrictions 
5 (Yes, with restrictions) 
                                            
65 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport in terms of the following: “Application for the 
allocation of train paths”, “Right to use allocated train paths”, “Use of points, switches and junctions”, “Train control” and “Other 
information” (IBM Deutschland GmbH and Kirchner, 2011, Annex IV – Weightings and range of answers, pp.8-9). 
66 Marketing for all train paths is measured by two sub-drivers in the 2011 report: higher cells refer to “Recording and communication 
of available train paths” (combining responses related to both freight and passenger transport) and lower cells refer to “Providing 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 





 Framework contracts No Yes  
 Transparent and standard train 
path allocation processes68 
No, no 
documentation 







    
 Coverage of infrastructure 
charging system69 
No Yes  
                                            
relevant supply-line information” (IBM Deutschland GmbH and Kirchner, 2011, Annex IV – Weightings and range of answers, 
p.10) 
67 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Deutschland GmbH and Kirchner, 
2011, Annex IV – Weightings and range of answers, p.9). 
68 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Deutschland GmbH and Kirchner, 
2011, Annex IV – Weightings and range of answers, p.9). 
69 This sub-driver comprises the responses to the following: “Application for the allocation of train paths”, “Right to use allocated train 
paths”, “Use of points, switches and junctions”, “Train control”, “Provision of further information”, “Use of power supply equipment 
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Driver Sub-driver 1 10 Other answers 
 Publication of infrastructure 
charging system70 
No Yes  





                                            
for traction current” and “Compensation for other services to track price” (IBM Deutschland GmbH and Kirchner, 2011, Annex IV – 
Weightings and range of answers, p.10). 
70 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Deutschland GmbH and Kirchner, 
2011, Annex IV – Weightings and range of answers, p.10). 
71 This sub-driver combines the responses related to both freight and passenger transport (IBM Deutschland GmbH and Kirchner, 
2011, Annex IV – Weightings and range of answers, p.10). 




Regulation index scores 
This appendix will present in a tabular form the regulation index scores for 
the 17 European countries in the sample (here listed alphabetically). These 
scores have been extrapolated by the IBM and Kirchner studies (2002, 
2004, 2007 and 2011) and subsequently manipulated. As described in 
Chapter 6, each of the 17 countries in the sample is assessed in respect to 
specific subject macro-areas which, in turn, correspond to the sum of 
drivers and sub-drivers. The scale of the scores for each sub-driver ranges 
from 1 (minimum) to 10 (maximum). 
It is worth recalling that the reports were not published in a yearly basis. 
Therefore, the scores for the gap years is estimated by using an averaging 
approach, calculating the mean between the values connected to two 
consecutive reports. The absence of a sub-driver for a particular year is 
countered by using constant scores, which refer to that sub-driver’s value 
found in the temporally closest report. Lastly, weights have all been aligned 
to those presented in the most recent report (IBM Deutschland GmbH and 
Kirchner, 2011), for which it is assumed that the authors have reached the 
best level of accuracy. 
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Table E.1  Regulation index scores for Austria (2002-2011) 
AUSTRIA 





General Aspects of 
the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 10.00 8.50 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 5.00 3.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of 
user fees 
0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 4.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 6.50 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 3.00 2.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 3.00 2.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 4.25 7.50 7.75 8.00 8.00 8.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
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Table E.2  Regulation index scores for Belgium (2002-2011) 
BELGIUM 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
 
        
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 9.50 9.00 9.50 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 7.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 5.00 6.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 4.50 1.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 10.00 5.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 3.25 5.50 6.13 6.75 8.38 10.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
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Table E.3  Regulation index scores for Denmark (2002-2011) 
DENMARK 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 4.00 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 10.00 5.50 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 6.50 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 5.50 10.00 7.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 7.00 8.50 10.00 7.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.75 9.50 9.75 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 6.20 2.40 6.20 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 8.58 8.42 8.25 8.22 8.19 8.89 9.59 
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Table E.4  Regulation index scores for Finland (2002-2011) 
FINLAND 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.50 5.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 5.50 10.00 6.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 1.00 3.50 6.00 6.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 7.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 3.00 2.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 7.00 8.50 10.00 6.00 2.00 1.75 1.50 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 10.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 9.35 8.70 8.00 7.30 8.00 8.70 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
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Table E.5  Regulation index scores for France (2002-2011) 
FRANCE 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 7.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 1.00 3.50 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 10.00 5.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 10.00 5.50 1.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 7.00 6.00 5.00 3.85 2.70 3.55 4.40 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 3.25 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.50 4.00 4.79 5.58 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 7.10 4.20 7.10 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 5.33 5.04 4.74 5.68 6.61 7.16 7.70 
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Table E.6  Regulation index scores for Germany (2002-2011) 
GERMANY 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 6.00 5.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 8.00 6.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.75 9.50 9.75 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 7.00 5.25 3.50 4.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 10.00 7.50 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.50 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 9.40 8.95 8.50 8.98 9.46 9.54 9.61 
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Table E.7  Regulation index scores for Greece (2002-2011) 
GREECE 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.50 2.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 2.00 1.95 1.90 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.25 5.50 7.75 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
     0.00 0.00   
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 5.50 1.00 4.85 8.70 8.70 8.70 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
TOTAL  1.000 3.14 2.33 1.51 3.79 6.07 6.91 7.74 
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Table E.8  Regulation index scores for Ireland (2002-2011) 
IRELAND 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Safety certificate      0.00 0.00   
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.50 2.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 2.36 2.01 1.66 1.97 2.28 3.77 5.26 
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Table E.9  Regulation index scores for Italy (2002-2011) 
ITALY 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 5.00 4.50 4.00 7.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 5.50 10.00 6.50 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 10.00 9.00 8.00 7.75 7.50 7.75 8.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 6.33 7.17 8.02 8.01 7.99 8.27 8.55 
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Table E.10  Regulation index scores for Luxembourg (2002-2011) 
LUXEMBOURG 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.50 4.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 1.00 3.00 5.00 3.50 2.00 5.10 8.20 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 4.50 8.00 4.50 1.00 2.25 3.50 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 1.00 5.50 10.00 7.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 1.00 5.50 10.00 7.75 5.50 7.75 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
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Table E.11  Regulation index scores for Netherlands (2002-2011) 
NETHERLANDS 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.50 8.00 9.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 5.00 3.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 5.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 8.50 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 7.46 7.58 7.69 8.28 8.86 9.03 9.20 
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Table E.12  Regulation index scores for Norway (2002-2011) 
NORWAY 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 5.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 5.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 10.00 5.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 10.00 5.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 1.00 3.50 6.00 6.00 6.00 3.50 1.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 4.50 8.00 5.75 3.50 5.75 8.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 5.00 3.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
  0.00 0.00 0.00     
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 9.35 8.70 9.35 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 4.29 5.10 5.90 6.87 7.84 8.23 8.63 
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Table E.13  Regulation index scores for Portugal (2002-2011) 
PORTUGAL 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 10.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.50 5.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 5.50 10.00 7.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
     0.00 0.00   
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 7.00 8.50 10.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 4.50 8.00 5.75 3.50 5.75 8.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 5.58 7.38 9.18 9.17 9.17 9.42 9.67 
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Table E.14  Regulation index scores for Spain (2002-2011) 
SPAIN 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.50 1.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 7.00 8.50 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 6.50 3.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 5.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 6.50 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.50 6.00 5.75 5.50 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.50 8.00 8.00 8.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.70 2.40 2.40 2.40 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 1.62 1.70 1.77 4.32 6.87 7.02 7.18 
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Table E.15  Regulation index scores for Sweden (2002-2011) 
SWEDEN 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 4.00 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 10.00 7.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 10.00 7.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 6.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.50 10.00 6.50 3.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 3.00 6.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 1.00 5.50 10.00 7.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 9.00 7.25 5.50 6.75 8.00 9.00 10.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 5.50 1.00 5.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 6.00 8.00 10.00 7.75 5.50 7.75 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 6.20 2.40 6.20 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 6.82 7.41 8.00 8.60 9.20 9.37 9.54 
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Table E.16  Regulation index scores for Switzerland (2002-2011) 
SWITZERLAND 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 1.00 4.00 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 10.00 7.50 5.00 7.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 9.00 9.50 10.00 9.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 1.00 5.50 10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 10.00 8.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 9.00 9.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 10.00 9.70 9.40 9.70 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 10.00 9.00 8.00 8.25 8.50 8.75 9.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 9.19 9.22 9.24 9.17 9.10 9.12 9.13 
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Table E.17  Regulation index scores for United Kingdom (2002-2011) 
UNITED KINGDOM 






of the Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Existence of Regulatory Authority pursuant to 
Art.30 Directive 2001/14/EC (responsible for non-
discriminatory access) 
0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of competence of Regulatory 
Authority 
0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency in case of proceedings/sanctions 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Independence of political influence 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Existence of an annual report 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Object of the 
Regulation 
         
 Inspection of network statement (10 aspects) 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning allocation procedure 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning charging scheme 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Investigations concerning level or structure of user 
fees 
0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring competition 0.022 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Powers of the 
Regulatory 
Authority 
         
 Can/Must start investigations upon request 0.015 10.00 7.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 









 Can/Must start investigations ex officio 0.015 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
 Legally binding character of Regulatory Authority 
decisions 
0.029 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Determination by the regulatory body 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of imposing coercive means 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 
 Possibility of imposing fines 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Possibility of issuing ex-post and/or ex-ante 
decisions 
0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Legal certainty of ex-ante decisions 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Monitoring processes 0.015 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Licensing          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.034 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of licensing process 0.017 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Safety certificate          
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of issue process 0.012 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Homologation of 
Vehicles 
         
 Independence of decision maker from incumbent 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparency of the issuing process 0.059 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Train Path Access 
Conditions 
         
 Existence of priority regulations for certain RUs 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Non-discriminatory access to services 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 









 Non-discriminatory marketing for all train paths 0.041 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.50 9.00 9.50 10.00 
 Transparent mechanism to resolve conflicts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Framework contracts 0.028 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Transparent and standard train path allocation 
processes 
0.039 7.00 8.50 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
Infrastructure 
Charging System 
         
 Coverage of infrastructure charging system 0.110 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Publication of infrastructure charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
 Uniform charging system 0.055 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
TOTAL  1.000 9.81 9.83 9.85 9.78 9.71 9.73 9.75 
 
